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ABSTRACT
This d is s e r ta t io n 's  an h isto rica l ana ly sis  of the po litica l culture 
of the Republic of Venezuela. Emphasis is placed on the relations 
between the nation 's  m ilitary and c iv ilian  se c to rs . For m ost of her 
ex istence a s  a n a tio n -s ta te , Venezuela was governed by individuals 
in military uniform. For the la s t e leven  years (1958 to  the present), 
c iv ilians have ruled V enezuela. U sing an h is to rica l approach with 
minimal a s s is ta n c e  from soc ia l sc ience  methodology, the burden 
assum ed by th is  study is  to  explain the reasons which have allowed 
th is transform ation to  take p lace .
M ilitarism  is a  predominant feature of Latin American p o lit ic s .
It signifies the presence of armed forces in  government. In the nine­
teen th  century , the most striking form of Latin American m ilitarism was
the caudillo—the b o ss , the leader, the m an-on-horseback, the d ic ta to r. 
Venezuela w as no exception . Some of the most powerful d ic tato rs in  
the history of Latin America were a lso  presidents of V enezuela. To 
1958, po litica l power in Venezuela w as controlled by the armed fo rces.
C ivilians in positions of power were not to  be found.
Yet, since 1958 and a t.th is  w riting , c iv ilians are governing 
Venezuela. The country has experienced peaceful po litica l cam paigns, 
honest e lections and parties  in power, a l l  w ithout military intervention.
iv
The three c iv ilian  presidents of Venezuela since 1958, Romulo 
Betancourt, Raul Leoni and Rafael C aldera, have performed adm irably. 
In telligence, wisdom and sobriety have characterized the ir leader­
sh ip . V enezuela's many economic and soc ia l ills  are being challenged 
to  the point where v as t strides in  education, agricu ltu re, housing and 
public health  are being made. But, the most striking feature of con­
temporary Venezuela is  i ts  po litica l stab ility  and absence of military 
officers in  positions of power.
A primary explanation a s  to  why th is  transform ation in the po li­
t ic a l culture of Venezuela transpired  was the role played by the 
Patriotic Junta during 1957 and 1958. The Patriotic Junta w as an 
ad hoc committee organized in  the summer of 1957 for the purpose of 
overthrowing the military d ic ta to r, M arcos Pdrez Jim dnez. It was 
composed of members from V enezuela's four most important po litical 
p arties , Democratic Action, the Democratic Republican Union, the 
Independent Committee for Political and Electoral Organization and 
the Communist Party of V enezuela. By printing and distributing 
clandestine lite ra tu re , the Patrio tic Junta succeeded in  winning wide 
public approval and support for i ts  stand aga inst the unpopular 
d ictatorsh ip  of P^rez Jim enez. On January 21, 1958, the Patriotic 
Junta called  for a general strike which paralyzed the nation . Students 
and other sym pathizers, under the direction of the Patriotic Junta,
v
brought Venezuela to the verge of so c ia l d is in teg ra tio n . W ith no 
a lte rn a tiv e , the country 's armed forces were forced to  demand the 
d ic ta to r 's  resigna tion . The era of M arcos Pdrez Jimdnez ended on 
January 23, 1958.
Throughout the rem ainder of 1958, the Patrio tic Jun ta , due to  
its  popularity and p re s tig e , continued to  ex e rc ise  considerab le 
influence on Venezuelan p o lit ic s . I ts  ca ll for a  po litibal truce among 
indiv idual po litica l p a rtie s  (in the name of c iv ilian  unity) w as endorsed 
openly by the n a tio n 's  en tire  ideo log ical spectrum . The Government 
Junta th a t rep laced  the d ic ta to rsh ip  w as committed to  the cause  of 
dem ocracy and rep resen ta tive  in s titu tio n s . W hen i t  w as th reathened  
by r ig h tis t elem ents in  th e  armed forces desiring  a return to  m ilitary 
ru le , the Patrio tic  Junta used  its  in fluence to  ra lly  m ass support 
behind the shaky provisional governm ent.
The P atrio tic  Junta a lso  exerc ised  a profound im pact on the 
thinking of m ilitary o ffic e rs . The la tte r  rea lized  tha t c iv ilian s  were 
w illing and ab le  to  fight for p o litica l liberty, and , once a tta in ed , 
prepared to  defend i t .  The Patrio tic Junta played a very im portant 
role in  es tab lish in g  c iv ilian  preem inence in  V enezuela.
v i
t
CHAPTER I , .i
A FRAMEWORK 
»
The Republic of Venezuela is  the northernmost country of South •
America. I t is  bounded on the w est by Colombia, on the south by
Brazil, and on the e a s t by G uyana, w hile i ts  northern shores are w ashed
by the Caribbean Sea and the A tlantic Ocean for over 2 ,000  m iles. Its
352,150 square miles of territo ry—about the combined areas of T exas,
Louisiana and A rkansas—make i t  the seventh  la rgest nation in  Latin
America. At the tim e of th is  w riting , the population of Venezuela is  •
approximately nine m illion. This population is  expanding a t  a  ra te  of
over three per cen t a  y ea r, making Venezuela one of the fa s te s t grow-
1
ing countries in  the w orld.
Regarding relig ion , Venezuela is  predominantly Roman C atholic, 
the v a s t majority of i ts  c itizen s professing th is  fa ith . The petroleum 
Industry represen ts the country 's most important economic ac tiv ity . 
Among the nations of the w orld, Venezuela is  the leading petroleum
*The ethnic com position of V enezuela's population is  as follows: 
68% m estizo , 20% w hite , 10% black and 2% Indian; 8% of the to ta l 
population is  foreign born with Ita lian s and Colombians comprising the 
la rg est foreign groups. David Eugene Blank (e d .) , Venezuela Election 
Factbook: December 1. 1968 (Washington /  D . C .:  In stitu te  for the 
Comparative Study of P o litica l System s, 1968), 3 .
/
exporter and second leading producer, outranked only by th e  United
S ta te s . P o litica lly , the Republic of Venezuela operates under a
federal system , th a t is  to  say  the powers of the nation are divided
betw een two ju r isd ic tio n s , s ta te  and n a tio n a l. The federal union
c o n s is ts  of tw enty  s ta te s ,  two federal te rr ito r ie s , a  federal d is tric t
•
and seven ty-tw o  is lan d s  in  the C aribbean S ea , w hich are ca lled
O
federal dependenc ies.
There is  an  old saying among the inhab itan ts of th is  p icturesque 
nation to  the  effec t th a t when God w as creating the un iverse and the 
tim e came for Him to  endow the a rea  w hich is  today  V enezuela, He 
spared  no th ing . This land  w as given m agnificent m ountains, fertile  
p la in s , g reat r iv e rs , trop ica l sh o re s , a  p a rad is iaca l clim ate and , 
ab o v e , a l l ,  g rea t, d iverse  q u an titie s  c f m ineral w ea lth . W hen the 
tim e came to d esignate  inhab itan ts for th is  m ajestic  land , however, 
the Lord a llo tted  Venezuela the d reg s . In th is  w rite r 's  many conver­
sa tio n s w ith  V enezuelans, he found th is  ta le  to  be a  favorite of the 
o lder, uneducated c it iz e n s . I t  w as th e ir  way of explaining why th e ir  
rich ly  endowed country , un til recen tly , had suffered co n sisten tly  
from tyranny and exp lo ita tion .
n
Ib id .; Edwin Lieuwen. Venezuela (London: Oxford U niversity  
P re ss , 1961), 1-11; Leo B. Lott, "V enezuela," in  M artin C . N eedier 
(ed .) ,  P o litica l System s of Latin America (Princeton: D . Van Nostrand, 
1964), 253-254; and U nited N ations S ta tis tic a l Bulletin for Latin 
Am erica. V (Santiago, C hile: Economic Com m ission for Latin America, 
1968), 29, 259-260.
Taken w ithin the Latin American contex t, Venezuela has no mono­
poly on tyranny or explo ita tion . Indeed, to  the scho lar, and even to  the 
"m an -in -th e -s tree t, " po litica l in s tab ility , v io lence, revolutions of 
a l l  v a r ie tie s , d ic tatorsh ips and corruption appear endemic to  Latin 
America. But even w ithin th is  framework, Venezuela has out­
performed its  neighbors south of the border, A glance a t her history 
e s tab lish es  Venezuela a s  the Latin American prototype. Comparatively 
speaking , no other country in  th is  culture area can claim  to  have 
experienced such frequent upheavals, w ith th e ir  attendant bloodshed 
and destruction , a s  those which have characterized  Venezuelan life; 
and no other country can claim  to have experienced d ic ta to ria l rule 
a t the hands of more venal, brutal men than  those who have typified 
Venezuelan leadersh ip .
Modernity has brought little  change to  the Latin American sc e n e . 
Violence a s  a vehicle for p o litica l, so c ia l and economic change has
O
been on the rise  throughout the present decade . In the m id-1950's 
there w as growing optimism for the triumph of dem ocratic c iv ilian  
governm ents, due to  the ouste r of d ictators in  Argentina, Colombia, 
Cuba, Peru and V enezuela, and to  the apparent su ccess of constitu tional
3Peter C alvert, "The Typical Latin American Revolution, " 
In ternational Affairs XI,TIT (January, 1967), 85.
4
regimes in  Brazil, Bolivia and Costa Rica. The problems facing these 
new civ ilian  governments were aw esom e. "Archaic soc ia l system s, 
land tenure , illite racy , rising  expecta tions, in flation , lo ss of 
foreign trade , rapid urbanization, and a h o st of other problems were
, i
a nightmare to anyone trying to  es tab lish  cause and effect re la tio n - 
5
s h ip s ." In th is  decade, the armed forces have unseated , a ltered  
or prevented civ ilian  regimes from taking power in Argentina (1962, 
1963 and 1966), Brazil (1-964 and 1968), Bolivia (1964), Dominican 
Republic (1963), Ecuador (1961, 1963, and 1964), El Salvador (1961), 
Guatemala (1963), Honduras (1963) and Peru (1962). Students of 
Latin America are in  general agreem ent a s  to  why the pendulum has 
swung back again from constitu tionalism  to  d ic ta to rsh ip . Briefly, 
the motives of the armed forces in  assum ing power can be lumped 
under two broad categories: the m ilitary 's desire  to  rule (for w hat­
ever reaso n s), and the poor performance of the civ ilian  governments 
r e p .c e ,*  ‘
4W illiard Foster Barber and Neale Ronning, Internal Security 
and M ilitary Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin 
America (Columbus: Ohio S tate U niversity P ress, 1966), 22. This 
growing optimism w as the main theme in Tad Szulc, Twilight of 
the Tyrants (New York: Henry H olt, 19 59).
®Barber and Ronning, In ternal Security . 25-26 .
6Ib ld . , 22; Kenneth F . Johnson, "C ausal Factors in Latin
American P olitical In s tab ility , " The W estern Political Quarterly
XVII (September, 1964), 432; and J . Fred Rippy, "Latin America's
Postwar Golpes de E s ta d o .11 Inter-American Economic Affairs XIX
(Winter, 1965), 80.
5
Venezuela is  notably absen t from the l is t  of nations th a t have 
undergone military intervention in the presen t decade. Since 1958, 
when her la s t  m ilitary dictator w as overthrown, the Republic of 
Venezuela has experienced dem ocratic, constitu tional, s tab le  
government. In her entire national history of over 150 y ea rs ,
Venezuela has never enjoyed such po litical s tab ility  with the con­
com itant, but hitherto ab sen t, b lessings of individual liberty and 
socio-econom ic ju s tic e . Yet Venezuela has had to  face a l l  the 
problems encountered by her s is te r  repub lics, plus the added handi­
cap of possessing  armed forces w ith the o ld e s t, most aggressive 
tradition of m ilitary in tervention in  a l l  Latin America.
Why has democracy endured in  V enezuela? Perhaps a more pro­
vocative question might be why has democracy endured a t  a ll?  Both 
w ithin and without Latin America, theo rists  long have been grappling 
with th is  is s u e . U ntil recen tly , scholars placed a great dea l of 
cred itab ility  in  the argument tha t democracy could only succeed in
7
By.the term "dem ocracy ,1 the ‘author has reference to  the 
very basic  connotations of th a t oft c ited  term: the right of the 
majority of the population to choose their lead ers , presumably
through free and honest e lections; and the right of the minority 
to continue to  attem pt to  become the m ajority, thus necessita ting  
individual freedom. A sim ilar, accep ted  definition can be found in
Charles O . Porter and Robert J. Alexander, The Struggle for Democracy 
in Latin America (New York: M acm illan, 1961), 2 .
\
a nation which contained a large middle class.®  Post-rWorld War II 
in stab ility  and m ilitary in tervention in  Argentina and Brazil, the two 
Latin American countries possessing  the largest middle c la s s e s ,  have 
shattered  the universal applicab ility  of th is  p o stu la te . These develop­
ments caused  students of the area  to  take a c lo se r, more c ritic a l, look 
a t Latin America's middle c la s s ; and the resu lts  were s ta rtlin g .
In a penetrating e s sa y , Jose Nun revealed th a t Latin America's 
middle secto rs lack the so c ia l, programmatic and ideological cohe- ■ 
sion of the ir counterparts in  the United S ta te s , thus placing them 
a t a disadvantage in  competing with the oligarchy and the working 
c la s s e s , who have definite objectives and more hom ogeneity.
The only group represen tative of the middle secto r which p o sse sse s  
the necessary  so lidarity  to overcome the power of its  com petitors is  
armed fo rces. Therefore, whenever the middle c la s se s  are 
threatened, the m ilitary w ill come to  their re scu e . "In other 
w ords. . . .there are enough reasons to  see  the Latin American middle 
c la s se s  a s  factors of political in s tab ility , whose instrum ent is  the 
army, and whose detonator is  p recisely  the dem ocratic institu tions 
which these  secto rs appear to  support. Nun's findings are strongly
^Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in  Latin America (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), 51; and John J. Johnson, "The Political 
Role of the Latin American Middle S ectors, " The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science CCCLXC (Tuly. 1965), 20-29.
q
JJose Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle C lass 
M ilitary Coup, " Trends in  Social Science Research in Latin America 
(Berkeley: In stitu te  of In ternational S tud ies, 1965), 56. For an 
an a ly sis  of N un's views see  Lyle N . M cAlister, "Recent Research and 
W ritings on the Role of the M ilitary in  Latin America, " Latin American 
Research Review II (Fall, 1966), 16.
supported by Columbia U niversity 's  Charles W agley, who concluded 
th a t, "It i s ,  however, to be noted tha t its  /m iddle c l a s s /  presence 
in  sign ifican t numbers in a nation does not correlate n ecessarily  
with po litica l s ta b ility . "*^
C losely  a llied  to  the belief in  a  relationship  between a large
middle c la s s  and the su ccess  of dem ocracy, and a  view which is
particularly  fashionable today , is  the notion of a d irect relationship
between economic prosperity and dem ocracy, or between poverty and
to ta litarian ism . Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela are the three
w ealth iest countries of Latin America, yet the ir h isto rica l records
of constitu tional in tegrity  are among the poorest.**  Nor is  there
any correlation between m ass misery and communism. As the Cuban
example has dem onstrated, communism can be victorious w ithout the
12active  participation of the m asses . . Yet, in sp ite  of th ese  h is ­
to rica l re a lit ie s , United S tates policy toward Latin America,
10C harles W agley, "The Dilemma of the Latin American Middle 
C la sse s , " Proceedings of the Academy of P o litical Science XXVII 
(May, 1964), 311. For a  different approach to  the idea th a t the u se ­
fulness of the middle c la ss  concept has been exaggerated see 
Richard N. Adams, "Political Power and Social S tructures, " in 
Claudio Veliz (ed .) .  The Politics of Conformity in Latin America 
(London: Oxford U niversity P re s s , 1967) , 16.
**Martin C. N eedier, P o litica l Development in  Latin America: 
In s tab ility . Violence and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random 
House, 1968), 95; and C alvert, "The Typical R evolution ," 92.
12 Boris Goldenburg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America 
(London; George A llen, 1965), 344-345.
* " . 8 
embodied in  the A lliance for P rog ress, is  based  on such p rem ises .
This policy has led one so c ia l s c ie n tis t  to  make a strong c a se  for
the correlation  of econom ic developm ent and so c ia l u n re s t, and to
sco ld  a s  m oralistic  and contrary to h is to ric a l experience th is
coun try 's  b e lie f th a t the so lu tion  to  po litica l in s tab ility  lie s  in
broad developm ent program s. *8
Two other req u is ite s  often prescribed  as  being ind ica tive  of a
su ccessfu l dem ocracy are  a high lev e l of education and un iversa l
suffrage . Concerning the form er, Argentina im m ediately comes to
m ind. W ith a  lite racy  rating  of over n inety-tw o per ce n t, her ed u ca-
14tio n a l le v e l ranks f irs t  in  Latin America. Yet, a t  th is  w riting ,
Argentina i s  governed by a  tig h t m ilitary d ic ta to rsh ip . "Germany
and France have been among the b es t educated  nations of Europe,
ISbut this, by i ts e lf  did not s ta b iliz e  th e ir dem ocracies. " A sim ilar
1 *3Lucian W . Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commence­
ment of R ebellions, " in  Harvey Eckstein  ( e d .) , In ternal War:
Problems and Approaches (New York: Free P re ss , 1964), 157-180.
For more on th is  su b jec t of economic developm ent and democracy 
se e  George I .  B lanksten, "The A spiration for Economic D evelopm ent," 
The Annals of the  American Academy of P o litica l and Social Science 
CCCXXXIV (M arch, 1961), 10-19; and Goldenburg, The Cuban 
Revolution. 344.
14U nited N ations S ta tis tic a l Yearbook. XVIII (New York: S ta tis ­
tic a l  Office of the U nited N ations, 1966), 226-243; and Hubert H erring, 
A H istory of Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 960- 
961.
^S eym our M artin L ipse t. P o litica l Man (Garden City:
D oubleday, 1963), 40.
problem ex is ts  when dealing w ith po litical partic ipation . "As the
events of the 1930's in Germany dem onstrated, " a s se r ts  Seymour
Martin L ipset, "an increase in the level of participation may reflec t
the decline of so c ia l cohesion and the breakdown of the dem ocratic
p ro c e s s .. .  .The belief th a t a  very high level of participation is
16always good for democracy i s  not va lid . "
Due to  the unique position occupied by the armed forces in
Latin America, th is  d iscu ssio n  would be deficient w ithout some
mention of the role of the m ilitary v is -a -v is  dem ocracy. G enerally,
Latin America has been regarded, and not incorrectly so , as an
underdeveloped area of the w orld . This descrip tion  has a lso  been
attributed  to  her m ilitary. U ntil only recen tly , it  w as an  accepted
fact th a t a s  th is  area  became better educated , modem, prosperous
and industria lized , correspondingly the Latin American military
17would become professionalized  and ap o litica l. This hypothesis 
has proved to be only partia lly  correct.
M ost authorities agree th a t since the end of the nineteenth 
century the majority of Latin American o fficers have been recruited
l 6I b id . , 37.
•^James H . M eise l, The Fall of the Re public-M ilitary Revolt 
in France (Ann'Arbor: M ichigan U niversity P ress , 1962), vi; and 
John J . Johnson, "The Latin-American M ilitary as a  Politically  
Competing Group in  T ransitional S o c ie ty ," in  John J . Johnson (e d .) . 
The Role of the M ilitary in  Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: 
Princeton U niversity  P ress , 1962), 107-109.
10
from the middle c la s s , educated in  modern academ ies, and trained in
18the new est techniques of military sc ie n c e . I t has been implied
th a t the in te re s t of the officers would turn increasingly  toward matters
of a military nature—weaponry, s tra tegy , national secu rity , promo-
19tio n s , pensions and retirem ent—and le s s  toward p o litic s . Develop­
m ents, however, have proved the contrary. "Indeed, in recent y ea rs , 
two of the most highly professionalized m ilitary establishm ents in 
Latin America, those of Argentina and Peru, have been very active 
in  p o lit ic s .
In attem pting to  account for th is  re a lity , two key explanations 
have received the most accep tan ce . The f irs t, meshed w ith the 
middle c la ss  concept previously d iscu ssed , acknow ledges th a t the 
only institu tion  represen tative of the middle secto r w ith the necessary  
cohesion to  a c t dec isive ly  is  the armed fo rces . This so c ia l link , 
coupled with the m ilitary 's monopoly on instrum ents of v io lence , has 
caused the armed forces to  become the defender of bourgeois
*®Lyle N, M cAlister, "The M ilita ry ,"  in  John J . Johnson 
(ed .) , Continuity and Change in  Latin America (Stanford: Stanford* 
U niversity P re ss , 1964), 139-145.
19Johnson, "The Latin-American M ilitary as a Competing 
Group in  T ransitional Society," 107-108.
20 Lyle N. M cAlister, "Changing Concepts of the Role of the 
M ilitary in Latin A m erica," The Annals of the  American Academy of 
Po litical and Social Science CCCLX (July, 1965), 90.
dominated nations ag a in st the le ftis t led m asses . A second reason
why 'professionalization had not led to  an  apo litica l m ilitary lie s
to ta lly  within the novel Latin American mold. H isto rica lly , th is
area lacks a trad ition  of a c tiv e , ex ternal w arfare. W ith the cold
w ar, th is trad ition  has been reinforced by the po lic ies of the United
S tates which has assum ed responsib ility  for the safe ty  o f the entire
w estern  hem isphere ag a in st outside ag g resso rs . The Latin American
m ilitary, faced with a void uncommon to  the armed establishm ents
of most coun tries, has turned inward. Thus professionalization
has strengthened contact between the c iv il and m ilitary spheres,
causing Latin Am erica's incongruous, a lb e it modern, armed forces
to  continue functioning in  the ir h isto ric  role of p residen t-m aker. 2 *
22"P ro fessionalism .. . is  no specific  for m ilitarism . "
The point to  be s tre s se d  now is  th is : a l l  of the above mentioned
concep ts—economic prosperity , a large middle c la s s ,  a high level of
education, m ass participation and a  professional m ilitary—cannot
guarantee the su ccess  of dem ocracy. These q u a lities  are sign ifican t
23because they tend to support dem ocratic values and practices; but
2*Jose*Nun, "The M iddle-G lass M ilitary Coup, " in Veliz,
The Politics of Conformity. 71-75.
22M cAlister, "Changing C oncepts, " 90. For a  detailed  ana ly sis  
of th is  problem outside Latin America se e  Samuel Edward Finer, The 
Man on Horseback (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 25-28 .
22L lpset. P o litical Man. 39-.40.
12
none of th e s e , taken jointly  or separate ly , can bring forth the incep­
tion or the m aintenance of dem ocracy.
D ifficult a s  i t  may seem , democracy can  and has survived in 
situations where even these p illars were virtually  n o n -ex isten t. 
Venezuela since 1958 is  a ca se  in  point, for "Venezuela appeared
•to be th e  most unlikely country for a su ccessfu l experiment of th is  
24k in d ," - Although she ranks firs t among the nations of Latin 
America in  per cap ita  income, V enezuela's problem is  not under­
developm ent, but m isdevelopm ent. "This mis development is  con­
nected w ith , and is  the resu lt of, the fact th a t most Latin American
25countries look more modern than  they  ac tually  a r e . " V enezuela's
high c o s t of living and extreme m aldistribution of w ealth  force over
half the population to  live a t bare subsistence  le v e l.2® V enezuela's
middle c la s s  is  estim ated  a t tw elve per cen t of the population, sm all
27even by some Latin American standards. At th is  w riting, over
24Gerhard M asur, Nationalism  in Latin America: D iversity and 
Unity (New York: M acm illan, 1966), 229.
25C alvert, "The Typical R evolution," 92.
2 ®Lieuwen, V enezuela, 14.
2?Argentina, Brazil, C h ile , Mexico and Uruguay have su b stan ­
tia lly  larger middle c la s s e s .  Johnson, "Political Role of the Middle 
Sectors , " 2 1 .
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th irty-four per ce n t of her c itizens are i l l i te ra te , ̂  ® and i t  has been 
only in the la s t  decade th a t the v as t m ajority of her people have 
been allowed to  partic ipate in  her national l i f e .3® The armed 
forces of th is  South American republic have undergone much pro­
fessio n aliza tio n , but th is  has had no v is ib le  effect in  d ep o litica liz -
30ing V enezuela's m ilitary. w I t seem s cred ib le , therefore, th a t "to 
the ex ten t tha t the po litica l subsystem  operates autonom ously, a
po litica l form may p ersis t under conditions normally adverse to  the
31emergence of th a t form. "
W hat is  the m issing ingredient? W hat is  th a t elusive quality 
th a t can create and support a  democracy under conditions seem ingly 
detrim ental to  i ts  surv ival? W hat is  th a t ab s trac t en tity  th a t, if 
ab sen t, can cause  democracy to  fa il in  a country th a t appears to 
p o sse ss  a ll  the attribu tes of the more advanced n a tio n s, such as 
the United S tates or the United Kingdom, in  which democracy has
28U nited N ations S ta tis tic a l Yearbook, XVIII, 81, 742; and 
Herring, Latin America. 960-961.
29Robert J . Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution: 
A Profile of the Regime of Romulo Betancourt (New Brunswick:
Rutgers U niversity P ress, 1964), 51-52 .
3®Philip B. Springer, “Social Sources of Political Behavior of 
Venezuelan M ilitary O fficers: An Exploratory A nalysis,"  Politico 
XXX (June, 1965), 348-355.
3 *Lipset. Po litical M an. 28.
14
endured? H istorians Arthur Preston W hitaker and David C . Jordan
32ca ll i t  the "ideology" of nationalism . Seymour Martin L ipset, the
OO
noted p o litica l-so c io lo g is t, ca lls  it  "cleavage and co n sen su s .
Although the approach of W hitaker and Jordan is  primarily a . 
priori and p o litica l, w hile L ipset’s is  more socio logical and induc­
tiv e , both are e ssen tia lly  in agreem ent on the basic  issu e  of what
makes democracy work. Since "N ationalism .. „is a sp irit, not a
34program; a  tool or instrum ent, not a  p u rp o se ," W hitaker and Jordan
argue th a t i t  is  a concept w hich eludes accep tab le  defin ition . For
th is  reason , the ideology of nationalism  can be understood only a s  a
functioning, mobilizing instrum ent w ithin a given nation. This
ideology, c losely  a sso c ia ted  w ith the national good, is  given
legitim acy in  observance by the various organizations th a t impose
an  identity  upon a nation . "Foremost among th e se  in  tw entieth-
century Latin America are governm ents, trade un ions, the m ilitary .
35and po litica l p a r tie s ."  Using the 1963 Venezuelan elections as  
a specific  example of how the ideology of nationalism  opera tes, 
W hitaker and Jordan concluded:
32Arthur P. W hitaker and David C . Jordan, N ationalism  in 
Contemporary Latin America (New York: Rree P re ss , 1966), 13-16.
33L ipset. Po litical M an. 1-10.
34W hitaker and Jordan, N ationalism , 3.
35Ib ld . . 28.
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Thus, the three la rgest p a rtie s , AD, URD, and COPEI, 
which stood so c lose  together on major is s u e s , polled 
71 per cent of the to ta l popular v o te . For w hat i t  may 
be w orth, th is w as evidence of w idespread agreement 
on the direction of V enezuela 's. . .n a t io n a lis t ic
orien tation . 36
The key to understanding the Lipset approach lies  in  the use
of two w ords, cleavage and co n sen su s. Paradoxically , both of
th e se  q u a lities  must be present w ithin a nation for democracy to
survive. C leavage, in  P rofessor U p se t 's  a n a ly s is , is  tantamount
to  legitim ate conflic t. "Surprising as  i t  may sound, a stab le
democracy req u ires. . . th a t there w ill be struggle over ruling
p o sitio n s, challenge to  parties in  power, and sh ifts  of parties in  
37office . " C leavage a lo n e , how ever, cannot maintain free , repre­
sen tative  government; consensus a lso  must be a ttendan t. In every­
day parlance, consensus might be labeled  the po litical “ru les of 
the game" of a  particular nation . A po litical system  which allows 
for "the peaceful 'p lay ' of power, the adherence by the 'o u ts ' to
decisions made by the ' i n s , ' and the recognition by the 'in s ' of the
38righ ts of the 'o u ts . '"  W ith specific  reference to  Latin America,
L ipset c ite s  the absence of th is  "peaceful play of power" a s  the chief
39cause of Latin American po litica l c h a o s .
36Ib id . . 137.
3^Lipset, P o litical M an. 1.
38Ib id .
39Ib id . . 27-28.
Cleavage and nationalism  long have been present in Venezuela 
and Latin America; the ideology of nationalism  and consensus have 
■ not. As Chapter IV of th is study w ill attem pt to  dem onstrate, the 
ideology of nationalism  and cleavage and consensus have been 
present in Venezuela since 1958—and so  has dem ocracy. The fact 
th a t the po litical culture of the Republic of Venezuela has undergone 
a traum atic transform ation in  the la s t  eleven years is  beyond d ispu te . 
A country th a t had been subjected  to  praetorian rule for v irtually  a ll 
of its  ex istence has suddenly achieved a  v iab le , represen tative form 
of government.
Although W hitaker, Jordan and L ipset are concerned mainly with
the maintenance of democracy and not its  creation , both e ssen tia lly
agree tha t the key to  understanding the inception of th is po litica l
form lie s  in  h isto ry . For the h is to rian s, "a na tion 's  h isto rica l
an im osities, co n flic ts , a sp ira tio n s, and many other factors must be
understood for the nuances of meaning and im plications of a nation-
40a lis t ic  ideology to  become c le a r . ' Surprisingly, L ipset, a 
behaviorist, s tre s se s  the significance of a na tion 's  h isto rica l 
experiences even more than Professors W hitaker and Jordan. A 
nation 's  heritage and characte ristics  may a l l  point to  one kind of 
po litica l form, yet another form may develop "because of a  syndrome
4®Whitaker and Jordan, N ationalism , 26.
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of unique h isto rica l fac to rs . . . . For  L ipset, the very per­
s is ten ce  o r failure of democracy in  any country depends on the  w ill
and ac tions of its  c itizen s in shaping those key h isto rica l events
42which determine i ts  d estiny . It w ill be the primary purpose of 
th is  d isse rta tio n , therefore, to  uncover, narrate and analyze those 
"unique h isto rica l factors" th a t gave birth to  the Venezuelan demo­
cra tic  revolu tion .
Due to  the nature of th is  central them e, the author has decided
to  develop th is d isserta tio n  w ithin a theore tica l framework ca lled
43p o litica l cu ltu re . Two motives prompted the insertion  of th is  very 
recen t epistem ological concept. The firs t is  th a t po litica l cu ltu re , 
by defin ition , em phasizes an orientation which paralle ls the ob jec­
tiv e s  of th is  work. The Patriotic Junta w as a  clandestine ad hoc 
committee organized in  the summer of 1957 for the purpose of plotting 
the  overthrow of the President of Venezuela, the m ilitary d ic ta to r 
Marcos Perez Jimenez (This w ill be the theme of Chapter V .). Once
41LiPset. Po litical M an. 28.
42Ib id . , and Seymour M artin L ipset, "Some Social R equisites 
of Democracy: Economic Development and P olitical L egitim acy ," 
American Political Science Review LIII (M arch, 1959), 103.
43An excellen t e s sa y  rela ting  the neoteric u tility  of the po litica l 
culture concept is  Lucian W . Pye "Political Culture and Political 
Development, " in Lucian W . Pye and Sidney Verba (e d s .) , P o litical 
Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton U niversity  
P re ss , 1965), 3 -26 .
th is goal w as accom plished, however, the Patriotic Junta, enjoying 
immense popularity and p restig e , became a kind of super pressure 
group, with every conceivable c iv ilian  secto r of Venezuelan soc ie ty  
rallying to i ts  banner; even the m ilitary paid i t  homage, a lbe it 
grudgingly. Thus, by a system  of o sm osis, a l l  th ese  diverse groups, 
from poor peasan t to  high-powered business execu tive , from student 
to housew ife, adopted the same po litica l and philosophical position 
a s  the-Patrio tic Junta . Stated briefly , (for i t  w ill be the primary ta sk  
of Chapter VI to  elaborate th is  phenomenon), th is  position w as to  
bring freedom to  Venezuela through dem ocratic, represen tative in s t i ­
tu tions . Because "the focus on po litica l culture ra ther than po litica l 
a ttitudes im plies a  concentration upon the a ttitudes held  by a l l  the
members of a po litica l system  rather than upon the a ttitudes held by
44individuals or particu lar categories of ind iv iduals , " the usefu lness 
of the po litica l culture concept and i ts  re lationship  to  the germane 
accom plishments of the Patriotic Junta are se lf-ev id en t.
The second motive for focusing on po litical culture is  to s tre s s
the difference between th is  concept and the trad itionally  accepted
process of "po litical developm ent." The objection to  political
development is  th a t i t  impedes objective ana lysis on the part of most
♦ ,
^ S id n e y  Verba, "Comparative Political Culture, " in  Pye 
and Verba, P o litical Culture and Po litical Development. 525.
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p o litica l observers because of the sub jec tive , axiom atic presence 
of cultural relativism .^®  The use of po litical development often leads 
to  an  expression of normative preference, which in turn is  usually  
derived from the  observer's  idealized  concept of h is own so c ie ty . A 
sim plification of th is  problem might read: "When I say po litica l 
developm ent, I mean democracy; and when I say  dem ocracy, I mean 
current practice in  the United S tates . P ast and present United 
S tates students of Latin American affairs have been guilty of th is 
conceptual t r a p . In th is  com position the term "dem ocracy" w ill be 
used  so lely  in reference to  a po litica l concept w hich, w ithin the 
lim its allowed by iso la tio n , is  uniquely Venezuelan. ̂
Another co n s is ten t error which th is  d isserta tio n  w ill attem pt to
48
avoid is  the practice of many Northamerlcan scholars of speaking
The dangers inherent in the use  of po litica l development are 
aired  in  Pye, "Political Culture and Political Development, " 11-12,
^ N e e d ie r , Po litical Development in Latin America. 3 .
47Ib id ., 24-25. Complete iso la tion  is  im possib le . The present 
fundamental political forms now in use  in most Latin American coun­
tr ie s  were es tab lish ed  during the early  independence period. This was 
republicanism  a s  expounded in Prance and the United S ta te s .
48Following common usage throughout Latin America, th is  e ssay  
w ill use the term Northamerlcan when referring to  a  c itizen  of the 
United S tates of America, This is  an assum ption, based on cultural 
rather than physical geography, tha t North America begins a t  the Rio 
G rande. Since Canada is  included , North Americans are divided into 
Northamerlcans and C anadians. S tan islav  Andre sk i. Parasitism  and 
Subversion: The Case of Latin America (London: W eindenfeld and 
N icolson, 1966), 1.
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49and writing of Latin America in  terms of continental g en e ra litie s . 
These general works have made a contribution in identifying and 
publicizing various important asp ec ts  of Latin American life , but 
many of the conclusions reached in  stud ies of th is  type are not 
holding up under in ten siv e , s pecialized  exam ination. This is  
especia lly  valid  in the area of civilian-m ilitary ,, re la tions w hich, 
due to  the ubiquitous role of the Venezuelan m ilitary, com prises a ■ 
su b s ta n tia l‘portion of th is  e s sa y . "Professional Latin-A m ericanists, 
how ever, are becoming increasing ly  aware of the d iversity  of the 
area and the quite d is tin c t character of so c ie ties  and in stitu tions 
of i ts  component national s ta te s .  This d isse rta tio n . The 
Venezuelan Experience; 1958 and the Patrio tic Tunta, is  an in ten - ' 
s ive  study of c iv ilian -m ilita ry  re la tions in Venezuela; i t  is  the 
sincere w ish  of the author th a t th is  work, in  some sm all w ay, w ill 
further the trend of encouraging Latin Americanists to  speak "in 
rigorously comparative rather than loosely  generalizing term s. "5*
In a l l  fa irn ess , i t  should be mentioned tha t in  frequent ca ses  
Latin Am ericanists have been forced from specia lized  inquiries due
49 Goldenburg. The Cuban Revolution, 7-8; and W illiam 
Donald Beatty, "Venezuela: A New Era, " Current H istory XXXVEI 
(March, I960), 144-145.
5®McAlister, "Changing C o n c e p ts ," 95.
5 i Ib id .
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52to  the incomplete nature of available d a ta . Behaviorists trained 
in modem techniques of em pirical research  in United S tates and 
European un iversities have been unable to  apply the ir methodology 
to  Latin America. "It requires data  th a t are often meager or non­
ex isten t; th is  is  true of a l l  of Latin America in  the n ineteenth  century 
and most of i t  in  the tw entieth  c e n tu ry .11 ̂  Making the best use  of 
w hat w as av a ila b le , students of Latin American p o lit ic s , to  explain 
why a po litica l system  survived or fa iled , looked a t co n stitu tio n s, 
ju d ic ia l s tru c tu res , parliam entary organizations and other formal 
apparatus of government. I t has been only of la te  th a t scholars 
have turned to  the increasing ly  important infrastructure of p o litic s— 
those  institu tions not d irectly  w ithin the government but which play
a  major role in  the decision  making p rocess—especia lly  po litica l
54parties and pressure g roups. On the s ta tu s  of s ta s io lo g ica l (the 
study of po litica l parties and pressure groups) research  in  Latin
52Scholars of a l l  d isc ip lin es are  agreed on th is  point. Arthur 
Preston W hitaker, N ationalism  in Latin America (G ainesville: 
U niversity  of Florida P re ss , 1962), 6; Pye, "Political Culture and 
P o litica l Development, ” 5; and Martin C . N eedier, Anatomy of a 
Coup d 'e ta t: Ecuador, 1963 (W ashington, D . C .: In stitu te  for 
the. Comparative Study of Political S ystem s, 1964), 40-41.
53
W hitaker. N ationalism  in Latin America. 6 -7 .
®^Verba, "Comparative Political C u ltu re ,” 514.
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America, one leading po litica l sc ie n tis t has labeled achievem ents 
in  th is area a s  "relatively  new" and*methodological accom plish­
m ents, "p rim itive ."5^
Students of Latin America's armed forces a lso  are faced with 
th is  lack of d a ta . Indeed, i t  is  th is  a rea , more than  any other, tha t 
is  the outstanding example of th is  d efic iency . The problem of data 
co llection  on the m ilitary is  compounded by severa l problem s.
Because of the nature and functions of these  in s titu tio n s , they  are 
highly sen sitiv e  to investigation  and tend to  surround the ir ac tiv itie s  
w ith security  re s tr ic tio n s . A lso, in many c a se s  the m ilitary is  unable
to  d istingu ish  between scholarly  research  and esp ionage, especially
56if  the researcher is  a foreigner. F inally, the Latin American m ili­
tary , when and if i t  d ec id e s , is  powerful enough to  sh ie ld  i ts e lf  from
57any kind of serious exam ination.
It is  hoped th a t the above d iscu ssio n  w ill help ju stify  the pur­
pose of th is study to  those who might question the value of a h is ­
to rian 's  writing on a sub ject of such contem poraneity, a sub ject tha t 
has not a tta ined  proper h isto rica l perspective . A ctually, i t  has been ‘
55John D . M artz, "Political Parties in  Colombia and Venezuela: 
C ontrast in  Substance and S ty le , " The W estern Political Quarterly 
XVIII (June, 1965), 318.
C
The author can personally verify the ex istence  of th is s itu a ­
tion .
S7M cAlister, "Recent Research and W riting, " 29 -31 .
23
the Northamerlcan h istorian  rather than  the p o litica l sc ien tis t or
socio log ist who has pioneered inquiry into the problems of Latin
America in  the tw entieth century. Especially  in the area of c iv il-
m ilitary re la tio n s , "historians were f irs t  in the field  and have pro-
58duced the bulk of published s tu d ie s . " Even Latin Americans have 
shown little  in te rest in th is  top ic . This is  due partly  to  the trad i­
tional d is ta s te  of in te llec tu a ls  for m ilitary in s titu tio n s , partly to 
prudence,’ for in  some countries investigation  of the  military can lead
to  anguish , and partly because Latin Americans prefer to expend their
59efforts examining problems over w hich they have some control.
60
So, since there is  "more than one road to  knowledge and perception," 
the h istorian  and h is to rica l methodology stepped in to  the vacuum 
created  when many so c ia l sc ien tis ts  discovered th a t they would be 
unable to use  the tools of their tra d e , and when Latin Americans 
chose to  avoid an unpleasant is s u e .
But there are positive reasons why h isto rians are actively  
engaged in  the study of tw entieth century Latin American po litics 
and the role of the m ilitary . Concerning po litical parties and pressure 
groups, h isto rians can derive much.from published political p ro p ag an d a - 
clandestine or o therw ise—reso lu tions, platforms and sp eech es, news ..
. 58Ib ld . , 39.
" i b i d . . 29.
60I b id . . 33.
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reports and ed itorial opinion. This work has re lied  heavily upon such 
sou rces,. As for the m ilitary, Latin American serv ice jou rna ls , upon 
which th is  study has based many of its  conclusions, can be par­
ticu larly  rewarding. On th is  m atter, Professor Lyle M cAlister, a 
'leading  expert on the Latin American m ilitary, has said:
They M ilita ry  service journals7  frequently include a rtic les  
and ed itorials expressing the armed fo rces' concept of the ir 
m ission and proper role w ithin the general so c ie ty , .  . .Where 
m aterials do not express explicitly  m ilitary attitudes on non­
professional m atters, in te lligen t inference or system atic 
content an a ly sis  may define them . Furthermore, the d istribu­
tion  of contents a s  between purely techn ica l or professional 
p ieces on one hand and item s concerned w ith national 
problems on the other provide a gross indication of what the 
armed forces regard a s  im portant. F inally , service journals 
often contain valuable biographical data on individual 
officers and h isto rica l a r tic le s  which reveal how the military 
view s i ts  own p a s t . ®1
Another reason justify ing  the presence of the h istorian  in  th is  a rea ,
in  addition to the availab ility  of trad itional sources of inform ation,
is  tha t the  h istorian  is  more catholic in  his in te re s t and le s s  bound
c o
by in te llec tu a l s ty le s . And fina lly , "while quantification  can be
m ost u se fu l. . particularly  in the present s ta tis t ic a l century, the
conventionally em pirical and in tu itive methods of the h isto rian  are
63s t i l l  ind ispensab le . . . . "
61Ib id .
62I b id . . 29.
®2W hitaker, N ationalism  in  Latin America. 7.
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There are probably o ther, more in ternationally  subjective 
reasons why h istorians are concerned with tw entieth  century Latin 
America. Scholars of a l l  d isc ip lin es are in  unanimous agreem ent 
th a t today Ib e ria 's  former p o ssessio n s in  the W estern Hemisphere 
are in  a  s ta te  of alm ost constan t revolution. There are several paths 
th e se  n a tio n a lis tic  convulsions may ta k e . There is  the fa sc is t 
example s e t by Juan Peron in  Argentina; there is  the  communist 
example s e t by Fidel C astro in Cuba; and there is  the dem ocratic, 
peacefu l, evolutionary, effective example se t by Romulo Betancourt, 
Raul Leoni and Rafael Caldera in V enezuela. Venezuela has proved 
th a t democracy can cope with the ta sk  of solving the problems of 
th is  area of the w orld.
N everthe less, th is  author in tends the Venezuelan example to  
be ju s t th a t, an exam ple. I t is  presumptuous of anyone to attem pt 
to  lecture a nation on how i t  should manage i ts  po litica l a ffa irs . It 
is  only through the growth of indigenous reform movements th a t any 
variety  of po litica l democracy can be es tab lish ed  solid ly  in  Latin 
America. The pattern of what happened in  Venezuela has not been 
repeated  and probably cannot be repeated  elsew here in  Latin America. 
I t  w as a Venezuelan experience. . -
CHAPTER H
LATIN AMERICA'S SOLDIERS AS POLITICIANS
Students who study the rela tionsh ip  between the civ ilian  and 
military sec to rs  of Latin American soc ie ty  never cease  to  be im pressed 
by one singular fact: w ith no exception! every Latin American nation 
has experienced m ilitarism . As used  by Latin A m ericanists, the term 
m ilitarism has acquired sp ec ia l m eaning. I t refers to  a country 's 
armed fo rces , or a part of them , taking ac tion  ag a in st an existing 
government and assum ing po litica l power.'*' By th is defin ition , 
m ilitarism  is  not new to  Latin America; armed institu tions of most of
9
these countries have been ruling the ir respective  nations for years .
■^Victor Alba, "The Stages of M ilitarism  in  Latin America, " 
Johnson, The Role of the M ilitary in  Underdeveloped C ountries. 
165; and Henry Anthony C hristopher, "The Political Behavior of 
the M ilitary in Latin America" (Evanston: unpublished Ph.D . 
d isse rta tio n , Northwestern U niversity , .1964), 140-142,
^Venezuela is  a premier example of th is  phenomenon. 
Chapter III of th is d isserta tion  gives a brief chronological survey 
of Venezuela in which the preponderance of her armed forces 
throughout her h istory  w ill be dem onstrated.
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W hat is  new , however, is  th a t through general usage scholars have
3
accepted  m ilitarism  as  the tag  for th is  Latin American rea lity .
D espite a long tradition  of po litica lized  armed fo rces, the
study of the role of the m ilitary in Latin America, by w hatever nam e,
has only recently  been accep ted  a s  a legitim ate and important
4
problem suscep tib le  to  scholarly  a n a ly s is . "It is  more than in te r­
e s tin g , i t  is  rather remarkable th a t Latin Am ericanists concerned 
w ith a region where arm ies have played pre-em inent ro les for a 
hundred and fifty  years should be so  dilatory in  exploiting th is  
trend . Of cou rse , th is  does not mean th a t the ex trapo litical role 
of the Latin American m ilitary was to ta lly  ignored before 1960 and the
3Although m ilitarism  has received  the endorsem ent of Latin 
A m ericanists (due mostly to  the lack of a  more su itab le  term ), its  
usage has not been w ithout sign ifican t critic ism . O rdinarily, one 
might think of m ilitarism  a s  connoting a system  which glorifies the 
m ilitary way of life , or a soc ie ty  organized along military lin es ; th is  
is  not applicable to  Latin America where the primary feature of the 
m ilitary has been i ts  nonmilitary g o a ls . Praetorianism or predatory 
m ilitarism  have been suggested  a s  substitu te  te rm s, but m ilitarism  
rem ains the most popular. Alfred Vagts, A H istory of M ilitarism  
(New York: Free P re ss , 1967), 11-13; and Lyle N. M cAlister, "The 
M ilitary Government: Arms and Politics in  Latin America-. Edwin 
L ieuw en," H ispanic American H istorical Review XL (November. 1960), 
588 .
4
M cAlister, "Recent Research and W ritin g ," 6.
^M cAlister, "The M ilitary and Government, " 584. For purposes 
of c larity , the m ilitary includes the regular arm ies, n av ies , a ir forces 
and nationally  controlled constabularies of the severa l n a tions. 
M cAlister, "Changing C oncepts of the Role of the M ilitary in  Latin 




appearance of Edwin Lieuwen's Arms and Politics in  Latin America.
General h isto ries  of the area  usually  had something to say on the
sub jec t, but most of th is  m aterial is  unsatisfactory  for several
reaso n s. In the firs t p lace, comments on the armed forces of Latin
America are usually  inc iden tal or peripheral to the main th em e .7
Second, th ese  accounts are descrip tive and narrative rather than
analy tica l or explanatory. F inally, a tten tion  is  directed toward the
more obvious m anifestations of m ilitary ac tion , such as  the "man on
horseback" or ctolpe de estado  (Spanish for coup d 'e ta t) , in stead  of
the more subtle corporate, environmental m otivations causing  military
in tervention. "The po litica l role of the m ilitary w as acknowledged,
described-, and deplored. . . . Under these  conditions, i t  is  hardly
8surprising th a t no 'important books' appeared. "
' This flurry of contemporary in te re s t in  the role of the Latin 
American m ilitary did not develop arb itrarily . Several influences 
contributed to its  current vogue. The tw entieth cen tury 's th ree world 
w ars, two ho t and one co ld , have shown th a t armed institu tions are
g
Edwin Lieuwen. Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1960). I t was th is  pioneer work and i ts  revela­
tions concerning the Latin American m ilitary tha t revealed to  scholars 
the research  opportunities availab le  in  th is  a rea . Professor Lyle N. 
McAlister has labeled  th is  work, "a consequential book." Ib id . . 587.
7M cAlister, "The M ilitary and Government, " 584.
8M cAlister, "Recent Research and W riting, " 5 -6 .
much more than simple combat instrum ents. "They are so c ia l sub­
system s w ith a life and rhythm of the ir own which transcend military 
operations and which in te rac t in  an infin ity  of complex ways with 
c iv il so c ie ty . " The appearance of a  Communist regime in  the 
Caribbean w as another factor creating th is  new aw areness of Latin 
America and her m ilitary. Recent Cuban h istory  has confirmed the 
fac t th a t th is  area of the globe is  destined  to  assum e a key role in 
the Cold War and th a t the armed forces of th ese  nations w ill deter­
mine largely how th is  role w ill be played. Ideally , the military can 
a c t a s  a defense ag a in st external hem ispheric aggression  and internal 
insurgency, while its  techn ica l and lo g is tica l sk ills  can bring much 
desired  economic development and m o d e rn iz a t io n .H o w e v e r ,  in 
re a lity , Latin America1 s armed forces continue to devote more time
to  po litics and le s s  to  those specific  functions for which ostensib ly
11they were created. W ithin th is realiza tion  lie s  the profundity of 
m ilitarism .
Since 1960, literature on the sub jec t of the Latin American 
m ilitary has not been characterized by general agreement; rather
g
M cAlister, "The M ilitary and Government," 582-583.
■^McAlister, "Recent Research and W riting, " 6 -7 .
■^Between 1930 and 1965, there were 105 su ccessfu l golpes de 
estad o . There is  no accurate manner of determining how many unsuc­
ce ssfu l golpes were attem pted. Barber and Ronning, In ternal Security 
and M ilitary Power. 249-263*
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diverse in terpretations are  the ru le . Yet, there are  some areas
where a consensus e x is ts , One area of general agreement is  th a t
the  genesis of Latin American m ilitarism  can be traced  d irectly  to
her colonial experience. Another is  the effect of the independence
struggle in  fostering the military heritage of the colonial epoch.
"It would be an error of the f irs t m agnitude, in  any attem pt to
understand the politics of the  Latin American rep u b lic s , to overlook
the powerful influences exerted on them by three centuries of 
12colonial ru le . '  From the very beginning, the six teen th  century
Spaniards who conquered and se ttled  the new world were men imbued 1
13with a strong m ilitary heritag e . The Spain th a t colonized the 
w estern  hem isphere w as the Spain of the reconqu ista . For nearly 
800 y ea rs , between 711 and 1492, C hristians and Moors kept Spain 
in  a continual s ta te  of w ar. Because of th is ,  Spanish m ilitary men 
assum ed an im portance, the consequences of which resu lted  in  the 
tran sfe r of th is  m artial m ystique to the  Spanish American Empire. The 
various represen tatives of the  Spanish Crown who ruled the empire
12M artin C . N eedier, Latin American Politics in  Perspective 
(Princeton: D. Van N ostrand, 1962), 6.
\ o
This background d iscu ssio n  of m ilitarism is  not relevant to 
the Portuguese empire in  America (Brazil). This does not mean th a t 
Brazil has been free of m ilitarism , i t  has not. B razil's m ilitary 
trad ition  grew out of the uncertain ties arising  from the abolition of 
slavery  in 1888 and the overthrow of the empire in  1889. John J. 
Johnson, The M ilitary and Society in Latin America (Stanford:
Stanford U niversity P re ss , 1964), 177-224.
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po ssessed  both po litica l and military re sp o n sib ilitie s . This w as
true of the powerful viceroys and cap ta in s-g en era l, as  w ell as of
the intendants and other subordinate o ffic ia ls . ^  "In the colonies
po litica l authority and m ilitary command were joined; today m ost of
the Latin American republics have s t i l l  to  create a military serv ice
15separated  from p o lit ic s ."
Spaniards in uniform a lso  enjoyed specia l privileges w hich se t
them apart from other men. They p o sse sse d  the fuero m ilitar and
cedulas de preem inencias. The fuero m ilitar was a body of law s which
gave the m ilitary the right to  exerc ise  leg a l jurisd ic tion  over th e ir own
membership. When so ld iers found them selves in legal d ifficu ltie s ,
they would invoke the fuero m ilitar in  order to appear before a military
1 ficourt and receive preferential treatm ent. The cedulas de preem inencia 
were economic in  scope. Soldiers were exempt from paying tax es  and 
le v ie s , immune from debtors prison, and the ir arm s, horses and cloth­
ing could not be confiscated  for payment of debts un less the royal 
treasury  w as the cred ito r. These immunities even followed members 
of the m ilitary in to  retirem ent. The effec t of these  priv ileges and
14C hristopher, "The Political Behavior of the M ilitary, " 2 -18 .
15N eedier, Po litics in  P erspec tive . 8.
16 For a  scholarly  examination of the fuero m ilitar see Lyle N. 
M cAlister, The "Fuero M ilita r" in New Spain (G ainesville: U niversity 
of Florida P re ss , 1959).
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exemptions was th a t of placing members of the armed forces above 
the la w .1^
Spain d iscree tly  avoided developm ents tha t might create a
m ilitary complex among its  colonial su b jec ts , but by 1760, a weakened
Spain, in an attem pt to  conserve funds and manpower, resorted to  the
18creation  of colonial m ilitia un its . This m ilitary build-up was 
acce lera ted  by the reversa ls of the Seven Years' W ar and was 
accom panied by the extension of the fuero m ilitar and cedulas de 
preem inencias to  the officers and men of the  m ilitia . "As w as the 
case  w ith the armed forces in  Spain, the members of the  military 
establishm ent in  the American co lon ies, by virtue of the ir m ilitary
19
affilia tion  and immunities!,regarded them selves as  a superior c l a s s .”
By 1810 and the beginning of the Latin American wars of inde­
pendence, fifty years had p assed  since colonial su b jec ts  were allow ed 
to  enter active m ilitary partic ipation . Speaking in h is to rica l term s, 
th is  is  not an insurmountable amount of tim e, and w hatever military 
trad ition  ex isted  might have been erased  had the struggle for inde­
pendence been brief. But i t  w as not b rie f . Led by the  officers and 
men of the colonial m ilitia , the patrio t w ars have been described thusly:
17Christopher, "The P o litical Behavior of the M ilitary , " 18-20.
18John J. Johnson, "The Latin-American M ilitary a s  a Competing 
Group in  T ransitional Society, " 94.
^ C h ris to p h e r, "The P o litica l Behavior of the M ilitary , " 41.
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/T h e y ?  dragged on for fifteen  years in  the Spanish  co lon ies 
a s  arm ies fought w ith constancy  a g a in s t prim itive fo rces , 
ag a in s t natu re , and ag a in s t primitive men. By the time they  
were term inated , a  generation  had grown up inured to  
b ru tality  and to  the reso lu tion  of is s u e s  b y 're so rt to  arms. . . . 
The destiny  of America had become su b jec tiv e—m ilitary 
lo y a ltie s  had become d is tin c t from c iv ic  lo y a l t ie s .20
W hen the struggle for independence w as com pleted, the newly
crea ted  Latin American republics w ere d ev as ta ted , p h y sica lly , e c o -
21nom ically and p o litic a lly . W ith the  removal of tim e-honored 
Iberian in s titu tio n s , chaos ru led . U ntil independence, a l l  power 
em anated from the crown w ith au thoritarian ism  and personalism  the
CO
chief ch a rac te ris tic s  of Spanish  co lon ial adm in istra tion . This w as 
now to be rep laced  by slogans of lib e rty , equality  and fra tern ity  and 
doctrines of co nstitu tiona lism , federalism  and cen tra lism . But slogans 
and constitu tions could not f i l l  the vacuum crea ted  by independence; 
350 years of to ta lita rian  rule w as not to be erad ica ted  w ith the stroke 
of a  pen . "The failure to  su b stitu te  a un iversa lly  accep ted  symbol of
oq
authority  w as the g rea t failure of the  independence movement.
20Johnson, "The Latin-American M ilitary a s  a  Competing Group 
in  T ransitional S ocie ty , " 9 7 .
21 Porter and A lexander. The Struggle for D em ocracy. 13-15.
22A scholarly  account of th e  authoritarianism  and personalism  
w hich personified  Spanish co lon ial adm inistration  and th e  alm ost 
com plete lack  of popular partic ipation  in the p o litica l p rocess can 
be found in  R. A. Gomez, Government and P o litics  in  Latin America 
(New York: Random H ouse, 1965), 15-19 .
Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to  Latin America (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1966), 67-68 .
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C ivilians in the immediate post war y e a rs , led by Latin
America's in te lle c tu a ls , attem pted to guide the po litica l life of the
young repub lics . As students' of the Enlightment, the ir commitment
to  liberty  encouraged them to  look to the French Revolution and the
su ccessfu l North American movement for independence for p o litica l
id e a s . In te llec tuals  c rea ted  beautifully  w ritten constitu tional
ch a rte rs , but these  documents "failed to  harmonize theory and 
1 24p rac tice . Independence had abolished  the monarchy but retained 
what is  natural to  a  monarchy— centralism , authoritarianism  and 
a ris to c racy .^ 5 This occurred partly  because these  tra its  were a way 
of life for over three centuries and could not be abrogated immediately 
and partly  because of the ideology of the struggle for independence. 
These wars were not so c ia l revolu tions. The socio-econom ic ca s te  
system  inherited  from Spain rem ained afte r po litica l em ancipation;
the wars of independence were conservative movements led largely
2 6by conservatives.
24Johnson, "The Latin-American M ilitary a s  Competing Group 
in T ransitional Society , " 9 5 .
25Tannenbaum, Ten Keys, 148.
O C
uGeorge I .  B lanksten, "R evolutions," in  Harold Eugene Davis 
(ed.) ,  Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald 
P ress), 119-121; and Edwin Lieuwen, "The M ilitary: A Revolutionary 
Force, 11 Annals of the American Academy of Politica l and Social 
Science CCCXXXIV (M arch, 1961), 31.
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Among the conservative elem ents, the most powerful group was 
the landed aris tocracy . Its  primary motive in supporting the inde­
pendence movement was to end the economic m ercantilism  of Spaint
in  favor of a more libera l system . When th e  civ ilian  in te llec tu a ls
and the ir w ell in tended documents failed to  bring about the stab ility
so necessary  for economic profit, and when these  th eo ris ts  and their
charters began tampering with so c ia l ega litarian  id e a s , the landed*
elite  turned to  the one institu tion  s t i l l  in ta c t from the colonial period
and the wars of em ancipation th a t could provide stab ility  and preserve
27the so c ia l s ta tu s  quo—the m ilitary .
The C atholic Church followed the example of the landed 
aris tocracy . The Church supported the Spanish cause as  long as 
victory seemed possib le ; but when Spain 's defeat became inev itab le ,
i .
she aligned herse lf on the side of the landed e lite , who represented
28orthodox C atholicism . When most of the constitu tions separated 
church and s ta te  and the in te llec tu a l leadership  began to  speak in 
uncomforting an ti-c le r ic a l jargon, the Church a lso  turned to  the m ili­
ta ry . In return for preserving her privileges and im m unities, the 
Church gave the m ilitary her support as the moral p illar of Latin 
America. In return for s tab ility  and protection for the  ex isting  cas te
27Johnson, "The Latin-American M ilitary a s  a  Competing Group 
in Transitional S o c ie ty ,"  95-96 .
28Ibid.
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system , the landed aristocracy  gave the m ilitary its  substan tia l 
economic backing.
The armed forces did not have to  accep t the overtures of the 
aristocracy  and the church, but they  d id . There were several reasons 
for th is . With an end to  the fighting, the m ilitary began to contem­
plate th e ir role in  the struggle for independence and the ir place in a 
peace-tim e so c ie ty . The armed in stitu tions of the newly created
republics began to  picture them selves as  suffering hardsh ips, depri-
29vation and exposure, while c iv ilians argued over the sp o ils . Had
not the m ilitary given Latin America i ts  freedom? W as i t  not only
right but a lso  n ecessary  th a t the m ilitary have a major voice in
determining forms of national organization and in  the making of public
policy? C ivilian po litic ians had the ir chance and had failed  to  create
viable po litica l system s. "The national arm ies, therefore, moved
into a power vacuum and proceeded to  exerc ise the po litical authority
30which they believed was inherent in  the ir s ta tu s  and m ission . . . . "
The stab ility  of any po litica l system  is  dependent on its  leg i­
tim acy, "the capacity  of the system  to  engender and maintain the
be lie f th a t the existing  po litica l in stitu tions are the most appropriate
31ones for so c ie ty . " The w ars of independence destroyed legitim ate
29Ib id .,  98.
29M cAlister, "Changing C o n c ep ts ," 86.
d ^ lip s e t. Political; M an. 64.
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32politica l power without providing an equally legitim ate su b stitu te .
The gap between legal norm and so c ia l reality  could not be bridged
by the new republican co n stitu tio n s. "Under conditions of th is
'legitim acy vacuum ,1 therefore, a l l  th a t remained was reliance on naked 
.,33force. . . .
Since power depended upon the po litica l use  of force, and the 
m ilitary controlled the instrum ents of fo rce, the armed fo rc e s , by 
assum ing po litica l power, resolved Latin America's c ris is  of leg iti­
m acy .34 This w as, and to  a great ex ten t rem ains today, the "super- 
m ission" of the  m ilitary. As defined by a  Brazilian m ilita ris t, super­
m ission is  "the undeniable right of the armed forces to depose the 
legitim ate pow ers. . . when the m ilitary fee ls th a t its  honor requires 
th a t th is  be done, or judges it  necessary  and convenient for the good 
of the country. "33 The fru its  of the m ilitary 's superm ission caused  
the n ineteenth  century to  spawn a  generation of armed p o litic ian s .
They and their successo rs were to  hold sw ay in most 
countries throughout the century carrying on in  the normal 
m ilitary-authoritarian  tradition inherited from the colonial 
era and filling the void of experienced c iv ilian  leadersh ip .
32Tannenbaum, Ten Keys, 146. For an example o f the conse­
quences of a legitim acy vacuum outside Latin America see Hans Kohn, 
Making of the Modem French Mind (Princeton: D . Van N ostrand, 1955).
33N eedier, Po litical Development in Latin America. 25-26.
34C alvert, "The Typical Revolution," 88.
^.Q uoted in Charles W . Simmons, "The Rise of the Brazilian 
M ilitary C la ss : 1870-1890," Mid-America XXXIX (October. 195^, 237.
3®Frank A. Knapp, Jr. , "The Meaning of M ilitarism  in  Latin 
A m erica.11 Foreign Service Toumal DCL (December. 1964), 20.
The most striking expression  of nineteenth century Latin 
American militarism w as the cau d illo . But to  refer to nineteenth 
century caudillism  as  a form of what tw entieth century scholars have ‘ 
labeled m ilitarism is  to in terpret the la tte r in  its  broadest sen se .
Three factors have apparently caused  Latin American literature to  refer 
to  caudillism  a s  a phase of m ilitarism . F irst, the rationale for po liti­
ca l intervention is  the sam e, the "superm ission" of the armed fo rces. 
The m ilitary in  Latin America, even today, view them selves a s  the 
guardian of the nation . Following logically  from th is self-ordained 
image is  the conviction th a t they stand outside and above the co n s ti­
tution and the law . Second, in  both centuries the so ld ier has had a 
poor opinion.of c iv ilian  leadersh ip . The m ilita ry 's image of e lec ted  
po litic ians is  characterized  by "feck lessn ess , inep titude, immorality, 
and even betrayal. The third feature common to the caudillo and 
the tw entieth  century m ilita ris t is. the ir control of the means of 
v io lence . Both have had sizab le  arm ies a t their command.^®
Recent scholarsh ip , however, has tended to  differentiate between 
the nineteenth century caudillo and h is tw entieth century cou sin . 
Caudillism  w as born of the profound disorder which followed the
^ M c A lis te r ,  "The M ilitary,"  153.
38johnson, "The Latin-American M ilitary a s  a Competing Group 
in T ransitional S o c ie ty ," 1 0 2 -1 0 3 .
39Ib id .; Robert L. Gilmore, Caudillism  and M ilitarism  in 
V enezuela, 1810-1910 (Athens: Ohio University P re ss , 1964), 6-7;  
and Olive Holm es, "Army Challenge in  Latin A m erica.11 Foreign 
Policy Reports XXV (November 14; 1959), 166.
struggle for independence. I t w as a po litical process in  which 
violence was an e sse n tia l elem ent. I t was anarch ic , se lf-genera ting , 
in stinc tive ly  asp iran t to  the vanished role of the monarchy. Caudillism  
w as highly personal; indeed , i t  has been labeled "the union of 
personalism  and violence for the conquest of power. "^° Personalism  
as personified by the crown in the colonial e ra , a  strong characte ristic  
of H ispanic culture, w as transferred to  the caudillo  after independence. 
A caudillo w as usually  a member of h is  na tion 's  m ilitary estab lishm ent, 
but th is  w as not a necessary , prerequisite; many were simply armed 
ch ie fta in s . Caudillism  w as parochial; the caudillo  was a  lo ca l leader 
concerned w ith local m atters only. H is fo rces, untrained and und isci­
plined, were little  more than  unruly mobs. Through h is a llian ce  with the
aris to cracy , the caudillo  was .committed to an agricultural-com m ercial
41economy and the order necessary  for i ts  developm ent. Caudillism
functioned within an unsoph is tica ted , illite ra te , im poverished soc ie ty ,
where the great majority knew little  and cared le s s  about government 
42and p o lit ic s . The mode of po litica l intervention used  by the caudillo 
was the pronunciam iento. A pronunciamiento transpired when an armed
40Gilmore, Caudillism  and M ilitarism  in  V enezuela. 7 , 47,
^  Johns on, "The Latin-American M ilitary a s  a  Competing Force 
in Transitional Society, " 101-104.
42Knapp, "The Meaning of M ilita rism ," 21.
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leader ."pronounced" aga in st the ex isting  government'. A c la sh  ensued,
43with the caudillo usually  replacing a he lp less c iv ilian  regim e.
Twentieth century m ilitarism bears scan t resem blance to
caudillism . While the caudillo  w as bom of the profound disorder
which followed independence, modem m ilitarism  has emerged from a
44socie ty  seeking balance and rapid restructuring . The caudillo  was 
provincial, but to d ay 's  m ilitary officer, a  member o f a modem army 
equipped with costly  armaments and backed by the resources of the 
s ta te , is  national in  outlook.' In the la s t century armies resem bled 
mobs; in the present century they are highly pro fessionalized . This 
p rofessionalization  has been achieved through the use  of officers and 
military m issions from other countries and greater em phasis on techn ica l 
training in m ilitary academ ies. "In fac t, the techn ical sk ills  of m ili­
tary  personnel have made them the bearers of modernity a s  repre­
sented  by industria liza tion . These developments term inated the 
agricultural-com m ercial a lliance  m aintained by the caudillo  and the 
landed e lite  in  the  nineteenth cen tu ry .
Other factors contributed to the fa ll of the "triple a llian ce"  
(aristocracy , church and military) th a t ruled Latin America in  its  firs t
43C alvert, "The Typical R evolution ," 90,
^ G ilm o re , Caudillism  and M ilitarism  in V enezuela. 9 .
45Johnson, "The Latin-American M ilitary a s  a Competing Force 
in  Transitional Society , " 105-107, 121.
century of independence. Industrialization  brought a source of w ealth
other than land to Latin America. As the parvenus rose in p restige/
the so c ia l monopoly of the propertied e lite  deteriorated . By its  very
nature, professionalization caused the military officer to identify with
industrialism  and the growing middle c la ss  tha t accompanied its  
46expansion. Another reason for th is  new alignment between the 
military and the middle sectors was th a t professionalism  led to 
changes in the com position of the m ilitary. W ith physical and edu­
cational qualifications replacing birth a s  the chief prerequisite for
entry into a military academ y, members of the middle c la ss  soon domi-
47nated the officer corps of Latin America's armed fo rces.
Just a s  modernization caused-the po litica l impotence of the 
aris tocracy , so did modernity check the po litical power of the Church. 
Nationalism  came to  Latin America in  the tw entieth  century. As in 
Europe centuries ea rlie r, i t  caused the in ternational Roman Church to
take a back se a t to  the n a tio n a lis t ferment which reflected  the d esires
48of these  countries to  a tta in  greater s ta tu s  in  the world. N ationalism
46I b id . . 105.
4^Nun, "The M iddle-C lass M ilitary C oup," 71-72.
48John J, Johnson, "The New Latin American N ationalism , " 
Yale Review UV (Winter. 1965). 187-188.
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"is undoubtedly the major ideology in Latin America today, and 
the military is  c losely  identified  with i t .
From the military of Latin America has come both the symbol and 
advocate of nationalism . For the m asses , the armed forces provide a 
symbol of national pride and power inherent in n a tio n a lis m .^  Economi­
ca lly , nationalism  in Latin America is committed to  term inating eco­
nomic dependence upon the more prosperous nations cf the globe. The 
military have made the m oderinzation of socie ty  their f irs t goal. Their 
control of organized fo rce , the ir technocratic  train ing , and their 
national pride have caused  Latin American armed forces to  have a
stra teg ic  in te re s t in the economic advancem ent of the ir respective 
51countries. Institu tional s e lf- in te re s t and national progress have 
replaced the personal, parochial cau d illo .
As the vehicle for po litica l intervention tw entieth century m ili­
tarism  has substitu ted  the more soph istica ted  golpe de estado  for the
52le s s  subtle pronunciamiento of the nineteenth  century. The golpe
^R o b e rt J . Alexander Organized Labor in  Latin America (New 
York: Free P ress , 1965), 6.
50John J. Johnson, "The New Latin American N ationalism ," 195,
5^W hitaker and Jordan, N ationalism . 24-25.
third method u tilized  by the military to a tta in  power is  the 
cu arte lazo . or barracks rev o lt. A cuartelazo occurs when a barracks 
or a military unit of reasonable facsim ile declares ag a in st the existing  
government. I t is  usually  successfu l if  enough other units join in  the 
rebellion in  order to tip  the sca le s  of power. Though cuartelazos have 
occurred in  both cen tu ries, i ts  m anifestations are more c lose ly  akin to 
the pronunciamiento than to  the golpe de e s tad o . C alvert, "The Typical 
Revolution," 90-91.
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depends on speed . The president and his entourage are se ized  and
hustled  out of the country. Sim ultaneously, the military announces
to  the nation a previously prepared campaign of v ilification  and ju s ti-  
53fica tion . The decision  for or ag a in st execution of a golpe de
estado is  usually  determined by a jo in t meeting of the heads of
various military branches, army, navy, a ir force and, depending on
the country involved, the national g u a r d .^  M odernization of the
armed institu tions of Latin America has brought an  end to  m ilitary-
po litica l hegemony of the arm y.^5
Just a s  the method of intervention has been updated, so  has the
product. The military junta has replaced the heroic leader to  whom the
armed forces h isto rically  surrendered the ir claim s to  power.
Above a ll e ls e , the jun ta , which ordinarily contains repre­
sen ta tiv es  of each branch of the se rv ic e s , suggests tha t 
a s  in stitu tionaliza tion  takes p lace , loyalty of man to  man 
w ill be slowly transformed into organic so lidarity  and a 
co llec tiv is t concept, reflecting the growth of a mass con­
sc io u sn ess , w ill be substitu ted  for the trad itional 
ind iv idualistic  o n e .56
53Ibid.
5^For a c lose  exam ination of the different branches of the Latin 
American armed forces and where they stand relative to  po litica l in ter­
vention see  Martin C*. N eedier, Anatomy of a  Coup d 'e ta t : Ecuador. 
1963 (W ashington, D . C .:  In stitu te  for the Comparative Study of 
Political System s, 1964), 35-36.
^K n ap p , "The Meaning of M ilitarism , " 2 2 .
®®John J . Johnson, The M ilitary and Society in  Latin America,
252.
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But due to the increasing  size  and complexity of modern governments,
military juntas have had to  rely  increasing ly  upon civ ilian  bureaucrats
57as adm inistrators of public a ffa irs . In th e  tw entieth century, the re­
fore, juntas have tended .to be tran sitio n a l, retaining power until a
58new government, one acceptable to  the m ilitary, is  chosen .
I t seems c lear from the above d iscu ssio n  that substan tia l differ­
ences ex is t between caudillism  and m ilitarism . The transitiona l stage 
which allowed for th is  transform ation w ithin the armed forces came a t 
the turn of the century . I t was juxtaposed by a change in  the to ta l 
environmental make-up of Latin America. The la s t decade of the 
nineteenth century is  usually  accep ted  a s  the beginning of the end of 
feu d alis tic  life in  Latin America. I t was a t  th is  time tha t the indus­
tria lized  countries of W estern Europe and North America began to  look 
abroad for m arkets, raw m aterials and foodstuffs. .One of the areas 
which immediately a ttracted  th e ir  a tten tion  w as Latin America.
European and North American in v es to rs , along with Latin American 
entrepreneurs., began mining, ranching and plantation en terp rises, ra il­
road and port fac ility  construction and commercial and banking concerns.
58On many o ccasio n s, however, transitiona l jun tas have remained 
in power indefin ite ly . Another occasional by-product of rule by a m ili­
tary jun ta  is  th a t an  individual member of the junta is  ab le  to  maneuver 
into a position of d ic ta to ria l power—with the consent of the armed 
fo rces, of course, N eedier, P o litical Development in  Latin America, 28.
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This ac tiv ity  acce le ra ted  urbanization  and the growth of sco io -
economic sec to rs  w ith in te re s ts  in  conflic t w ith those  of the ru ra l,> cq
agricu ltu ral o ligarchy.
The various Latin American repub lics did not begin th is  process
of m odernization sim ultaneously . Some nations were slow er than
o thers in responding to  the more mature demands of the tw entieth
century . World War I ,  how ever, provided the needed im petus for the
more tardy countries and acce le ra ted  progress in  th o se  nations where
in d u stria liza tio n  w as already  underw ay.
During th a t co n flic t, the coun tries from w hich the Latin 
Americans had become accustom ed to buying most of the ir 
m anufactured goods were unable to continue to  provide th ese  
products; a s  a  re s u lt ,  the Latin American countries were 
faced  w ith the a lte rn a tiv e  of going w ithout or producing th ese
goods them selves.
The im pact on Latin America of the G reat D epression  and World W ar II
61
had sim ilar effec ts and served to  in c rease  the pace of m odernization.
It w as inev itab le  tha t th ese  broad so c ia l and economic changes,
i
accom panied a s  they were by the  influx of new id e a s , would u ltim ately  
influence the m ilitary es tab lishm en ts of Latin A m erica. The fin  de 
s ie c le  a lso  brought m ilitary p ro fessio n a liza tio n . This w as part of the 
general im pact on the a rea  from Europe and th e  U nited S ta te s , but
C Q
^ P o r te r  and Alexander. The Struggle for Dem ocracy. 21-22; and 
A lexander, Organized Labor in  Latin A m erica. 3 -4 .
finA lexander, Organized Labor in  Latin A m erica. 5 .
61Ibld.
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especia lly  from the former. "At the end of the nineteenth century,
French and German m issions began introducing modem military 
62methods. " The United S tates concentrated its  efforts on training 
the armed forces of Caribbean and C entral American rep u b lic s , 
although not alw ays by inv itation . World War I , World War II and 
the Cold W ar, w ith their extraordinary m ilitary p rio rities , a l l  have 
contributed to  the continually improved quality  of Latin America's 
armed fo rc e s .
The raison  d 'e tre  of th is  trea tise  on the trad itional role of Latin
America's so ld iers as po liticans is  to dem onstrate the dec isive  part
they play in determining the policy d irections of the ir respective
countries—a s  a prelude to  a  specific  d iscu ssio n  on the po litical
influence of the Venezuelan m ilitary. Thus far in th is  chapter, an
attem pt to  remain objective has been m ade. M ilitarism  has not been
praised or condemned, and only areas of wide unanimity among scholars
have been eva luated . Professor Lyle McAlister c ite s  these  a reas  of
agreem ent a s  follows:
It / m i l i t a r y  bas become le ss  personalistic  and more in s titu ­
tional; somewhat le ss  predatory and more oriented toward the 
solution of national problems; le s s  dependent on the employ­
ment of naked force and more prone to rely  on manipulation, 
and negotiation; le ss  ready to  defend the trad itional order and 
more inclined  to  support or a t le a s t  to lerate middle c la ss  
p o litica l lead ersh ip . 34
^L ieu w en , Arms and P o litic s . 31.
63Ib id . , 31-33.
64M cAlister, "Recent Research and W riting, " 9.
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Yet academ ic d issension  re la tive  to m ilitarism  does ex is t. The most 
striking area of th is factionalism  dea ls w ith the im plications of m ili­
tarism  for the economic, soc ia l and politica l development of Latin 
America and , for our purposes, V enezuela. Simplified, is  militarism  
good or bad?
6J
Three d is tin c t schools of thought on th is m atter are d iscern ib le .
The "trad itionalist"  in terpretation  of m ilitarism , the firs t to  appear,
can be found in  most older Latin American tex tbooks. The contemporary
♦
version of th is approach is  found in  the works of Edwin Lieuwen, the
previously cited Arms and Politics in  Latin America and Generals v s .
66
P resid en ts . This view is  based on the belief th a t the dynamic of 
Latin American history is  the struggle for economic development and 
soc ia l reform through dem ocratic, constitu tional p ro ce sse s . M ili­
tarism  has prevented th i s . Lieuwen acknow ledges progressive changes 
in the Latin American armed fo rces, but th is  has not altered the funda­
mentally predatory nature of m ilitarism .
The "rea lis t"  position on the issu e  of militarism  is  somewhat 
le s s  denunciatory of the Latin American armed forces than the trad i­
tio n a lis t position . Among h is to rian s , John J. Johnson in his already
cc
Ib id . , 5 -33 . This source contains a d iscussion  of these  
various positions along with other new research  developments on the 
role of the Latin American m ilita ry .
S^Edwin Lieuwin, Generals vs . P residen ts: Neomilitarism in 
Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).
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cited  The M ilitary and Society in Latin America has contributed most 
to the c rysta lliza tion  of th is  view. This is  a lso  the interpretation 
accepted  by most po litical s c ie n tis ts , among whom Martin C .
N eedier , ^  Theodore W y c lo ff^  and Frank A. Knapp, Jr.®® are the most 
noted. According to  th is concept, m ilitarism  is  not an obstacle  to 
democracy and soc ia l reform in Latin America. Rather, m ilitarism  is  
endemic to  the po litica l culture of the a rea , a culture where po litical 
power is based on force and v io lence . All secto rs of society  live by 
th is  environmental reality ; but the m ilitary, due to  the ir monopoly of 
the means of force, enjoy a d is tin c t advantage. The rea lis t position 
is  characterized  by an extrem ely pessim istic  attitude toward Latin 
America's c iv ilian  leadersh ip , p as t, present and fu tu re . Given th is 
s itua tion , the re a lis t fo resees a positive role for the armed forces of 
Latin America v ia civ ic  action  type p ro jec ts . The w ell tra ined , effi­
c ien t military officer is  simply better su ited  for adm inistrative 
responsib ility  than the corrupt, vacilla ting  po litic ian .
R7M artin C . N eedier, Po litical Development in  Latin America; 
In s tab ility . V io lence . and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random 
H ouse, 1968).
fifiTheodore Wyckoff, "The Role of the M ilitary in Latin American 
P o li t ic s ,11 The W estern P o litica l Quarterly (September, 1960), 745-763.
®®Frank A. Knapp, Jr. "The Meaning of M ilitarism  in Latin 
A m erica,11 Foreign Service Journal IXL (December, 1964), 20-25 .
49
The third theore tica l position on m ilitarism is  more analy tical
H A
than programmatic. Jose^Nun is  a sso c ia ted  with th is  third interpre­
tation  , which is  highly c ritica l of both the trad itional and re a lis t 
approach. According to Nun, the trad itional position is  derived from 
nineteenth century European and United S tates antim ilitarism  and , as 
such , is  inapplicable to  Latin America. The assum ption tha t c iv ilian  
rule is  ind ispensab le to  so c ia l reform is  not n ecessarily  valid  south 
of the border. Nun contends tha t the re a lis t view is based on the 
various experiences of the new emerging nations of Asia and A frica, 
particularly N asse r 's  Egypt; and tha t i t  does not apply to the Latin 
American repub lics. They are not new, each  one having an es tab lish ed  
trad ition . W hile Nun does not advance his own methodology for the 
study of m ilitarism , the im plications of h is critique are c le a r , Latin 
America is  a  complex po litica l culture area unlike any other. O bjec­
tiv ity  and meaningful so lu tions w ill develop only when th is postu late  
becomes the basic  ana ly tica l premise of Latin A m ericanists.
With one reservation , it  is  th is  la s t  position 'that most nearly 
parallels the framework estab lished  in  the introductory chapter of th is  
study. The basic  shortcoming of Jose 'N un 's observations is  th a t, for
^^Jose/ Nun, ."A Latin American Phenomenon: The. Middle C lass 
M ilitary Coup , " in  Trends in  Social Science Research in Latin America 
(Berkeley: In stitu te  of In ternational S tud ies, 1965), 55-59, and "The 
M iddle-C lass M ilitary C oup," in C laudio Veliz (ed .) , The Politics of 
Conformity in Latin America (New York: Oxford U niversity P re ss , 1967)
purposes of a n a ly s is , the ideological iso la tion  of Latin American 
m ilitarism  is  both im possible and undesirab le . Although Latin 
America is a novel po litica l culture a rea , she has borrowed many 
po litica l ideas and practices from Europe and the United S ta te s , 
esp ec ia lly  democracy and represen tative in s titu tio n s . Over many 
y ea rs , dem ocratic ideology, though treated  cavalierly , has become 
very much a part of the Latin American s c e n e , Po litical evolution in 
a dem ocratic direction is  becoming more w idespread. Iron ically , the 
most conclusive evidence to  th is effect has come from Latin America's 
. armed fo rces.
In fifteen out of nineteen coups d 'e ta t  which took place during 
the decade 1955-1964, the overthrown government w as instead  
succeeded by a  provisional government charged w ith making 
preparations for elections w ithin a lim ited period of t i me , . . .
The striking thing about th is  pattern of behavior is  not tha t the 
resu lts  of the ensuing e lections may sometimes not be 
respected  or th a t they may be conducted in a partia l manner, 
but tha t the ■ hold of the norms of dem ocratic ideology is  so 
great.
The reader should keep th is  development in mind in  re la tion  to  the 
definite conclusions reached in  the next chapter.
Chapter III w ill deal w ith m ilitarism  in  V enezuela. I t w ill concern 
i ts e lf  with p recise examples of m ilitarism  th a t were trea ted  only gen­
erally  in  the presen t chapter. I t  w ill dem onstrate both th e  strong and 
weak points of the th ree concepts d iscu ssed  above. I t w ill present
71* •‘■Needier. P olitical Development in Latin America. 28.
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cases  of m ilitary intervention to halt constitu tional p rocesses and 
so c ia l betterm ent, epochs of weak civ ilian  regim es and in stances of 
the so ld ier as modernizer. From th is  delineation there w ill emerge a 
unique nation with a unique problem of m ilitarism .
CHAPTER III
VENEZUELA'S SOLDIERS AS POLITICIANS
Throughout m ost of the colonial e ra , Venezuela was a marginal 
p ossession  in  the Spanish American Empire. The centers of activ ity  
in :the Empire, Santo Domingo, M exico and Peru,attracted conquest 
and settlem ent because of the ir mineral w ealth and sedentary Indian 
populations su itab le for labor. Venezuela had no precious m inerals, 
and her aboriginal in h ab itan ts , com paratively spa rse , were nomadic 
and belligeren t. Econom ically, therefore, she remained a poor and 
neglected colony of Spain . P o litically , the seven provinces which 
came to  make up Venezuela were adm inistered from external centers 
of power. During the six teenth  and seventeenth  cen turies, Venezuela 
w as under the ju risd ic tion  of the Audiencia of Santo Domingo; during 
two periods in  the eighteenth  century, 1717-1724 and 1740-1777, she 
w as adm inistered by the Viceroyalty of New G ranada. In 1777, Vene­
zuela  became an autonomous C aptaincy-G eneral, a  subdivision of the 
Spanish Empire headed by a m ilitary officer. W ith a fellow officer 
ruling V enezuela, the colonial m ilitia units formed in  the 1760's were 
ab le  to  extend and strengthen the ir already prefenred p o sitio n . By the 
n ineteenth  century, d r il ls , training and especia lly  the extension  of
52
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the fuero m ilitar to  the officers and men of the colonial m ilitia served.
to  create the b asis  for a m ilitary ca s te  in  V enezuela. ^
When the Latin American wars for independence began in  1810,
Venezuela was the movement's spearhead in South America. Spain 's
determ ination to  crush the movement a t  its  origin, and V enezuela's
determ ination to  achieve freedom ,caused the la tte r 's  movement for
po litica l independence to  become the most cruel, bloody and prolonged
2
of Latin America. The Liberator, Simon Bolivar, a  native son of
3
Venezuela, labeled  his country the "barracks" of South America. As 
h isto ry  would record, Venezuela lived up to th is ep ith e t.
By 1830, men like Simon Bolivar, Jose^de San Martin and Antonio 
Jose 'de  Sucre, ta len ted  C reoles who might have guided the young 
republics, into national m aturity, were no longer on the scen e . Their 
p laces were taken  by undisciplined m ilita ris ts  schooled in the violence 
of the revolutionary movement. In 1830, with the unifying influence of 
Simon Bolivar removed, am bitious caudillos brought about V enezuela's
^Josey Gil Fortoul, H istoria C onstitucional De Venezuela I 
(C aracas, Editorial Las N ovedades, 1930), 91-92; Lott, "V enezuela," 
237; Gilmore, Caudillism  and M ilitarism . 10; and Lieuwen, V enezuela, 
23.
^Philip B. Taylor, "Democracy for Venezuela ? ,  " Current H istory 
II  (November, 1966), 284-285.
Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in  Latin America. 165; and M asur, 
N ationalism  in Latin Am erica. 59.
54
secess io n  from the Republic of Colombia. (Colombia, created during 
1821 and 1822, was made up of New Granada, Venezuela, Panama 
and Ecuador.) These ve te rans, who had crea ted  the Venezuelan s ta te ,
4
wanted to lead and control i t .
In 1960, a Venezuelan author, writing on the sub jec t of c iv il-  ■
m ilitary rela tions within his country, declared:
The h istory  of Venezuela is  the uninterrupted struggle of two 
concepts:, civilism  versus m ilitarism . These two irrecon­
c ilab le  positions express the drama of the nation .^
At the time i t  was w ritten , the accuracy of th is  statem ent was unques-
tionab le . Nineteenth century V enezuela, however, w as another m atter.
H ostility  did ex is t between Venezuelan m ilitary men and her sm all band
7
of in te lle c tu a ls , but to  say th a t a constan t struggle prevailed between 
th ese  two groups is  a  gross overestim ation of civ ilian  power. Conflict 
was p resen t in  n ineteenth  century V enezuela, but i t  w as characterized
4
Ib id . / 19; Gilmore, Caudillism  and M ilitarism , 11; and Gil 
Fortoul, H istoria C onstitu tional De V enezuela, I ,  683-685.
5
Angel M ancera G alle tti, Civilismo y.M ilitarism o (C aracas: 
Universidad Central de V enezuela, 1960), 9 .
g
In 1960, the im proprieties committed by V enezuela's la s t  m ili­
tary d ic ta to r, Marcos Perez Jimenez, who had been ousted in  January, 
1958, were s t i l l  fresh in the minds of V enezuelans. This resu lted  in 
much antipathy directed ag a in st the m ilitary and an increased  resp ec t 
for the civ ilian  elem ents responsib le for the d ic ta to r 's  fa ll .  For more 
on th is sub ject see  Chapter VI.
7
Frank Bonilla, "Cultural E lites , " in  Seymour M artin L ipset and 
Aldo Solari (e d s .) . E lites in  Latin America (New York: Oxford 
U niversity P re ss , 1967), 251.
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by caudillos competing for power among them selves—not with c iv i-
0
lian s . Until w ell into the tw entieth century, "general-presidents" 
controlled Venezuela through military power; "the unchallenged 
supremacy of the armed forces has been the chief characte ristic  of
Q
the nation 's  p o lit ic s ,"
C onstitu tionalism , the idea of lim ited government, did not 
flourish in  V enezuela, In stead , her p o litica l, so c ia l and economic 
institu tions have rested  upon authoritarian  concepts crea ted , enforced 
and interpreted by the m ilitary . The complete lack  of resp ec t for demo­
c ra tic , represen tative government is  b e s t dem onstrated by a glance 
a t V enezuela's constitu tional h istory . Since 1811, Venezuela has had 
tw en ty -six -constitu tions—the record for our hemisphere.*® D ictators 
manipulated these  constitu tions to  serve their own in terest; and th is 
is  an important factor in  explaining why Venezuelans throughout history 
have had so little  resp ec t for dem ocracy.**
True, there were civ ilian  directed  parties in  n ineteenth  century 
V enezuela, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party. T raditionalist
Q /
John D. M artz. Accion Dem ocratica: Evolution of a  Modem 
Political Party in Venezuela (Princeton: Princeton U niversity P re ss , 
1966), 299.
9Lieuwen, Arms and P o litic s , 165.
10"When Is a P le b is c i te ," America XCVIII (January 4, 1958), 386.
**L ott, "V enezuela, " 246 , 253 .
5 6
in  outlook, the C onservatives were supported by the landed oligarchy 
and the Church. They favored a strong cen tral government and con­
tinued c le rica l priv ilege. The L iberals, professing ega lita rian , an ti­
c le rica l no tions, favored decentralized  government. Yet the differ-
12ences between the two parties were academ ic. Their energies were
directed  toward mounting the bandwagon of the m ilitary officer most
likely  to  defend th e ir position and provide the accompanying sp o ils .
From 1811, the year of her declaration  of independence from Spain, to
1958, when her la s t  m ilitary d ic tator w as overthrown,' Venezuela had
eigh t c iv ilian  p residen ts . Six of these  were puppets,and a ll eight
governed a t  the w ill of the m ilitary. Of the 147 years between 1811
and 1958, th ese  eigh t c iv ilian  presidents of Venezuela served a  grand
13to ta l of fifteen  y ea rs . Given th is  s itua tion , c iv ilian  leadership  in 
Venezuela was not v ac illa tin g , i t  was virtually  n o n -ex is ten t. "The 
h istory  of Venezuela can alm ost be told in  the lives of its  m ilitary 
d ic ta to rs .
The firs t important figure to  control the destiny  of Venezuela 
was G eneral Jose" Antonio Pa'ez. From 1830 to  1848, th is  llanero 
chieftain  and hero of the w ars 'o f independence w as the m aster of the
12Ibid_., 249, 252.
•̂ I b i d . , 245; and Taylor, "Democracy for Venezuela? ,"  285.
i
14Edwin Lieuwen, "Political Forces in  V enezuela ," The World 
Today XVI (August, I960), 350.
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nation. Paez was e lec ted  president for two term s, 1831-35 and 
1839-44, but he rem ained the power behind the scenes un til 1848.^  
General P aez, a conservative by nature, ru led in the in te re s t of land­
owners and wealthy m erchants. Above a l l ,  Venezuela needed internal 
peace, and th is the caudlllo  provided. Paez began to rebuild the 
economy, encourage agriculture and enforce greater f isc a l respon­
s ib ility . 16
By 1840 opposition to the Paez regime had developed in  the form 
of the Liberal Party. The new party 's membership was composed of 
debt-ridden farmers, sm all businessm en and in te lle c tu a ls . The farmers 
and businessm en d isliked  the economic monopoly of tbe large land-, 
owners and wealthy m erchants, while the in te llec tu a ls  ag ita ted  for an  
end to s lavery , w ider suffrage and the abolition  of cap ita l punishm ent. 
In the face of mounting defiance , the Conservative Party found i t  
increasing ly  necessary  to  resort to  force and electo ral fraud in order 
to  re s is t  the Liberal challenge. The elections of 1846 w as won by 
General Jose Tadeo M onagas, a C onservative. A political c ris is  was 
precip itated  when i t  became apparent tha t Monogas cared more about 
perpetuating his own power than serving the  in te rest of the conservative
-^These are not "popular" elections but "indirect" e lec tio n s. The 
congress e lec ts  the president and the p residen t, in  tu rn , appoints the 
co n g ress . The disadvantages of th is ’ system  for the non-incum bent are 
obvious. Revolution thus becomes the only solution for those desiring 
po litica l power.
16Lott, "Venezuela. " 238: and Lieuwen. Venezuela. 33-34.
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oligarchy. When Conservative m inisters balked a t h is p o lic ie s , they 
were fired and replaced by Liberals in M arch, 1848. As expected ,
General Paez moved to  oust G eneral M onogas, but the la tte r had been 
building up his m ilitary backing and was ready , Pa'ez w as defeated 
in 1848 and exiled in 1850. ^
i
Jose/ Tadeo Monagas was the chief caudillo  of Venezuela for a
decade. From 1848 to  1858, many of the planks in the Liberal Party
platform became law: abolition of slavery , abolition of cap ita l punish- ,
ment, extension of the suffrage and lim itation of in te re s t ra te s . Though
noble in in ten t, many of these  reforms were m eaningless due to  the
P residen t's  refusal to  resp ec t routine p rocesses and lib e rtie s . The
Paez adm inistra tions, though ty rann ical, were devoted to  promoting
the national w elfare; under M onagas, "the economy began to  stagnate
18and decay; continuous d efic it financing ruined the nation 's  c r e d i t ."
In 1850, Monagas placed h is brother, Jose/ Gregorio M onagas, in  the 
presidential p a lace , and , in 1854, Jose/ Tadeo assum ed the presidency 
for another four y ea rs . In 1857 a new constitu tion  w as drawn up which 
placed no restric tions upon re -e lec tio n  and extended the  p residentia l 
term to six  y e a rs . This obvious attem pt to  es tab lish  a Monagas dynasty  
was too much for the already disgruntled L iberals. C onservatives and
*^Lott, "V enezuela," 239; Lieuwen,- V enezuela, 35-36; and Gil 
Fortoul, H istoria C onstitu tional De V enezuela. I I ,  222-225.
18Lieuwen, V en ezu ela . 3 6 -3 7 .
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Liberals joined forces and brought the dictatorship  to an  end in
March, 1858. The inab ility  of the two parties to agree on a form of
government plunged Venezuela into five years of bloody civ il w ar,
the F ederalist W ar. ^
The main issu e  th a t precip itated  the F ederalist W ar, federalism
versus centralism , w as a r tif ic ia l. The rea l struggle w as between rival
caudillos seeking to  control the nation. The course of th is  war is
extremely com plicated. Suffice i t  to  say , i t  was excess iv e ly  cruel,
onwith the cen tral government exchanging hands numerous tim e s . By 
1863, the forces of the Liberal Party were victorious and a federal 
system  w as adopted, w ith a new constitu tion  promulgated in 1864.
But a fed e ra lis t constitu tion , coupled with control of the cap ita l and 
national government by the Liberal Party, did not bring peace to 
V enezuela. The propertied e lem en ts, in league w ith regional ca u d illo s . 
ruled the provinces independently of the federal government, .while the 
la tte r was m ilitarily  unable to  require the re s t  of the country to  cooperate 
in national a f fa irs . Real tranquility  did not come to  Venezuela un til 
1870,-when Antonio Guzman Blanco, the Liberal po litican -genera l, was 
able to  e s tab lish  personal hegemony over the nation .^*
^ Ib id . . 37-38; and Lott, "Venezuela, " 239.
on
wAn excellen t account of the Federalist War can be found in 
William D. and Amy L. M arsland, Venezuela Through I ts  H istory (New 
York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1954), 169-188.
^ L o t t ,  "V enezuela," 239; Lieuwen, V enezuela, 38-39; and Gil 
Fortoul, H istoria C onstitucional De V enezuela, in, 198-218.
For eighteen years Antonio Guzimn Blanco was the undisputed 
22m aster of Venezuela. He "probably did more to  modernize Venezuela
23
than a l l  o ther leaders combined in  the century following independence.
A system  of public primary education throughout the country was 
es tab lish ed , and s ta te  support w as extended to  secondary and pro­
fessional schools and to  the Central U niversity in  Caracas . Guzman 
Blanco put the nation 's  economy in  order. Some methods used  to achieve 
th is  were as  follows: public works were in itia ted ; port fac ilitie s  were 
improved and major c itie s  modernized; railroad and road construction
was subsidized; custom s duties w ere reduced, causing increased
/
revenue through a higher volume of trade; g ra ft and corruption were 
severely  curtailed; and foreign investm ents were encouraged.  ̂4
It w as in  the area  of chu rch -sta te  re la tions th a t the caudillo 
introduced h is most far-reaching reform s. A M ason and extreme an ti­
cleric  . Guzman Blanco dea lt a blow to  the power of the Venezuelani
25Catholic Church, from which it  would not recover until the 1960 's.
22  /^ T h e  best study of Guzman Blanco is  George S. W ise , C audillo;
A Portrait of Antonio Guzman Blanco (New York: Columbia U niversity  
P ress , 1951).
23Johnson, "The Latin-American M ilitary as  a Competing Group 
in  T ransitional Society, " 111.
2 A /Ramon Diaz Sanchez, Guzman: Elipse De Una Ambicion De Poder 
(C aracas; Ediciones Del M inistro De Educaci<&i N acional, 1950), 550- 
565; Lott, "V enezuela," 240; and Lieuwen, V enezuela, 239.
^ D ia z  Sanchez, Guzma'n, 543-546; "Five More Y ears, Time LXX 
(December 30, 1957), 30. For an exam ination of the resurgence of the 
church a s  a  po litica l force in  contemporary Venezuela see  Chapters VI 
and VII.
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Compared to  her role in  other Latin American co un tries, the influence
of the Church in  Venezuela w as never particularly strong. This was
due to  c le rica l resentm ent "springing from the Church's support of the
Crown in  the struggle for independence and its  identification  with the
2 fioligarchic forces of socie ty . . . . "  W hatever po litica l influence the 
Church p o ssessed  prior to  1870 was com pletely extinguished by the 
church-sta te  leg isla tio n  of Guzman Blanco. Church property was con­
f isca ted , marriage and the reg istra tion  of v ita l s ta tis t ic s  were secu la r­
iz ed , religious ceremonies outside church buildings were prohibited, 
and Protestant se c ts  were encouraged to  send m issio n arie s . "The 
Church in Venezuela never fu lly  recovered from the ferocious a ttacks
I
he made upon i ts  w ealth , its  position in  education, and its  sp iritua l
27and moral influence over the people.
On the surface i t  seem ed th a t Venezuela had entered a new era , 
but the reforms of Antonio GuzmaVBlanco were superfic ia l. The admir­
able educational programs in itia ted  in  h is early years of power were not 
su sta in ed . It soon became apparent th a t h is stern  fisca l po lic ies and 
demands of bureaucratic honesty wer.e not to benefit the country but to 
improve his own opportunities for graft. M ost of the public works
2 fiLott, "Venezuela, " 252. For a brief d iscussion  of the po litical 
role of the Roman C atholic Church in Latin America see N eedier, Politics 
in P erspec tive . 42-44 . v
27
Lieuwen, "Political Forces in V enezuela ," 352-353; and Lott, 
"V enezuela," 239.
projects inaugurated by Guzman Blanco became sta tu es and monuments 
to  him self . F inally , even his persecution of the Church stemmed more 
from his desire for se lf-d e ifica tio n  than from any personal religious 
convictions. "In sum, though Guzman Blanco's rule had positive 
a s p e c ts , on .balance his w as a regime th a t brought few lasting  benefits
0 ftto  the n a t io n ."
In 1888, the caudillo  w as overthrown by old ag e , bad health  and
the forces of opposition. He died shortly thereafter. Four years of
chaos and confusion followed the ouster of Guzman Blanco, for "he
had supp ressed , not destroyed , the sp irit of d isorder and barbarism ,
and once his iron hand was removed, i t  sprang up a l l  over Venezuela
until cruder and heavier f is ts  rammed i t  down ag a in . I t w as not
until 1892 th a t G eneral Joaquin Crespo was able to  m uster enough
m ilitary backing to  impose his w ill upon the nation . Corruption and
inefficiency characterized  the seven year rule of C respo. In 1899, the
Crespo government was overthrown by an army headed by General
30Cipriano C astro , the "Lion of the A ndes." This w as the beginning 
of the "Tachira D ynasty ."
The Venezuelan s ta te  of Tachira is  located  in  the extreme sou th- . 
w estern  section  of the country. I t borders Colombia and lie s  in the
28Lieuwen, V enezuela. 41-42 .
29M arsland, V enezuela, 210.
30Lott,"V enezuela, " 240; and L ieuwen, V en ezu ela . 4 3 -4 4 .
foothills of the Andes M ountains. When Cipriano Castro se ized  the 
presidency in 1899, he inaugurated a fifty -n ine  year period of almost 
unbroken rule by military officers from Tachira: Castro, 1899-1908;
Juan Vicente Gomez, 1908-1935; E leazar Lopez Contreras, 1935-1941;
Isa ia s  Medina A ngarita, 1941-1945; and M arcos Perez Jim enez, 1948-
311958. The adm inistration of the "Lion of the Andes' w as "charac­
terized  by adm inistrative tyranny, ineffic iency , graft and extravagance, 
by financial chaos, by alm ost constant dom estic revolt, and by fre-
90
quent foreign in te rven tions. " Personally , C astro 's co n s tan t d iss ip a­
tion and inebriation resu lted  in  collapsing health  and cau sed  the andino 
to  seek  sp ec ia lized  m edical treatm ent in  Europe in 1908. W hile he was 
abroad, his v ice-p resid en t and chief lieu ten an t, General Juan Vicente
Gdmez, assum ed the presidency and invited  the deposed lead er to
33rem ain permanently in Europe.
For the next tw en ty -sev en  years , Juan Vicente Gomez, th e  "Tyrant 
of the Andes" or the "Democratic C aesar, " a s  his detractors and
31Gary W illiam H oskin, "Community Power and P o litica l Moderni­
za tion , 11 A Study of a Venezuelan City, " (Urbana: unpublished 'Ph.D . 
d isse rta tio n , U niversity of I l l in o is , 1967), iv .
32 Lieuwen, V enezuela. 44.
33John D. M artz ,. "V enezuela's G eneration of '28: The Genesis 
of Po litical Democracy, " Tournal of Inter-American Studies VI (January, 
1964), 17; and Lott, "Venezuela,," 240.
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panegyrists respectively  dubbed him, was the  undisputed boss of
3 4 tVenezuela. During the Gomez y ears , 1908-1935, "Venezuela was
in the grip of the most heavy-handed and ru th less d ic tatorsh ip  in its
or /
history. Q Venezuela w as managed as the private e s ta te  of Gomez 
and his fam ily. The ch o ices t es ta tes  were confiscated and became 
their personal property. Since there w as a complete absen ce  of civil 
and po litica l liberties , even  the historic Conservative and Liberal 
Parties d isappeared . The key  to  the cau d illo 's  power w as a w ell- 
disciplined army officered w ith  andinos, an  elaborate spy network, 
and bru ta l, terrifying torture chambers for those  who .dared critic ize  
Gomez or h is  adm inistration. Perhaps the ch ief contributions of 
Gomez were an extensive highway system  and internal s ta b ili ty , which 
allowed the economy to p rosper. Neither a id ed  the people of 
V enezuela. The new network of roads w as bu ilt to enable the  army to 
move promptly to any part of the republic where revolt th rea tened . 
Gomez-imposed stability  allow ed a n ascen t petroleum industry  to 
develop, w hich soon brought fortunes to  the  president and h is  Tachira 
cabal. Nothing was done to  elevate the Venezuelan people: living 
standards were m iserable, agriculture and industry  rem ained primitive,
^U nfo rtuna te ly  there is  no scholarly study available on Juan 
Vicente Gomez. A highly c r itic a l but jo u rn a lis tic  exam ination of 
Gc^mez is  Thomas Rourke, Gdmez: Tyrant o f the Andes (New York:t 
William Morrow, 1936). A rep ly  to Rourke and representing a laudatory 
analysis of Gomez is Pedro Manuel Arcaya, The Gcftnez Regime in ■ 
Venezuela and Its Background (Washington, D . C .: Sun Printing, 1936).
S^Lott, "V enezuela," 2 4 0 .
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health  and education degenerated, and government housing was non­
ex is ten t .  ̂®
The philosophic ra tionalization  of the Gomez regime was supplied
■
by h is M inister of the  Interior, Laureano V allenilla Lanz, in his book
f  37called  Cesarismo D em ocratico, is su e d  by the government in 1929.
It was an effort to ju s tify  the monolithic rule of Go'mez and V enezuela's
cau d illis tic  past. According to th is  philosophy, d ictatorsh ip  was the
only form of government su itab le for V enezuela, due to  the unsettled
nature of its  peop le . The authority  of the Venezuelan caesa rs  derived
from "dem ocratic11 o rig in s . Since Venezuelans in stinc tive ly  turned to
strong , sagacious le a d e rs , the dem ocratic c a e sa r  always represen ted ,
a lb e it unconsciously , the w ill of the people. He w as, therefore,
dem ocracy personified . The absurdity  of th is  collation  between
caudillos and dem ocracy is  obvious, for Go'mez and most of V enezuela's
d ic ta to rs never had any concern for the underprivileged majority and
4
never attem pted to  a llev ia te  so c ia l in e q u itie s .
W hat the an ti-a ris to c ra tic  d ic ta to rs did was to  stim ulate 
v ertica l mobility; they expelled  the ir enem ies from the ranks 
of the priv ileged, and brought in  some of the ir formerly 
impecunious fr ie n d s . . . and became founders of new a r is ­
tocra tic  lineages .38
3^Ib id . . 240-241; Lieuwen, V enezuela. 46-50; and M artz, 
Accidh D em ocratica. 300.
3?Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, Ce'sarismo Democratico (Caracas; 
Imprenta Garrldo, 1952).
3®Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion. 130-131; Goldenburg, 
The Cuban Revolution. 92; Lott, "Venezuela,1 245; and Lieuwen, 
Venezuela. 48-49.
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It was under Gomez th a t o il was f irs t discovered and extracted 
in  V enezuela. By 1930, she had become the w orld 's second leading 
producer. This new economic developm ent brought in  so much w ealth 
th a t it  enabled Venezuela to retire  her national debt and Gomez to su r­
vive the world depression  which began in  1929. Foreign oil companies 
"had what they  considered an id ea l industry-govem m ent re la tionsh ip . 
This consisted  of alm ost com plete freedom of ac tio n , dealing only with 
the d ic ta to r, and making a farce out of the law when the occasion 
dem anded. The tremendous petroleum revenues w ere siphoned off 
by Gomez, h is family and the army; the country and its  people derived 
lit tle  benefit from th e m .^
On December 17, 1935, Juan Vicente Gomez p assed  away peace­
fully in h is s le e p . ^  Venezuelans reacted  to  the news of his death  with 
ce leb ra tions, loo ting , r io ts , dem onstrations and, above a l l ,  a demand 
for restoration  of c iv il l ib e r t ie s . With the iron f is t of Gomez removed, 
Venezuela began a process of p o litica l, so c ia l and economic moderniza­
tion th a t most of her s is te r  republics had experienced a generation 
ea rlie r . The seeds of th is  transform ation had been planted during the 
- Gomez era .
^E d w in  Lieuwen, Petroleum in Venezuela: A H istory (Berkeley: 
U niversity of California P ress, 1955), 118.
40Ib id . , 118-119; and Lott, "Venezuela, " 241.
41L ieuw en, V en ezu ela . 5 0 -5 1 .
Economically, Venezuela under Gomez had evolved from an 
agrarian to  a mineral based economy, primarily because of foreign 
investm ent. However, Gomez was not the firs t president to  encourage 
in ternational investm ent. Throughout the nineteenth  and into the 
tw entieth  century , foreign investm ent had supplied the finances and 
technology necessary  to bring V enezuela's agricultural products to  the 
in ternational m arket, a s  w ell as the necessary  transporation and com­
m unications. W ith the discovery of o il during the Gomez regim e, a 
sh ift in the resources exported occurred as  foreign cap ita l and tech ­
nology turned to petroleum . As years p assed , the Venezuelan economy 
became le s s  d iversified , more ex trac tive , to ta lly  dependent upon o il 
and , therefore, highly vulnerable to  world economic f lu c tu a tio n s .^
Of particular importance to th is study are the military reforms 
of Juan Vincente Gomez, which resu lted  in  the complete transform ation 
of the Venezuelan armed fo rc e s . Gomez was shrewd enough to  realize  
th a t his retention  of power rested  on h is ability  to  suppress rival 
cau d illo s . Using the ever increasing  revenue from petroleum, he se t 
about expanding and modernizing the Venezuelan m ilitary to  an  extent 
th a t no w ould-be asp iran t dared challenge his suprem acy. Gomez 
estab lished  the firs t Venezuelan m ilitary academ y. A German trained
4^Otto F einstein , "The Role of Foreign Investm ent in the 
Development of Venezuela" (Chicago: unpublished Ph.D . d isse rta ­
tio n , U niversity of Chicago, 1965), 6 , 23-26.
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Chilean military m ission was employed to run the school and undertake
the professionalization  of the army. After World War I , the most
promising young officers were sen t to  Europe for advanced train ing ,
while French and Italian  airmen were brought in  to e s tab lish  an air
fo rce . With loyal Tachira partisans commanding a ll  key p o s ts , Gomez
43truly became a national cau d illo .
Ironically  i t  was the m ilitary reforms inaugurated by her most 
powerful caudillo  th a t contributed most of the term ination of caudillism  
in  V enezuela. Gradually the cadets produced by the G om ez-built m ili­
tary academ ies began to  develop a concern.for s ta tu s , adequate weapons
44and advanced tra in in g .
M ilitary men could become cau d illo s , but only a t  the sacrifice  
of the ir m ilitary character. Caudillos could become military 
men, but only a t  the price of professionalization . . . . I f  the 
caudillo-becom e-m ilitary  man desired  to  continue his po litica l 
ac tiv ity  i t  would n ecessarily  be through the m ilitary in s titu ­
tion .4®
Ever since independence caudillism  had been the dominant tra it  of 
Venezuelan p o litic s , but, by 1935, "Caudillism  had been replaced by 
something approaching true m ilitarism . "^6 accesso ry  character­
is t ic s  of caudillism  {violence, nepotism , oligarchy and a p re-industria l
M cAlister, "Recent Research and W riting, " 26; and Lieuwen, 
V enezuela, 46.
^^M artz, Accion D em ocratlca, 300.
4sRobert L. Gilmore, Caudillism  and M ilitarism . 8 .
^ M c A lis te r, "Recent Research and W riting, 26.
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economy) had been replaced by the. complex demands of modernization; 
industria lization , urbanization and a growing15 middle c la ss  .47
Yet, ju s t  as  a void of represen tative civ ilian  leadership  existed  
after independence, a sim ilar void appeared in 1935. Due to the 
oppressive Gomez d ic ta to rsh ip , organized c iv ilian  groups capable of 
dominating and stab iliz ing  the po litica l p ro cess , po litica l parties and 
pressure groups, professional and student o rganizations, labor unions 
and a dome Stic-com m ercial lobby, were e ither absen t or inchoate . The 
only pressure group p o ssessin g  the effective so lid ity  necessary  to 
dominate and stab ilize  the n a tio n 's  po litics w as the new modernized 
armed forces of V enezuela. Caudillism  had filled  the power vacuum 
created by the  passing  of the Spanish crown; m ilitarism  w as now to 
f ill the power vacuum created by the passing  of caudillism .^®
V enezuela, how ever, w as not sufficien tly  removed from its  
cau d illis tic  past to  d iscard  en tire ly  i ts  leg acy . The decade from 1935 
to  1945 served as a tran sitio n a l period in  the development of Venezuelan 
m ilitarism . The oligarchy w hich held economic and so c ia l hegemony 
in  Venezuela under Gomez, though weakened by the rise  of new sectors 
th a t accom panied m odernization, w as s t i l l  a power to  be considered;
^7Gilmore, Caudillism  and M ilitarism , 12-13.
^®Ib id . , 3, 13. To re ite ra te , m ilitarism  signifies the domination 
of the p o litica l processes of a nation  by its  armed fo rces. Political 
in tervention takes place in  the name of the armed forces rather than an 
indiv idual. Johnson, "The Latin-Ameiican M ilitary a s  a Competing 
Group in  Transitional Society, " 1 1 9 .
i t  demanded a continuance of the sta tu s q u o . Of critical importance 
for the. future of Venezuelan po litics  was the m ilitary. During the 
adm inistrations of Eleazar Lopez Contreras (1935-1941) and Isa ia s  
Medina Angarita (1941-1945), there transpired a  piecemeal accum ula­
tion  of resentm ent between the young, highly trained  officers of diverse
so c ia l background and the many i l l i te ra te , politically  appointed
49gom ecista v e te ra n s . These young turks would have to w ait ten  
years for the ir opportunity. In 1935 the key to  power, the Venezuelan 
armed fo rces, rem ained in  the hands of the Tachira lieu tenants of Juan 
Vicente Gomez. The old order w as crumbling, but the new order was 
not yet ready to  assum e control.
General E leazar Lopez C on treras, M inister of War under Gomez 
and a fellow an d in o . became th e  new strong man of V enezuela. He 
assum ed control upon the death  of h is Tachira comrade in 1935 A 
gom ecista C ongress elected  him for a fu ll five year term commencing 
in  1936. For a  tim e L<^pez Contreras acqu iesced  to the formation of 
po litica l p a rtie s , organized labor unions and student groups th a t fol­
lowed the return of civ il liberties caused by the  death of P resident 
G o m e z . I t  w as not until early  1937 tha t the new president fe lt 
secure enough to  check the growth of popular po litica l participation
49M artz, Accion D em ocratica, 301.
®^Victor A lba, Historia d e l Movimiento Obrero en America 
Latina (M exico, D . F .: Libreros M exicanos U nidos, 1964), 178.
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In V enezuela. Labor unions were ou tlaw ed , student leaders were 
ex iled  or im prisoned, and a l l  po litica l p arties  were declared  ille g a l 
w ith  the so le  exception of the  p res id en t's  own party.
Yet Lopez Contreras w as no Gdimez. "He w as more c iv ilized  
and p ro g ressiv e . . . and h is  regime re flec ted  the d ifference . "52 The 
Lo*pez Contreras government inaugurated the  firs t "N ational Plan" for 
economic developm ent. The v ita l provision of th is plan w as to  "sow "
i
the petroleum — use V enezuela 's petroleum revenue to  stim ulate under­
developed a re a s  of the econom y. The revelation  of Gom ez's corruption
i
and o il company collusion  and the exam ple of M exico 's na tionaliza tion  
of foreign o il com panies cau sed  public opinion to back Iopez C ontreras 
in h is  su c ce ss fu l attem pt to  ra is e  the share of oil profits from sev en  
to  nearly  seven teen  per c e n t . 52 He a lso  in itia ted  a  program of 
dom estic improvement w hich included construction  of schoo ls, dock s , 
highw ays and needed public w o rk s .5^ In 1941, Lopez C ontreras' choice 
a s  h is  su c ce sso r  was G eneral Isa ia s  M edina A ngarita, M inister of W ar
51 *L ie u w e n /V enezuela, 53-54.
52M arsland . V enezuela, 251.
52F e in ste in , "The Role of Foreign Investm ent, " 189.
5^David Eugene Blank (e d ,) , V enezuela Election Factbook: 
December 1, 1968 (W ashington, D. C .:  In stitu te  for the Com parative 
Study of P o litic a l System s, 1968), 8 .
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and fellow and ino . The Congress dutifully complied and the Tachira 
establishm ent was p e rp e tu a te d .^
Personally , Medina Angarita was easygoing and far more liberal 
than his two immediate p red ecesso rs . Po litical parties were allowed 
to  organize and function, and many were allow ed to  win se a ts  in the 
Congress . A minimum of labor organization w as to le ra ted , and the • 
firs t so c ia l security  and income tax  laws were introduced. Many of 
th e se  programs were financed by a new law of 1943 regulating foreign 
oil com panies in  V enezuela. The governm ent's share of petroleum 
profits was increased  from nearly  seventeen to  th irty-tw o per cen t. 
P o litica lly , however, Medina A ngarita 's liberalism  had its  lim its; 
and , as . 1945 rolled  around, he began lining up support for h is  chosen 
su ccesso r.
The trad itio n a lis t elem ents of Venezuela, the large landowners 
and some senior army o ffice rs , were very unhappy with P resident 
Medina A ngarita 's libertarian  ten d en c ies . All of the officers from 
Tachira, and especia lly  ex-P residen t Lopez C ontreras, had a  more 
personal motive for being unhappy w ith the P residen t. Medina 
Angarita had v io lated  the code of the purple (Purple is  the color of ' 
Tachira.). Since the days of C astro , men from Tachira controlled
^ L o t t ,  "V enezuela," 241; and M arsland, V enezuela, 251.
®®Blank, Venezuela Election Factbook, 8-9; M arsland, 
Venezuela. 252; and Lett, "V enezuela," 242.
V enezuela, "when one Tachirense died or re tired , another Tachirense
r 7
took h is p lace. But Medina Angarita surrounded him self with 
in te llec tu a ls  from C aracas, and his fellow andinos see thed . By 1945, 
the rift between Lopez Contreras and the President was com plete. 
O bviously, Medina A ngarita 's control of the Congress and the electo ral 
machinery was sufficien t to e lec t constitu tionally  his chosen su ccesso r.
Force of arms seemed to  be the only a lternative  of the Venezuelan
✓ 58"right'1 which lined up behind the candidacy of Lopez C ontreras.
"During the summer of 1945 the nation w as ten se  am idst rumors tha t
the pax ta c h ire n se , which had  enforced po litica l order ever since  the
turn of the cen tu ry , was about to be broken by c iv il war between the
lo p ec is tas  and m ed in is tas . 1,58
In O ctober, 1945, President Medina A ngarita, concentrating upon
the th rea t from the righ t, was overthrown by a golpe de estado  led by a
group of young officers and supported by the Venezuelan " le f t . "
V enezuela's transitiona l period from caudillism  to  m ilitarism  w as over,
for th is  1945 coup had a l l  the qualitie s  of contemporary m ilitarism .
The movement w as conspiratorial; the golpe had been carefully  planned.
The President &nd Lcfpez Contreras for good measure) were quickly
c 7
M arsland, V enezuela, 252. 
58Ibld.
89Lieuw en, V en ezu ela , 6 2 -6 3 .
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arrested  and ex iled . The junior officers occupied the key communica­
tion  centers of the country and announced to the nation their motives:i
to  in stitu te  un iversal suffrage, in s ta ll  c iv ilian  government, promote 
constitu tional reform and create  a p rofessional, apolitical m ilitary.
They denounced any intention to  rule th em selv es. The rebel officers 
se t up a provisional junta to  run the country and, to  most peop le 's
su rp rise , allow ed a c iv ilian , Romulo Betancourt, to  become provisional
* 60 p resid en t.
In 1944, for a varie ty  of reaso n s , the rebellious young officers 
(none ranked above major) had formed the Patriotic M ilitary Union 
(UPM) which spearheaded the movement to overthrow President Medina 
A ngarita. Its  th ree  most im portant members were Maj ors Carlos Delgado 
Chalbaud and M arcos Perez Jimenez and Captain Mario V argas. To 
in stig a te  a purely military coup would have been in co n sis ten t with the 
aim s of the UPM; so the young officers invited V enezuela's b es t organ­
ized  po litica l party , Democratic Action (AD), to  become a co­
conspirator. As expected , the leadership  of Democratic Action, long 
vocal in their denunciation of m ilitary ru le , procrastinated; but, when 
i t  became ev iden t th a t the UPM would a c t ,  regard less of AD's dec ision , 
the la tte r decided to accep t the offer. Thus, Romulo Betancourt, the
^Rom ulo Betancourt, Venezuela: Politica v Petroleo (Mexico 
City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1956), 180-190; and Lieuwen,
"A Revolutionary Force," 33.
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leader of AD, w as allow ed to  become the provisional,president of
fi 1Venezuela in  O ctober, 1945.
I t truly seemed as  if  Venezuela had entered a  new e ra . The 
armed forces had pronounced for rep resen ta tive , dem ocratic govern­
ment; the w ill of the many and not ju s t the few finally  would be 
rea lized . Yet ample cause for pessim ism  ex is ted , for the ostensib le  
motives of the UPM in  ousting the P resident were designed simply to  
a ttrac t wide popular approval. Their ulterior reaso n s, according to 
one Venezuelan authority , were a s  follows:
Gom ecista holdovers refused to retire; promotions were slow 
or non -ex isten t; techn ica l improvements were blocked by 
superior officers; a wide varie ty  of m ilitary reforms were 
re jec ted  by the leadersh ip . Salaries for m iddle- and jun io r- 
lev e l officers were low, and prospects of ra ise s  were s lig h t. 
Comparable m ilitary men elsew here in Latin America were 
proceeding with a ltera tions and a general modernization tha t 
seem ed possib le  in  V enezuela. In sho rt, a stagnation  ex isted  
w hich th ese  officers were determ ined to  d isp e l. 62
The pessim ism  referred to  above is  derived from the corporate designs
of the UPM. Their primary motive for intervention w as not patriotism ;
i t  was in s titu tio n a l s e lf- in te re s t.
N ev erth e less, for the moment, Venezuela would-be governed by
an adm inistration staffed  by c iv ilians and oriented toward dem ocracy.
The provisional government la s te d  from O ctober, 1945, to  February,
1948. It w as run largely  by members of Democratic Action; AD's
Cl
Lieuwen, Arms and P o litic s , 84; and M arsland, V enezuela, 
253-254.
®^Martz, Accion D em ocratica, 302.
program became the governm ent's program. There w as complete 
po litica l freedom, and po litical parties mushroomed in  s ize  and 
number; v as t strides were made in education; V enezuela's prostrate 
agriculture was revived; dom estic industry  was encouraged by the 
s ta te ; labor w as encouraged to  organize; the M inistry of H ealth 's budget
*
w as quadrupled; real agrarian reform w as introduced; universal suffrage 
became a  reality ; and elections were honest and th e ir  resu lts  re sp ec ted . 
On December 14, 1947, for the firs t time in  h istory , Venezuelans w ent 
to  the  polls en m asse and e lec ted  a presiden t. Their choice was Romulo 
G allegos, the AD candidate , a novelis t and elder s ta te sm an .' He w as 
inaugurated on February 15, 1948.*^
President G allegos' term w as halted  on November 24, 1948, when- 
h is  leg a l, constitu tional, dem ocratically-chosen  adm inistration w as 
overthrown by a military golpe de e s tad o . Once again  the military had 
corporate reasons for in tervention , y e t th is  undertaking was not w ithout 
considerable c iv ilian  support. Democratic Action's program and i ts  
im plem entation a liena ted  several elem ents of the c iv ilian  sector. I ts  
revolutionary plan of agrarian  reform caused  the large landowners to  
become the governm ent's most b itter antagonists. Industria lis ts  vo iced  
predictions of soc ia l upheaval a s  the strength of organized labor 
in c reased . The m ilitary a lso  received  urging from a  new , unexpected
^ L o t t ,  "V enezuela," 242; Lieuwen, V enezuela, 75-87; and 
M arsland, V enezuela. 255-258.
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source, V enezuela's nascen t political p a rtie s , esp ec ia lly  the 
Democratic Republican Union (URD) and the Independent Committee for 
Political and Electoral Organization (COPEI). The AD government of 
1945-1948 w as highly p artisan . Patronage was monopolized; URD 
and COPEI were allowed no part In adm inistration; and with AD's 
. ''e lectoral base growing rapidly due to  i ts  grass roots reform program, 
the position of V enezuela's opposition parties would remain hopeless 
un less a change occurred. The armed forces of Venezuela would 
probably have acted  ag a in st President G allegos with or without c iv ilian  
encouragem ent. N ev erth e less, c iv ilian  d isconten t undoubtedly served 
as  a ca ta ly tic  agent for th e  military.
The s ta ted  motives of the m ilitary in justify ing  the ir action  were 
a ltru istic :
/
The armed forces d isso lved  Accion Democratica because i t  . 
attem pted to  inc ite  the  people to  conduct a general strike of 
a p o litica l nature, because it  tr ied  to  destroy th e  in s titu ­
tional essen ce  of th e  armed forces and convert i t  into an 
instrum ent of the ir design , and because an extrem ist faction 
of the party was attem pting to m aintain itse lf  in  power by 
d iverse means of so c ia l d isin tegration .
This situation  caused  the armed forces to  assum e control 
of the government in  order to stop  the po litical chaos.
(54Lieuwen, V enezuela, 74-89; and M arsland, V enezuela, 257-259. 
C ivilian groups urging the military to  intervene in  th e ir  nation 's  po litics 
is  a frequent occurrence in Latin Am erica. For an exam ination of th is  
problem see Johnson, "The Latin American M ilitary a s  a Competing 
Group in  T ransitional Society , " 124.
^ Venezuela, O ficina Nacional de Informacion, Documentos 
relativos a l movlmiento m ilitar del 24 de noviembre de 1948 (C aracas: 
Imprenta N acional, 1949), 19-20, 29; c ited  in Lieuwen; Arms and 
P o litic s , 8 6 .
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Romulo Betancourt, speaking for AD, countered:
Democratic Action did not have an inflexible ho stility  toward 
the armed fo rc e s .. . .  But we recognized tha t the army's only 
function was that a ss ig n ed  it under legal dem ocratic p ro cesses , 
tha t i s ,  that of an in stitu tio n  of a professional and technical 
characte r, subordinate to  the executive power, entirely 
removed from p o lit ic s .
AD was fa ith fu l to the above stated  position  v is -a -v is  the armed 
fo rces . I t ca tered  to dem ands of the younger officers by publicizing 
th is view , cashiering  most of the officers above the rank of major, 
granting lib e ra l salary in c re a se s , and sponsoring improved living and 
training fa c ilitie s  for the m ilitary . In sp ite  of th is program, the m ilitary 
became increasing ly  apprehensive toward AD, for many officers believed 
the government, if perm itted, would destroy  their s ta tu s  by creating 
some sort of civ ilian  m ilitia  as  a counterweight to  the armed fo rc e s . 
Three years of dem ocratic, c iv ilian  government in Venezuela, of w hat­
ever qu a lity , was not enough to  change th e  po litica l habits of the m ili­
tary . Backed by over a century  of trad itio n , the armed forces of 
Venezuela w ere not prepared to  support th e  government; they w anted to 
be the government.
A fu ll-fledged  military, junta was s e t  up to  rep lace the G allegos 
government. The junta w as composed of three o fficers , two of whom
fiflBetancourt, Po litica y Petroleo, 461-470.
67Lieuwen, V enezuela. 87-89; and Johnson, "The Latin American 
Military a s  a  Competing Group in T ransitional Society , "113.
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had been leaders of the UPM. The president of the junta was 
Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Delgado Chalbaud; the  other members 
were Major Marcos Pe'rez Jime'hez and Lieutenant Colonel Luis Felipe 
Llovera Pa'ez, both from Tachira. M ost of AD's reform program was 
abandoned by the new government. Labor unions were abolished and 
most of the ir leadership  imprisoned or ex iled , agrarian reform was 
halted  com pletely, advances in education , deemed dangerous to  the
so c ia l order by the m ilitary , were severely  curtailed  and AD w as out-
. 68 law ed .
V enezuela's p e a san ts , industria l workers and students had gained 
much under AD. It was th ese  three elem ents, representing far over fifty 
per cent of the Venezuelan population, th a t would suffer most under the 
decade of m ilitary rule th a t followed 1948.®^ The g reat m asses of 
Venezuelans came to rea lize  the importance of having a government 
sym pathetic to  the ir p ligh t. Three years of c iv ilian  government had 
acce lera ted  the revolution of rising  expecta tions in  V enezuela. Momen­
ta rily , th is  hitherto  oppressed m ass of Venezuelans had experienced 
so c ia l and economic betterm ent; they would remain a source of d is s a t is ­
faction and unrest to  an indifferent m ilitary regim e. Even V enezuela'si
sm all but growing middle sec to r, po litica lly  connected w ith URD and
®®Holmes,. "Army Challenge in Latin A m erica," 184; Lieuwen, 
V enezuela. 89-91; and Blank, Venezuela Election Factbook, 10.
®^For a  c loser exam ination of the 1948 Venezuelan coup a s  a 
holding action  for the "right" ag a in st p ressures from the " le f t ,"  see  
Lieuwen, "A Revolutionary F o rc e ," 32-36.
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COPEI, eventually would become alienated from the m ilitary govem -
’ ment th a t it  had encouraged in 1948. The chance of attain ing  power
under AD had been slim ; under the military i t  became im possib le . By
1948, and to  increasing degrees thereafter, socio-econom ic ju s tice
and po litica l liberty became identified  with civ ilian  ru le .
The military jun ta ruled Venezuela until November 19, 1950, when
its  head . Lieutenant Colonel Delgado Chalbaud, was a s sa ss in a te d  under« , %
m ysterious circum stances Marcos Perez Jimenez became the new
strong man of V enezuela. In keeping with constitu tional procedure and
p ractice , the m ilitary regime ca lled  for national e lections on November 30,
1952. A pro-government party w as formed, the  Independent Electoral
/ 71Front (FEI), whose candidate w as the now Colonel Pe'rez Jimelnez. So
j
confident was the government of v ictory , th a t  i t  allowed URD and COPEI 
to campaign and en ter their respective  presiden tia l cand ida tes, Jovito 
VillaLba and Rafael C aldera. Villalba and Caldera campaigned vigorously. 
URD's program demanded d rastic  reform, w hile COPEI ca lled  for a more
70Delgado C halbaud's a s s a s s in  was Rafael Simon Urbina, a 
soldier of fortune, who was subsequently  sho t "while trying to e s c a p e ." 
These bizarre circum stances c a s t much susp icion  on V enezuela's new 
strong man, Marcos Pdrez Jim dnez. M ost of the questions ra ised  con­
cerning th is episode are s t i l l  unansw ered. For an in te resting  treatm ent 
of Delgado C halbaud 's a ssa ss in a tio n  se t ag a in st a backdrop of in te r­
national o il intrigue between Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil see 
Herbert W endt, The Red, W hite, and Black Continent: Latin America— 
Land of Reformers and Rebels (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), 169-170.
71 Lieuw en. V en ezu ela , 9 0 -9 1 .
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moderate reform government. The elections were conducted under the
AD-authored constitu tion  of 1947, which permitted un iversal suffrage.
72The resu lts  were a farce . When returns indicated tha t URD would 
win by a lan d slid e , the government slapped a  tig h t censorship  on a ll 
election  n ew s. On December 2 , the government announced th a t Marcos 
Perez Jimenez had been e lec ted . The ‘following year a new constitu ­
tio n , enhancing the power of the p residen t, was prom ulgated, URD
73w as outlawed and Jovito Villalba joined Romulo Betancourt in  ex ile .
Once again a native  son of Tachira ruled Venezuela.
Colonel Marcos Perez Jimenez w as not a caud illo , but a m ilitary 
officer ruling in  the name of the armed fo rc e s . He was quite cognizant 
of the fac t th a t his base of power w as the armed forces and th a t he 
would remain president only a s  long as  he held"the loyalty  of the m ili­
ta ry . With th is  in  mind, P. J . , a s  he was referred to  by most 
V enezuelans, s e t out to keep the armed forces as contented a s  p o ssib le . 
M ost of V enezuela's $2 m illion -a-day  oil royalties were spent on the 
m ilitary . O fficers' sa la ries  were ra ised  to seductive le v e ls , and 
United S tates arms shipm ents .were supplemented w ith the f in e s t foreign 
'  manufactured equipm ent, including British-made je t s .  Officers occupied
72Lieuwen, Arms and P o litic s , 87.
72Leo B. Lott, "The 1952 Venezuelan Elections; A Lesson for 
1957, " The W estern Po litical Quarterly X (September. 1957), 541-58; 
Beatty, "Venezuela: A New E ra," 145; Lott, "V enezuela," 242; and 
Lieuwen, V enezuela. 91-93 .
the most important and lucrative government p o s itio n s . It wa s not 
unusual to  find m ilitary bases with famous paintings in each room, 
Persian rugs on floors polished like m irrors, c ry sta l chandeliers, and 
g reat windows with s ilk  damask d rapes. Since many officers were not 
allowed in  the more a ris to cra tic  country clubs of Venezuela, P. J . 
built the $10 million Circulo M ilitar in C aracas, the most sumptuous 
o fficers ' club in th e  world. I t is  "Latin America's most expensive 
monument to the inferiority  complex of o fficers . "7^
The philosophy of the Perez Jimenez regime was the "New
N ational Ideal. " I t w as provided by P. J. 's  c lo se  friend and advisor,
Laureano V allenilla Lanz, son of the Gomez apologist of the same name
7 5who created the dem ocratic caesa r concept. The th e s is  of the New 
N ational Ideal w as simple: V enezuela's g rea tes t need w as economic 
progress, and since she was not ready for democracy and representative 
in s titu tio n s , a d ictatorsh ip  committed to  economic advancement w as the 
b es t possib le  government for her. In the words of Marcos Perez 
Jim enez, the New N ational Ideal was dedicated  to  the following program:
74Johnson, The M ilitary and Society in  Latin America, 131, 172- 
173; Milton S . Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The U .S . and Latin 
America (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963), 193; Geoffrey Bocca, "The 
Rape of V enezuela,"  Coronet XUV (December 14, 1959), 127; Thager 
W aldo, "Why Latin America D istrusts U s ,"  H arper's M agazine CCXVII 
(November, 1958), 85; and "Venezuela Topples a D ic ta to r ," Senior 
Scholastic  LXXII (February 14, 1958), 10.
75  /uM artz, Accion D em ocratica, 94.
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The m oral, in te llec tu a l and m aterial improvement of the 
inhabitants of the fatherland and the rational transformation 
of its  physical environment, to  permit Venezuelans to  occupy 
the rank which corresponds to her geographical location, her 
extraordinary w ealth and her glorious tradition.^®
The Church, and esp ec ia lly  landowners and foreign in v esto rs , 
were extremely contented with the New N ational Ideal. Never a 
powerful influence in  V enezuela, the Church's continued non­
involvem ent w as assured  when the Perez Jimdnez adm inistration pro-
77vided for Catholic instruction  in  public sch o o ls . Land redistribution 
w as ended by P. J . , and once again between two and three per cent of
th e  population owned between seventy-five and ninety per cen t of the
78  /  /land . Venezuela under Perez Jimenez became a paradise for foreign
cap ita l. P lans for a nationally  owned oil company were dropped;
m illions of dollars in new concessions were granted; and P. J . ended
th e  trad ition  estab lished  by his p redecesso rs, civ ilian  and m ilitary, of
increasing  V enezuela's share of oil profits; i t  was reduced from th irty -
seven to tw enty-five per cen t. Yet V enezuela's take from foreign
extraction of her resources increased  by leaps and bounds. P .J . 's  rule
7 fi  ̂ /Venezuela Bajo e l Nuevo Ideal N acional; Realizaciones
Durante e l Gobiemo del Coronel Marcos Perez Timenez (Caracas:
Publicacio'nes des Servicio Informativo Venezolano, 1955), 1.
77F einstein , “The Role of Foreign Investm ent, 11 218.
78Lieuwen, "Political Forces in  Venezuela, " 349; and Eisenhower, 
The Wine is  Bitter. 121.
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coincided with the Korean War and the Suez c r is is , both of which
caused  petroleum production and cost to soar. Besides o il, an
additional source of revenue was discovered , iron o re. United S tates
Steel and Bethlehem S teel began investing millions of dollars in
V enezuela. Foreign investors have ca lled  the Perez Jime'nez years
79V enezuela's most prosperous.
C ivil libe rties  w ithin Venezuela were another m atter. A near
su ccessfu l attem pt was made to  erad icate  po litica l p a rtie s . AD and
URD leaders not already in ja il  or abroad were hunted down, k illed ,
imprisoned or ex iled . By 1953, even COPEI, V enezuela's trad itionally
conservative C hristian Democratic party , fe lt the heavy hand of the
government when the party expelled members who cooperated with 
/ 80Perez Jime'nez. All industria l and peasan t unions were destroyed 
and their leaders persecuted , while the government estab lished  a
81puppet labor confederation with luxurious headquarters in  C aracas.
79 "Five More Y ears," 30; "V enezuela's D ictator is Out, " 
Business Week (February .!, 1958), 80; Andreski, Parasitism  and 
Subversion, 99; W endt, The Red, W hite and Black C ontinent, 171; 
Goldenburg, The Cuban Revolution, 92; F einstein , "The Role of 
Foreign Investm ent, " 218; .and Virgil Salera , "Some Problems of the 
Venezuelan Petroleum Industry, " In ter- American Economic Affairs IX 
(Summer, 1955), 78-98.
80Lott, "The 1952 Venezuelan E lec tio n s ,"  557; Feinste in , "The 
Role of Foreign Investm ent," 219; and Beatty, "Venezuela; A New 
Era, " 148.
81Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, 146, 151; and 
M artz, Accion D em ocratica, 261.
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Freedom of the press d isappeared . The Perez Jimenez regime was 
condemned by the Inter-American Press A ssociation for its  press
censorship , imprisonment of journalists and forcible confiscation
82of new spapers. Education would take  years to recover from the 
setbacks it  met during the New N ational Ideal. P. J . built a new 
beautiful $134 million C entral U niversity  of Venezuela a t Caracas but 
kept i t  c losed  most of the tim e. When i t  did open, government offi­
c ia ls  allow ed no autonomy. With the exception of th e  Central 
U niversity , new school construction did not keep up w ith the popula­
tion growth, while the portion of the budget for education dropped to 
one of the low est in  Latin America. Student dem onstrations, both
university  and high school, were met w ith  m ilitary ac tio n , alw ays
83resulting  in  c a su a ltie s . The d ic ta to r 's  tight grip on the nation was 
enforced by a  huge spy and secre t police network, the National 
S ecu rity .8^ In an interview  with Time, P . J . explained why a ll th is  
was necessary :
I make every effort to  give Venezuelans the kind of government 
adapted to  them .. . .  We are s t i l l  in  our in fan t years and we 
s t i l l  need h a lte rs . . . .  There must be a leader who shows the 
way without being perturbed by the n ecess ity  of winning 
demagogic popularity.
^ B e a tty , "Venezuela: A New E ra ,"  147.
88W alter S . W ashington, "Student Politics in  Latin America: The 
Venezuelan Example, " Foreign Affairs XXXVII (April. 1959), 467; 
Eisenhower, The Wine is  Bitter. 32-33.
Q A
W aldo, "Why Latin America D istru sts U s , "  85; and L ieuw en,
V enezu ela . 92 .
85Time (February 28, 1955), 29.
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D espite the tremendous tax  w ealth th a t entered Venezuela in the 
1950's, the great majority of her people remained poor, unhealthy, 
illite ra te  and domiciled in  the most primitive surroundings. Huge sums 
were spent on frivolous public works projects and highway construc­
tion , where peculation w as most conveniently concealed . Colonel 
Pulido Barreto, P, J . 's  ordnance ch ief, was able to  am ass over $100 
million from parking m eter concessions a lone. P. J . 's  personal fortune 
in 1958 w as estim ated by experts a t  somewhere over $250 million; yet 
V enezuela's school teachers averaged le s s  than $90 a month and over 
ninety per cent of her labor force averaged le s s  than $3 a day.®® 
Economically, Venezuela became more and more dependent upon a 
single extractive industry , thus increasing ly  sen sitiv e  to  events abroad. 
Govemm ent-foreigner investor primacy rather than p rivate , dom estically 
generated cap ita l dominated Venezuela. United S tates companies were 
helping to  es tab lish  in Venezuela the very system  they  bitterly  oppose 
a t home, an  economy directed and controlled by the s ta te . D espite 
years of affluent foreign investm ent, Venezuela under the Tachira 
dynasty failed  to ach ieve what econom ists, c a ll " ta k e -o ff ." The economy 
was backward and unbalanced— "dominated by and dependent upon one
Q C
Lieuwen, Petroleum in  V enezuela. 119-120; "Five More Years, " 
30; Andreski, Parasitism  and Subversion, 98-99; "Friendly Strongmen," 
Time PCX (July 15, 1957), 42; and Lott, "V enezuela," 242.
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commodity, w hile agriculture stagnated , and no sign ifican t private
0 7
dom estic cap ita l market developed.
In April, 1957, the Venezuelan Congress enacted leg isla tion  
which called  for national e lections on December 15th of the same year. 
The experience of the 1952 elections had c a s t the Venezuelan people
go
into a  "morass of cynicism  and d isillusionm ent. " The adm inistra- 
tion tha t would oversee the 1957 elections was the same government 
tha t v io lated  its  promise in 1952; no one took the announced elections 
seriously . In November, true to  popular belief, P resident Perez 
Jimenez made i t  c lear th a t in stead  of an e lection  w ith opposing candi­
d a te s , a  "p leb isc ite"  would be held on the designated day of ballo ting. 
The only name appearing on the ballo t would be M arcos Pe'rez Jime'nez, 
and voters had a choice of voting for or aga inst him. No w rite-in s 
were allow ed. On December 15, 1957, apathy reigned; only govern­
ment em ployees w ent to  the p o lls . So rigged w as th is e lection  tha t 
two hours after the polls c lo sed , Laureano V allenilla Lanz, M inister 
of the Interior, ca lled  reporters to  his office and announced, w ith a 
138 calibre revolver prominently displayed on his d esk , th a t the citizens 
of Venezuela had voted for Pdrez Jimdhez in overwhelming num bers.
87peinstein , "The Role of Foreign Investment," 7, 23, 28, 36. 
^ L o t t ,  "The 1952 Venezuelan E lec tions, “ 541.
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As the new year of 1958 dawned, Venezuela braced its e lf  for five more 
years of m ilitary d ic ta to rs h ip .^
Before concluding and evaluating th is look a t V enezuela's so ld iers 
a s  politicians and in  order to  obtain a more complete picture of the 
national po litica l spectrum , one must exam ine, a t le a s t cursorily , 
V enezuela's other advocates of po litica l to ta litarian ism , the Communists. 
I t may seem strange tha t a single chapter might contain an examination 
of m ilitarism , usually  iden tified  w ith the far righ t, and communism, the 
far le ft. Yet th ese  ideologies have two common features which justify  
th is  jux taposition . The f irs t is  general and commonly accepted; they 
are both an ti-dem ocratic . The second is  unique to  the Venezuelan 
milieu; paradoxically , cooperation had characterized  the relationship  
between V enezuela's communist movement and her m ilitary d ic ta to rs . 
Iron ically , the fortunes of communism in  Venezuela have risen  under 
m ilitarism  and declined under dem ocracy.
The international communist movement did not reach Latin America 
un til some years afte r the 1917 Russian Revolution. In 1928, the date 
of the Sixth C ongress, there were parties functioning in seven  Latin 
American nations; and , subsequently , ce lls  were estab lished  in  a ll the 
Latin American countries w ith March 5, 1931, generally accepted  as  the
8^ Ib id ., 541-557; "Five More Y ears," 30; "General Marcos 
Pe'rez Jime'nez— S till on Top in  V enezuela, " U .S . News and World 
Report XLIII (December 27, 1957), 17; and "When is  a P leb isc ite ,"
386.
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formal founding of the party in Venezuela. Under the fierce d ic ta to r­
sh ip  of Juan Vicente Gomez, Venezuelan communists, a s  everyone 
e ls e , were persecuted. Therefore, the ir ac tiv itie s  and propaganda 
remained meager. The death of Gomez in 1935 and the temporary
V  # .
relaxation of restric tions allow ed the communists to en ter the race 
for popular po litica l support. In order to  achieve strength through 
' unity, V enezuela’s civ ilian  po litica l leaders formed the m onolithic 
N ational Democratic Party (PDN) in  1936. By 1937, the PDN frag­
mented w ith i ts  non-communist members, led by Romulo Betancourt, 
demanded tha t its  communist members break with the Communist In ter­
national, thus permitting the PDN to become a  stric tly  Venezuelan 
organization rather than  a puppet of the Soviet U n io n .C o m p o s in g  
a  sm all minority, the communists le ft the PDN in  1937 and formed the 
Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV). N either party w as able to  thrive 
since President E leazar Lo'pez Contreras soon persecuted them both
q i
with fine im partia lity .
gn
Latin America1 s Communist P arties , including V enezuela 's, have 
always held to the official Soviet lin e . Even with Fidel Castro and the 
Sino-Soviet struggle, the Soviet Union s t i l l  holds the alleg iance of most 
of Latin Am erica's Communist P a rtie s . For a thorough ana lysis  Of th is 
situation  see  Roger Phillip Hamburg, "The Soviet Union and Latin 
America, 1953-1963" (Madison: unpublished PhfD. d isserta tio n , 
U niversity of W isconsin , 1965).
® ̂ Robert J . A lexander, Communism in Latin America (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers U niversity P ress , 1957), 255; Luis E. Aguilar (ed .) , 
Marxism in  Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 10—17; 
Rollie E. Poppino, International Communism in Latin America: A History 
of the Movement (London: Free P re ss , 1964), 87; and Salvador de 
M adariaga, Latin America between the Eagle and the Bear (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 145-146.
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The PCV opposed and protested the e lection  of Isaias Medina
Angarita in 1941. By 1942, i t  executed a  complete about-face and
became an ardent friend of the P resident. Its  motives were twofold:
the firs t was in ternational, for Medina Angarita declared him self pro-
Ally shortly after Adolph H itler invaded the Soviet Union; the second
was dom estic, Medina Angarita, far more to leran t than either Lopez
Contreras or Go'mez, never persecuted the Communists and even
rev ised  the C onstitution so as  to  elim inate an artic le  which outlawed
the party. But freedom of po litica l movement for the PCV was not
w ithout its  p rice . In return , the Communists were required to swing
their support behind the p residen t's  congressional cand idates.
Because of th is  cozy arrangem ent, the Communists opposed the 1945
golpe of the Patrio tic M ilitary Union, but declared the ir neutrality  when
92they  discovered AD w as involved.
The PCV rem ained prostrate during the tr ien io , the three years 
of Democratic Action directed government (1945-1948). Provisional 
P resident Romulo Betancourt made i t  c lear th a t, like h is p redecessor, 
he would not interfere with the ir legitim ate po litical a c tiv itie s , but, 
unlike his p redecessor, he would refuse the ir cooperation. During the 
trien io , therefore, V enezuela's Communists were alienated  from the 
centers of power. From 1945 to  1948, the PCV a lso  experienced b itter
^ V ic to r Alba, H istoria del Movimiento Obrero, 222; and 
Alexander, Communism in  Latin America, 256-259.
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sch ism . A growing difference of opinion over cooperation with Medina 
Angarita was carried over into the trien io  and aggravated by the issu e  
of whether or not to cooperate with the AD government. This fragmenta­
tion was heightened by personal am bitions of individual party members 
One faction , the "Red Com m unists," w as led by Juan Bautista Fuenmayor 
and favored coexistence w ith AD. The other faction tabbed them selves 
"Black C om m unists," and advocated a l l  action th a t might d iscred it the 
Betancourt and G allegos adm in istra tions. Although the sp lit w as not 
mended un til 1952, both groups were elated  by the 1948 golpe de estado 
and the new m ilitary regim e's in tense persecution of AD. Communist 
labor and .student organizers began pouring into the vacuum created 
when Democratic Action and a l l  its  leaders were declared personae non 
g ra tae . The m ilitary junta did not m olest the Communists
Marcos Perez Jimenez w as quick to  rea lize  the po ten tia lities of 
organized labor a s  a power base  in  a fa sc is t d ic tato rsh ip . His close 
friend , Juan Domingo Peron of A rgentina, had proven th a t even the m ili­
tary  could be forced into subm ission when brought face -to -face  with 
m illions of determined w orkers. P. J . , in  order to  further secure 'h is 
hold over V enezuela, w anted to  emulate the Peron example; but to  break 
AD’s hold over national labor and e s tab lish  his own organization would
qq
Alexander, Communism in Latin America. 259-264; Poppino, 
In ternational Communism. 88; Holm es, "Army Challenge in  Latin 
A m erica," 174; and M artz, Accion D em ocratica, 261.
take tim e. W ith th is  in mind, Colonel Perez Jimenez outlawed the Red 
Communists but le ft the Black Communists relatively  free to  operate, 
particularly in the labor movement. The Black Communist Federation 
of Workers w as the only labor organization granted legal recognition 
by the Perez Jimenez government. P. J. 's  motives were three: with 
the backing of th is  communist federation he could claim  a  semblance 
of. labor support; abetting the communists would help offset Democratic 
Action influence; and, most im portant, the Black Communists served as 
sp ies for the government in its  persecution of AD, URD, COPEI and 
Red Communist labor lead ers . In 1952, Pe^ez Jimenez was finally  
able to  es tab lish  a  national, governm ent-controlled labor union, 
M .O .S .I .T . (Movimiento Obrero S indical Independiente de Trabaiadores). 
"Significantly enough, most of its  principal leaders were ex-commu­
n i s t s . " ^
As 1958 dawned in V enezuela, the forces of democracy faced a 
dim future. The Communist Party in Venezuela was growing at a  rapid 
pace, especially  among industria l workers and stu d en ts , particularly 
a t  V enezuela's mammoth Central U niversity in C aracas. This increased  
strength w as not derived from the popularity of M arxist-Leninism , but
^A lex an d er, Communism in Xatin Am erica. 267-269; M artz,
Accion D em ocratica. 261; A lexander, Organized Labor in Latin 
America. 146-147; "Embarrasing E x ile s ,"  Time LXII (June 2, 1958),
30; and Johnson, The M ilitary and Society in Latin Am erica, 144-145.
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from the unpopularity of the military d ic ta to rsh ip . The Communist 
Party was the only organization s t i l l  functioning with which c iv ilians 
opposing the regime could identify . la te r ,  when Pe'rez Jimdnez began 
persecuting the Black Communists because they  had outlived their 
u se fu ln ess , the PCV remained the most powerful c iv ilian  group w ithin 
Venezuela. In the  firs t p lace , being more or le s s  an underground move-I
ment, it  p o ssessed  the b es t experience and training in  clandestine
ac tiv itie s ; and , secondly, i t  possessed  an ample source of revenue
95unavailable to other p a rtie s , the Communist In ternational.
Complementing the advantages of the PCV was its  powerful, 
though unwitting a lly , the United S tates of America. Deep resentm ent
towards the U .S .A . developed among Venezuelans during the Perez
/  ' *
Jimenez adm inistration. This resu lted  not so much from our m aintain­
ing cordial re la tions and supplying millions of dollars worth of m ilitary 
m aterial to a highly unpopular d ic tato rsh ip , but because the United 
S tates went "out of its  way to  pay homage to  h is r e g i m e . H a t e d  
Pedro Estrada, P . J . 's  sec re t police ch ief, was received  en th u sias ti­
ca lly  when he v is ited  W ashington, D . C ,; Colonel Perez'Jime'nez w as 
made an "honorary submariner" by the U .S . Navy; and , worst of a l l ,  in  . 
1954, P resident Dwight D . Eisenhower conferred the leg ion of M erit on
QC
F einste in , "The Role of Foreign In v estm en t," 219-220; M artz, 
Accion D em ocratica, 292; and M adariaga, Latin America, 23.
•^A lexander, Communism in Latin America. 269.
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Marcos Perez Jimenez for "specia l meritorious conduct in  the fu lfill-
97ment of h is high functions. . . . "
D espite increased  communist strength , a s  1958 made its  appear­
ance, the armed fo rces, as they had for most of V enezuela's h isto ry , 
were in  complete control of the s itua tion . Their record was poor. 
Venezuela was a t once the rich est and the poorest nation of Latin 
America. In the minds of m illions of V enezuelans, despotism  was 
tantam ount to military ru le , and m ilitary rule meant a retarded economic 
system , o ffic ia l corruption, educational backw ardness and mass m isery . 
Either because of in stitu tiona l conservatism , corporate se lf- in te re s t,
H ispanic American Report VII (August, 1954), 22; Beatty, 
"Venezuela; A New E ra ,"  148; W aldo, "Why Latin America D istrusts 
U s ,"  84-86; Andreski, Parasitism  and Subversion. 99; and F einstein ,
"The Role of Foreign Investm ent, " 218-219. The best diplom atic study 
of the Eisenhower adm inistration and.Latin America is  John A. W inters, 
"Eisenhower—Good Partner of Latin American D ictators: A C ritical 
Study of U .S . Hemispheric D efense Policy, " (Chicago: unpublished 
Ph .D . d isse rta tio n , U niversity of Chicago, 1962).
In 1953, P resident Eisenhower sen t h is brother, M ilton S. 
Eisenhower, on a fact-finding  m ission to Latin America. /M ilto n  S. 
Eisenhower (Special Ambassador), "U .S . —Latin-American Relations_, "
The Department of S tate Bulletin XXIX (November 3, 1953), 695-717/
In 1963, writing of his 1953 v is it to Venezuela, Milton S. Eisenhower 
sta ted  the following: "I could readily  see th a t Pe'rez Jimenez was trying 
to  keep his army as happy as possib le . I knew th a t he had buildings 
full of po litica l prisoners, th a t there  was an undercurrent of po litical 
unrest, and th a t many of his enem ies were in ex ile . " /M ilton S. 
Eisenhower, The Wine is  Bitter: The U .S . and Latin America (Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1963), 193_./ Subsequent ac tions by offic ials of the 
United S tates of America in  decorating Marcos Perez Jime'nez seem  highly 
inconsisten t w ith the findings made by th is  sp ec ia l am bassador, who a lso  
happened to  be a  brother of the  President of the  United S ta te s . M ilton 
E isenhow er's 1953 report.contains no mention of h is 19 63 revelation .
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personal am bition, indifference or ignorance, the armed forces of 
Venezuela had inhibited economic progress and so c ia l ju s tic e . Sooner 
or la te r pent up popular asp ira tions would explode and "dual com­
munism" was prepared to take charge.
As.in V enezuela, two factions of the communist party were operat­
ing in  Fulgencio B atista’s Cuba. One cooperated w ith the dictator to 
make inroads in to  the government, labor unions and student groups, 
w hile the other faction struggled ag a in st Batista to obtain the sympathy 
and support of the m a s s e s . H i n d s i g h t  can provide the remainder of 
the story . When the proper moment arrived, and a propitious vehicle 
presented him self, C uba's communists were ready to  provide tha t 
vehicle with a ll the ingredients necessary  to s e t up a new variety of
Latin American despotism , despotism  of the le f t. As 1958 opened,
J
despotism  of either variety  seem ed to  be V enezuela's inevitab le fa te .
q q
Aguilar, Marxism in Latin America, 36; and Alexander, 
Communism in Latin America, 269.
CHAPTER IV.
VENEZUELA'S POLITICANS AS POLITICIANS
Since 1958 both Venezuela and Cuba have experienced revolu­
tion . These were not typ ical Latin American revolutions because both 
nations, in the course of their revolutionary movements, underwent 
real econom ic, so c ia l and po litical change. The Cuban experience 
was characterized by public t r ia l s , genocide and mass exodus, re su lt­
ing in  the establishm ent of an aggressive communist d ic tato rsh ip . The 
Venezuelan experience w as characterized  by genuine reforms imple­
mented by honestly  e lec ted  o ff ic ia ls , conditions which resu lted  in 
the establishm ent of one of the m ost stab le  dem ocracies in Latin 
A m erica^,The difference between the Venezuela described in  the 
previous chapter and the Venezuela of today is  incred ib le . The 
incredib ility  of th is con trast is  heightened by the fact th a t th is  tran s­
formation occurred w ith a minimal amount of so c ia l d islocation  .
December 15, 1957, was th e  date of the p leb iscite  which 
"elected" Colonel M arcos Perez Jimenez to  a five-year term as 
President of V enezuela. Approximately twelve months la te r , one 
finds Venezuela involved in  another e lec tion . In a free and honest 
co n test, preceded by a spirited  th ree-w ay cam paign, Romulo Betancourt, 
the candidate of the Democratic Action Party, w as elected  to. a five-year
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term as  President of Venezuela. President Betancourt completed his 
entire constitu tional term . "He w as the firs t e lected  c iv ilian  President 
in  the nation 's entire history to do so . "3’
This achievem ent a tta in s  greater significance when viewed 
ag a in st the awesom e problems faced by Romulo Betancourt. Politi­
ca lly , the P resident and his party , AD, were rocked by in ternal schism . 
In 1960, AD's left-w ing broke w ith the party and formed the pro-C astro 
Movimiento de la  Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). In 1962, AD suf­
fered further fragmentation when another estranged element withdrew
2over personal is s u e s  and formed the ARS. Betancourt's coalition  
government of th ree parties, AD, URD and COPEI, nearly  collapsed
^Edwin Lieuwen, Generals v s . P resid en ts . 86 . An outstanding 
study of the adm inistration of Romulo Betancourt is  Robert J. A lexander, 
The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution: A Profile of the Regime of 
Romulo Betancourt (New Brunswick: Rutgers U niversity P re ss , 1964).
A brief, but authoritative biographical sketch  of Betancourt can be 
found in  Harry Kantor, "The Development of A. D. De Venezuela, " 
Journal of Inter-American Studies I (April, 1959), 239-243.
2
Peter Snow, "Political Party Spectrum in  Venezuela, " Caribbean 
S tudies IV (January, 1965), 36-47; and Taylor, "Democracy for 
V enezuela? , " 284-290. The in itia ls  ARS do not represen t specific  
words but were taken  from a C aracas public relations firm, Publicidad 
ARS, whose slogan was "Let us think for you . " The Venezuelan press 
implied th is was what the ARS faction of AD was saying to President 
Betancourt. Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution,
80-83.
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in 1960, when the Democratic Republican Union withdrew in  pro test
3
over strained relations between Venezuela and C uba.
The Venezuelan economy was uncertain . From 1958 to I960, 
foreign cap ita l fled Venezuela. This "capital flight" took place 
because the comrade of the foreign com panies, Pe^rez Jim enez, was 
no longer in  power; but more sp ec ifica lly , it  was due to b u sin ess ' 
fear and d is tru s t of a civ ilian  government tha t would have to  bid for 
popular support.^  Contributing to the m alaise of the economy was 
the legacy of the New N ational Ideal: Venezuelan agriculture could 
not feed her people; slums were appearing overnight filled  with unem­
ployed, unsk illed  migrants; the co lo ssa l graft and u se le s s  public 
projects of P . J . and his cronies le ft the country deeply in debt; and 
forty per cent of V enezuela1 s school-age children were without the 
m ost basic  educational f a c i l i t ie s .5
As if th ese  obstac les were not sufficient challenge, Betancourt 
a lso  was plagued by foreign intervention in the in ternal affairs of
3  ̂ /J. M. Dominquez C hacin, "URD y la Revolucion, Cubana, “ in
Jovito Villalba M M  (ec*s •)/ URD y la Revolucion Cubana (C aracas:
Editorial D octrina, 1961), 3-10,
^M ostafa F. H assan , "C apital Flight: V enezuela, 1958-1960," 
Inter-American Economic Affairs XVII (Autumn, 1963), 53-73; and 
"Venezuela's D ictator is  O ut,"  79-80.
C
Tad Szulc, The Winds of Revolution: Latin America Today—and 
Tomorrow (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 64-95; and Rippy, 
"Latin America's Postwar Golpes de Estado, " 73-80.
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V enezuela. Democracy in  the Caribbean was not in the plans of the 
Dominican R epublic 's d ic ta to r, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. In January, 
1960, a Tightest military coup, directly  a s s is te d  by Trujillo, was 
un successfu l. When th is attem pt to bring down the Betancourt 
government fa iled , a bomb plot to a s sa ss in a te  the P resident, per­
sonally planned and supplied by Trujillo , was carried out in June, 
1960. The Venezuelan P residen t's  m ilitary aid w as killed; and Romulo 
Betancourt, badly burned, h is vision and hearing severely  im paired, 
remained bedridden for s ix  months . As a resu lt of the charges brought 
ag a in st the Dominican Republic by Venezuela before the O rganization
of American S ta te s , for the  firs t time in its  h istory  th a t organization
!) e
condemned a  member s ta te  and imposed sanctions ag a in st i t .
With the a s sa ss in a tio n  of Rafael Trujillo in May, 1961, 
V enezuela's ex ternal th rea t from the right was s ilen ced . I ts  place 
w as taken by a combined ex ternal-in ternal threat from the le ft cham­
pioned by Pidel C astro 's Cuba. C astro 's  Venezuelan arm w as the 
Armed Forces of N ational Liberation (FIAN), a te rro ris t organization 
staffed by the MIR and the pro-C astro  wing of the Venezuelan 
Communist P arty . 7 Aware th a t they lacked the necessary  strength to
^Alexander, The Venezuelan Democratic' Revolution. 142-144; 
and Romulo Betancourt, “The Venezuelan M iracle, " The Reporter 
XXXI (August 13, 1964), 38-40.
7The most balanced Venezuelan account of FIAN terrorism  is  
Rodolfo Jose‘S C ardenas, La InsurTeccio'n Popular en Venezuela 
(Caracas: Ediciones Catatumbo, 1961).
topple the government, FLAN's goal was to  cause such disorder and 
confusion through urban and rural insurgency, property destruction 
and a s sa s s in a tio n s , th a t the military would be com pelled to in te r­
vene . This would enable Fidel Castro and his Venezuelan followers 
to rally  the m asses aga in st a reactionary , m ilitary d ic ta to rsh ip .
FIAN violence took a heavy to ll , but effective m ilitary and police 
counterm easures directed by the government neutralized  its  ac tiv itie s  
and undermined C astro 's  prestige in  Venezuela. On November 2 , 1963, 
a four ton cache of arms was discovered on the Northwest co ast of 
V enezuela. An OAS investiga tion  team subsequently  proved, beyond
any doubt, th a t the arms had come from Cuba and th a t they were to be
g J
used to  produce a blood bath in C aracas. FLAN bent the Betancourt 
government but did not break i t .
Romulo Betancourt w eathered the storm; Venezuelan democracy 
and V enezuela's civ ilian  p o litic ian s , trad itionally  Latin America's 
w eakest and most obscure, had proven the ir ab ility  to  endure. On 
December 1, 1963, amid FLAN threats of rep risals for anyone who 
participated in  the e lec tio n s , n inety-one per cent of V enezuela's
®Arthur Preston W hitaker, "C uba's Intervention in  Venezuela:
A Test of the Q .A .S ., " Orbis VII (Fall, 1964), 511-536; Edwin 
Lieuwen, The U .S . and the Challenge to Security in Latin America 
(Columbus: Ohio S tate U niversity  P re ss , 1966), 78-79; Taylor, 
"Democracy for Venezuela? , " 285-286; and Betancourt, "The 
Venezuelan M iracle, " 37-40.
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reg istered  voters turned out and elected  AD's Raul Leoni President of 
Venezuela. At midday on March 11, 1964, with great pomp and 
splendor, occurred "one of the g rea test events in contemporary Latin
Q
American po litics . " For the firs t time in  the history of Venezuela, 
power w as transferred , orderly and peacefu lly , from one dem ocrati­
cally  e lec ted  ch ief executive to  h is legitim ate s u c c e s s o r .10
Like Betancourt, Raul Leoni was one of the charter members of 
Democratic Action and he had long been recognized as  the popular 
choice of Venezuelan labor. Leoni became the second dem ocratically 
chosen presiden t of h is country to  serve out h is constitu tional term . 
Although the problems faced by the former M inister of Labor were not
of the magnitude of those encountered by Betancourt, Leoni's adm in-
,y
is tra tio n  had its  share of d ifficu ltie s . As soon as  Leoni took office, 
COPEI abandoned its  coalition  partnership w ith AD in  favor of the role 
of loyal opposition . This precip itated  a  cabinet c r is is ,  and the new
^JohnD . M artz, The Venezuelan E lections of December 1, 1963 
(W ashington, D. C .: Institu te  for the Comparative Study of Political 
System s, 1964), 1. This monograph is  the definitive work on the 1963 
Venezuelan e le c tio n s .
^ Ja m es  D. Cochrane, "The Venezuelan Executive: Background 
M aterial for a Study of the Leoni Adm inistration, " Caribbean Studies
VI (January, 1967), 61-64. To many N ortham ericans, the  transfer of 
po litica l power from one man to  another might appear routine, but for 
Latin America, with her personalistic  culture and trad ition , th is  is  a 
ra re , incom prehensible e v en t. For more on th is  problem see  Frank ■ 
Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to  Latin America (New York: Vintage Books, 
1966), 145-146.
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president was forced to sea rch  desperate ly  for other a llie s  in order to 
m aintain h is government, ***■ In 19 65 inflation hit V enezuela, followed, 
in  1966, by a drop in  petroleum production, severe contraction in the 
ava ilab ility  of credit and the flight of cap ita l. ^  Fidel C astro and the 
FIAN continued to harass the government. Under Leoni, V enezuela's 
te rro rist le ft concentrated its  efforts on urban insurgency and used its  
influence in labor to c a ll w ildcat strikes in the hope of disrupting the 
economy.
Raul Leoni w eathered the s to m , as  had h is predecessor; and 
once again  amid th reats of v iolence and rep ression , Venezuelans 
turned out in record-breaking numbers on December 1, 1968, to  e lec t 
a new presiden t. Their choice fe ll on Rafael Caldera of COPEI, 
V enezuela's Christian Democratic Party. C aldera 's victory w as a
11 COPEI's motives in  breaking with AD are carefully analyzed 
in Franklin Tugwell, "The C hristian Democrats of V enezuela, " Tournal 
of Inter-American Studies VII (April, 1965), 245-267. For an excellen t 
biographical sketch  of Raul Leoni see Cochrane, "Venezuelan 
E xecutive," 61-73.
1 9 The Venezuelan petroleum industry  and , therefore, the entire 
economy were adversely  affected  by increased  competition from the 
Middle E ast. "Venezuela Snaps Back," In ternational Commerce LXXIV 
(February 26, 1968), 15-17; and Taylor, "Democracy for Venezuela? , " 
287.
^L ieu w en , The U .S . and the Challenge to Security . 64-65; and 
Taylor, "Democracy for V enezuela? , " 286.
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a slim  one, for AD1 s Gonzalo Barrios ran a c lose  second. ^  Never­
th e le s s , the verdict o f  the voters was honored. On March 11, 1969, 
Raul Leoni removed the red p residen tia l sa sh  and draped i t  over the
shoulders o f Rafael C aldera, sym bolizing the transfer of executive 
15power. In the opinion of th is au thor, the e lection  and assum ption 
of power by Caldera w as of momentous importance for the future of
Venezuelan dem ocracy. For the second time in the na tio n 's  h istory ,\
p residen tia l power was transferred , orderly and peacefully , from one 
dem ocratically elected  ch ief executive to  h is legitim ate su ccesso r. 
More sign ifican t, how ever, is  the fac t th a t for the firs t time in  the 
history of V enezuela, power was p assed  from one po litica l party to 
another. For the firs t tim e , V enezuela's "ou ts , ".w ithout resort to 
repression  or civ il w ar, succeeded in becoming V enezuela's " in s ."
A crucial te s t  of constitu tional democracy had been met.
If the  sudden surge of dem ocratic p rocesses in contemporary 
Venezuela seem s rem arkable, of equal in te re s t is  the performance 
of V enezuela1 s armed fo rces , traditionally  the most po litica lly - 
inclined m ilitary estab lishm ent in Latin America. Relations between
•^W all Street Tournal, December 17, 1968; and The Times- 
P icayune, December 5 , 1968.
•^ D iscurso del Presidente de la Republica Dr. Rafael Caldera 
en e l Acto de la Toma de Posesion del Cargo (Caraca s : Imprenso en 
Venezuela por Cromotip, 11 de Marzo de 1969).
the three c iv ilians who have governed Venezuela s ince  1959 and the 
military have been marked by com plete subservience and obedience 
of the la tte r to  the former. The commands of the four serv ices (army,* i
navy, a ir  force and national guard) have been firm in  the ir support of
1 fidem ocratic government. °
From the very beginning, P resident Betancourt, in his frequent
m essages to  the nation , "repeatedly p raised  the officer corps for its
ap o litic a l, p ro fessional comportment, for its  loyalty  and for its
patriotism . In April, 1960, and in  May and June, 1961, attem pted
golpes de estado by Tightest elements in the Army were crushed in a
combined Army-Navy-Air Force a s s a u lt .  In May, 1962, a serious
Navy-M arine revolt led by le f tis t , pro-C astro  officers was quelled by
18troops loyal to  the government.
The e lection  of labor-oriented Raul Leoni in 1963, coupled with
»
the age-o ld  susp icion  of V enezuela's m ilitary officers toward civilian
p o litic ian s , caused  some to fear for the future of democracy in  
19Venezuela. . This f§ar proved to be groundless. Relations between
■^Blank, Venezuela Election Factbook, 25.
*7Lieuwen, Generals v s . P re s id en ts , 88.
18I b id . , 89; Lieiiwen, The U. S.  and the Challenge to  Security. 73 
and John Donovan, Red M achete: Communist Infiltration in the 
Americas (New York: Bobbs-M errill, 1962), 142-143.
19Lieuwen, G enerals v s . P re s id e n ts , 91 .
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Leoni and the armed forces were excellen t; in fact, a s  h is  term
progressed , many officers expressed a g reater degree of tru s t and
2 n. confidence in Leoni than in his p redecesso r. In the words of 
President Leoni, the performance of the m ilitary during h is  adm inistra­
tion w as laudable:
In th ese  d ifficult tim es, the N ational Armed Forces adjusted 
the ir conduct to the s tr ic t and lo y a l fulfillment of th e ir con­
stitu tiona l obligations and their professional d u ty . They 
have refused the overtures of th o se  who would bring politics 
in to  the barracks, forgetting th e se  are  principals reserved 
for c iv ilian , partisan  ac tiv ity . . . 0 They are alw ays ready 
to  obey, defend and maintain the legitim ate government and, 
in  every ca se , to  enforce the verd ic t of the e le c to ra te .^ 1
From a l l  appearances, loyalty and cooperation w ill characterize
relations between the m ilitary and the p resen t President of Venezuela,
Rafael C aldera. In his inaugural address of March 11, 1969, President
C aldera, after examining the record of th e  armed forces in  the past
decade, described V enezuela's military a s  "firmly behind democratic
22in stitu tions and, without a doubt, loyal to  the constitu tional order. „ . . 
One of C aldera’s firs t a c ts  as President w as to pick a new  Defense
2°Personal interview  with members of the United S ta tes M ilitary 
M ission assigned  to  Venezuela during the  Leoni adm inistration.
2 1xM ensaje A1 Conqreso Del P residente De La Republics Dr. Raul 
Leoni (Caracas: Imprenta N acional, 1964), 43.
^  P is  curs o de Presidente de la Republics Dr. Rafael Caldera en 
el Acto de la Toma de Posesion del Cargo (Caracas: Im prenso en 
Venezuela por Gromotip, 11 de Marzo de 1969), 5.
M inister, boldly passing  over several sen ior pro-AD officers in  making
his se lec tio n . When V enezuela's h ighest ranking general, Pablo
Antonio Flores, openly grumbled, President Caldera abruptly removed
him from his m ilitary command. He now plans to appoint Flores am bas-
23sador to an  as yet unnamed Central American country.
Since 1958, therefore, the po litical culture of Venezuela has 
experienced traum atic transform ation. G enerally , the country moved 
from dictatorsh ip  to dem ocracy, from a government of men to a govern­
ment of laws . If there is  such a thing as  a "turning point" in a n a tio n 's  
h isto ry , surely the year 1958 w as a "turning point" in  the development 
of V enezuela's po litica l cu ltu re . M ilitary ru le , the chief tra it of the 
country 's po litica l life,,, vanished in  1958. C ivilian ru le , virtually 
absen t until 1958, made its  appearance and estab lished  lasting  pre­
eminence over the armed fo rc e s . It is  im possible to  understand fully 
the Venezuelan dem ocratic revolution without firs t examining its  
o rig ins, which are firmly rooted in  the po litica l events of 1958. Only 
upon a  thorough exam ination of those events can a re a lis tic  assessm en t 
be made.
23,1 Man of El C am bio ," Time XCIII (May 2, 1969), 30. A short 
but complete biographical sketch  of Rafael Caldera can be found in 
"New P residen tds Man of Varied Achievements, " Venezuela U p-to-D ate 
XII (W inter, 1968-1969), 5.
The most reputable and widely acclaim ed study of Venezuelan 
po litics since 1958 is  Robert Jackson A lexander's The Venezuelan 
Democratic Revolution: A. Profile of the Regime of Romulo Betancourt 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers U niversity  Press , 1964). Ignoring the 
events of 1958, Alexander attribu tes the su ccess  of democracy in 
Venezuela to  popular approval of Democratic A ction 's reform program 
and to  the po litica l acumen of Romulo Betancourt, particularly  the 
la tte r. Both of these  explanations are v a lid , but they are  inadequate. 
Romulo Betancourt long has passed  from the po litica l scen e , y e t 
dem ocracy p e rs is ts . Democratic A ction 's program was recen tly  
repudiated by the e le c to ra te , yet democracy p e r s is ts . Democracy 
has endured in  Venezuela for a  m ultiplicity of reaso n s , none of which 
can be sa tisfac to rily  analyzed without firs t examining the origin of 
th a t nascen t trad itio n . I t would be futile to  attem pt to  understand 
contemporary French po litics without some knowledge of 1789. I t 
would be equally futile to  attem pt to comprehend modem Venezuela 
without first examining 1958.
As specifica lly  outlined in the previous chapter, the ch ief charac­
te r is tic  of Venezuelan po litics has been rule by the m ilitary . Incidents 
or epochs .of c iv ilian  rule in  the nation 's h isto ry  are few and far 
betw een. Examples of c iv ilian  power and dem ocratic p ro cesses , 
which might help explain  the sudden strength of th ese  forces in 1958, 
are difficult to  recogn ize. N evertheless, however weak and inchoate ,
, Venezuela does have a dem ocratic trad ition . The rem ainder of th is
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chapter w ill be devoted—through the use of a  novel# but valid# 
approach—to estab lish ing  a dem ocratic heritage for Venezuela prior 
to 1958. An understanding of th ese  obscure inciden ts is  necessary  
to  comprehend fully the events of 1958 and the triumph of democracy 
over m ilitarism .
It is  the w riter 's  contention th a t three h isto rica l events in 
V enezuela's past form the basis of her dem ocratic trad ition . Accom­
panying th ese  three h isto rica l experiences and emerging from them# 
were three civilian# heterogeneous sectors# each  circum scribed by 
the armed forces# yet each gaining a new aw areness of its  po litica l 
po ten tia l. The three events took p lace in  1928# 1936-1937, and 
1945-1948. The three groups dominating th ese  civ ilian-dem ocratic 
spurts were university students# p o litica l parties and organized 
labor. Each epoch looked to  its  p redecessor for example and experi­
ence# and each epoch bu ilt upon the accom plishm ents of i ts  prede­
ce sso r. Thus# the civ ilian  m achinations of 1928 and 1936-1937 are 
feeble when compared to  the trien io  of 1945-1948; and# of course# a ll 
three eras are dwarfed by the achievem ents of V enezuela's civ ilian  
dem ocrats since 1958.
The strife th a t ex is ts  on many United S tates college and univer­
sity  cam puses today between students on the one hand and the 
Establishm ent on the other is  no novelty for observers of Latin America. 
Since 1918# students in the un iversities of Latin America have been 
dem anding, with more or le s s  effectiveness# a  g reater share of
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responsib ility  in  the adm inistration of the educational institu tions
they attend and the so c ie tie s  in which they live . The University
Reform Movement which originated in the U niversity of Cordoba
(Argentina), rep resen ts the longest continuous expression of the
24revolution of asp ira tions in  Latin America. In 1918, contrasting
sharply with A rgentina's rapidly expanding middle c la s s ,  stood the
anc ien t U niversity of Cordoba, stronghold of conservatism  and bastion
of the trad itional e l ite . The demands of the students a t the U niversity
of Cordoba were essen tia lly  soc ia l and po litica l. They reflected  a
middle class desire to end the status-preservation function of the
university  in favor of the university  a s  an instrum ent of soc ia l
mobility. Politically, the students demanded "co-government, " for
only through university  autonomy and student representation  in its
adm inistration could these  reforms have a valid  and lasting  b a s i s .2^
The studen ts ' demands were granted, and henceforth, desp ite  in tense
opposition, the U niversity Reform Movement has spread throughout 
2 6. Latin America.
2^John P. H arrison, "The Confrontation w ith the Political 
U n iv e rs ity ,1 Annals of the American Academy of Social and P olitical 
Science CCCXXXIV (March, 1961), 74.
)
^ A lis ta ir  H ennessy, "University Students in  N ational P o litic s , " 
in  Veliz, The P olitics of Conformity in  Latin America, 129; and John P. 
H arrison, "Learning and Politics in Latin American U niversities, " Pro­
ceedings of the Academy of Political Science XXVII (May, 1964), 331-336.
26Kalman H. S ilvert, "The U niversity Student, " in Johnson, 
Continuity and Change in  Latin America, 210-211; and Kevin Lyonette, 
"Student O rganizations in  Latin America, " International Affairs XLII 
(October, 1966), 655-656.
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With the passing of tim e, student grievances multiplied and
student po litica l activ ity  increased  proportionately. Government
in s tab ility , po litica l interference in th e  un iversities and poor academ ic
standards frustrated professors and students a like and ultim ately
caused a brain drain to  un iversities in  the United S tates and Europe,
or even to private u n iv e rs itie s . The inab ility  of Latin America's
un iversities to become professionalized  has been another source of
student un rest.
Part-tim e lecturers teaching irrelevant sy llabuses to  part- 
time students is  not university  education in any proper sense 
of the word. State un iversities  often seem little  more than 
vocational night schools geared to producing the minimal 
qualifications for entry into professions which the needs of 
the country no longer dem and. 22
Students in law and the hum anities have been especia lly  hard hit;
the Latin American repub lics ' underdeveloped econom ies cannot absorb
th e ir  sk ills—their education becomes irre lev an t. ^8 These grievances
and concom itant demands for rectifica tion  never remained within
university  w a lls . Student demands became national po litical is s u e s ,
w hile students a tta ined  po litica l influence out of a l l  proportion to
the ir number.
Student grievances are not confined to Latin America. However, 
th ree fac to rs , unique to  th is  culture a re a , help to explain  why
27H ennessy , "U niversity S tu d e n ts ," 122-123.
2^johnson, "The New Latin American N ationalism ," 200-201.
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university  students are the vanguard of civ ilian  p o litica l power in 
Latin America. F irst, a s  c itizens of countries where illiteracy  is  
w idespread, students feel obliged to take an active part in national 
a ffa irs , especia lly  in the in te re s t of the le ss  fortunate majority. 
Second, most Latin American un iversities offer no ex tra-curricu lar 
a c tiv itie s , thus students turn to po litics as  the only a lternative . A 
third factor is  the num erical superiority , in econom ically under­
developed n ations, of students in the soc ia l sc ien ces and hum anities 
over those in  the natural and techn ica l sc ien ces . Since the ju r is ­
diction of the soc ia l sc ien ces  and hum anities involves areas of 
po litica l re levance , m ost of Latin America1 s students are po litically  
inc lined . ^
Other elem ents ind irectly  served to  complement the po litical 
activ ism  of s tu d en ts . All the major un iversities of Latin America are 
located in  national c a p ita ls . This encourages po litica l activity 
"because po litics and i ts  consequences are more v is ib le , national 
po litica l organizations and leaders can pay immediate attention to  the 
s tu d e n ts , and student p ro tests  may be directed toward the actual sea ts
^ L y o n e tte , "Student O rganizations, " 655; M ichieya Shimbori,
■ "Zengarkurin: A Japanese C ase Study of a Student Political Move­
m ent, " Sociolocjy^of Education XXXVII (Spring, 1964), 238; and 
Seymour Martin L ipset, "U niversity Students and P olitics in Under­
developed C oun tries,"  M inerva CCCX1 (Autumn, 1964), 37-50, and 
"The Political Behavior of U niversity Students in  Developing N ations, " 
Social and Economic S tudies XIV (March, 1965), 60-65.
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30of au thority . " One of the main accom plishm ents of the University 
Reform Movement w as to give extraterritoriality  to  Latin American 
u n iv e rs itie s . Although the rule has been violated by many govern­
m ents, generally i t  has been respected , causing un iversities to 
become sanctuaries of d iverse po litical ideo log ies. T raditionally  
repressed  groups such as  labor, peasan ts and po litica l p artie s , have 
often strengthened the s tu d en ts ' conception of their po litica l function 
by encouraging them to  champion the v o ic e le s s . F inally , the in tro­
duction of the sem i-professional student and the appearance of 
student groups affilia ted  with national parties enhanced the political 
role of the university . Professional students who often span several 
student genera tions, are usually  on the payroll of a p a rty . They play 
a v ita l role in politics by serving as po litica l activists, recruiting 
ag en ts , e lection  m anagers, and a lso  as lia iso n s between university 
a ffilia tes  and the national party. W ith the Latin American university 
evolving into an instrum ent of po litical and social reform, it  was only 
natural for political parties  to  try to  use student power for the benefit 
of the ir specific  programs. 31 Therefore, the  university  in  Latin 
America is  not an ivory tow er, and student po litics is  n o t a training 
ground for future p o litic ia n s . "Through the U niversity Reform Movement
3®Lipset, "U niversity Students and P o litic s , " 60. 
^ H e n n e s s y , "U niversity S tudents, " 131-134.
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and p o litica l ac tiv ism , students in  Latin America are an important
32political group as su c h . "
The consequence of student po litica lization  has been that in 
the p resen t century alm ost a ll po litica l movements posing an a lte rn a­
tive to  nonrepresentative governments in  Latin America "have ori­
ginated in  the un iversities  and have found the ir f irs t expression 
through student o rgan ization ."  Venezuela in  1928 amply verifies 
this observation. At th a t time Venezuela was the personal property 
of Juan Vincente Gdm ez, a s tead fast opponent of the U niversity 
Reform Movement. W hile Latin American un iversities in  other coun- 
tries took important s trid es toward autonomy, Gc&nez intervened fre­
quently in  the affairs of V enezuela's Central U niversity a t  C aracas. 
N ationalism  and Latin so lidarity , often m anifested in anti-Yankee 
p ro test, dominated Latin America' s po litica l atm osphere; yet Gomez 
enjoyed close tie s  w ith the United S tates and her o il com panies. For 
the f irs t time in Latin America, there were emerging po litical parties 
and popular figures genuinely sym pathetic to the needs of the ir 
country 's m asses . New eras had already dawned for Chile under 
Arturo A lessandri, for Mexico under Francisco Madero and for Uruguay
under Jose/ Battle y Ordonez—but not for V enezuela,34 All these
%
33Lyonette, "Student O rganizations, " 661.
33Ib id ., 657.
3^Lieuwen, "Political Forces in  V enezuela, " 353; and Aguilar, 
Marxism in  Latin America. 8 -9 .
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fac to rs / meshed with the socio-econom ic in ju s tices  and brutal
p o litica l intolerance of the Gomez government, caused unrest among
3 SV enezuela's university  s tu d en ts . In 1928, embracing the cause of 
governmental reform and protesting over the policies of the Gomez 
regim e, university  students and their leaders openly opposed the 
government. The more prominent leaders of the "Generation of 1928" 
were Jovito V illalba, Gonzalo Barrios, Raul Leoni and Romulo 
Betancourt. 36
Student W eek, the Semana del E stud ian te, in  Venezuela is  
February 6 -12 . In 1928 the Venezuelan Student Federation (FEV), 
already tw ice d isso lved  by P resident Gomez, planned to celebrate 
Student W eek with announced so c ia l ev en ts , the crowning of a queen 
and cultural d iscu ss io n s . This was a subterfuge, for the students 
planned to  use  the occasion to  voice the ir disapproval of the d ic ta to r­
sh ip . Raul Leoni, president of the FEV, designated  two second-year 
law students named Betancourt and Villalba to address separate con­
c lav es . The speeches of th ese  young orators were em otional, moving 
and—in the eyes of the governm ent--treasonous and inflammatory.
3^Robert J .  Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution: Profiles of 
Latin American Leaders (New York: M acm illan, 1962), 109-110.
36John D. M artz, "V enezuela's G eneration of '28; The G enesis 
of Po litical Democracy, 11 Tournal of Inter-American Studies VI 
(January, 1964), 17-18. This artic le  by Professor Martz is  the best 
treatm ent of V enezuela's "Generation of 1928. "
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Their main theme w as a demand for dem ocratic, civ ilian  government
1 %
and an end to  the d ic ta to rsh ip . By the end of Student W eek, Villaba,
Betancourt and others were a rrested  on charges of subversion and>
slapped into dungeons.
These a rrests  sparked reaction  as hundreds of students took to 
the stree ts  of C aracas, daring Gomez to arrest them . Infuriated, the 
dic tator d irectly  ordered over 200 more students ja ile d . ^8 These mass 
a rrests  by the government caused  V enezuela's "normally passive
Oft
c itizen ry 11*0 to  jo in  the  protesting studen ts , a s  d isturbances spread 
from the cap ita l to La Guaira and M aracaibo. U nexpectedly, the 
government relented  and freed m ost of the imprisoned s tu d e n ts , who 
once again  took to  the s tr e e ts . 40
This apparent show of mercy (or w eakness) by the government, 
along with the turmoil racking Venezuela in  February and M arch, 1928, 
was probably instrum ental in  fanning the flam es of d iscon ten t among 
junior military officers and cadets a t  the new M ilitary Academy. These
^^Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, 109; and M artz, 
"Generation of '2 8 , '' 18-19.
^T hom as Rourke, Gomez: Tyrant of the Andes (New York: 
William Morrow, 1936), 228.
33M artz, "Generation of ' 28, " 19.
4®Betancourt, Politica y P etro leo . 68.
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young military engineers, technicians and pilots were disenchanted 
with the ir assignm ents—tending ca ttle  and overseeing cane-cu tting  
laborers on the numerous plantations of Juan Vincente G o^ez . The 
young officers made common cause with the students in  a major 
a s sa u lt aga in st the d ictatorsh ip  on April 7, 1928. At firs t the 
rebellion was su ccessfu l, but the tide turned in favor of the govern­
ment when the rebels failed  to capture the barracks of San C arlos, the 
major arsenal of C aracas. An a le rt officer, E leazar Lo^ez C ontreras, 
was responsible for halting the rebel advance. Gomez and h is govern­
ment recouped rapidly; th is  time no mercy w as shown. The offending 
officers suffered most and were imprisoned indefin ite ly . Those 
students who could not escape  into ex ile  were weighted down with
ball and chain and sent to the interior as road construction laborers.
41Once aga in , Pax Tachirense returned to  V enezuela.
The Generation of 1928 failed  to achieve its  g o a ls . I t  "provided 
the rationale for ac tio n , but the physical power to  overthrow co n s ti-
A Otu ted  authorities lay elsew here. Therein lie s  the chief cause for
the po litica l defeat of V enezuela's students in 1928. Yet a l l  w as not
lo s t , for positive resu lts  were d iscern ib le . This had been the "first
43major expression of democratic sentiment” in Venezuela. Because
4^-Martz, "Generation of '2 8 ,"  18-20; and Alexander, Prophets 
of the Revolution, 109,
^ S ilv e r t ,  "The U niversity Student, " 222.
^ M a r tz ,  "Generation of '28 , “ 20.
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of th is , in the eyes of the Venezuelan public, students a tta ined  a
reform ist mystique; th is  mystique would prove in fluential in  mobilizing
public opinion behind future efforts a t governmental reform . For the
stu d en ts , the defeat and subsequent exile or imprisonment of 1928
heightened the sense of being inheritors or transm itters of the noble
tradition of po litica l l i b e r t y .^  The G eneration of 1928's most sa lien t
accom plishm ent w as to  p lant the seeds of democracy in  Venezuela.
Although rep ressed  harsh ly , the ideas expounded by these  students
survived and ultim ately trium phed.
The leaders of the Generation of 1928 remained in prison or in
exile un til 1936, the year of V enezuela's next attem pt a t  a ttain ing
dem ocratic, c iv ilian  government. It w as during th ese  years of
estrangem ent for th e ir country th a t some of th e se  young Venezuelans
45engaged in  a "passing  flirta tion  with M arxism. . . ,"  but only a 
few retained  th is adm iration. This flee ting  romance w ith Marxism 
is  easily  understood. With few exceptions th e se  men were extremely 
young, the ir adult experiences were few and b itte r, they were 
sca tte red  throughout the hem isphere and beyond and longed for home,
44H ennessy, "U niversity S tuden ts, " 134-135.
45M artz, "Generation of *28, " 2 1 -2 2 . Romulo Betancourt was 
the most important member of th is  group to jo in  the Communist Party; 
he was among the organizers of the Costa Rican Communist Party.
In 1935, Betancourt resigned from the Party, thus closing h is a ffilia ­
tion  with the movement. He in s is ted  on the primacy of national 
problems rather than the in ternational d ic ta tes  of the Cominterm.
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and they were in search  of a theore tica l basis for them selves and their 
country. Two other movements also  influenced th ese  young po litic ians. 
These were the M exican Revolution and the Peruvian Aprista move­
m ent, dem ocratically oriented but both in tensely  n a tio n a lis tic . When
the leaders of the G eneration of 1928 returned to V enezuela, they were
4to  trave l a sim ilar path.
M eanwhile, for the next seven years , Venezuela remained under 
the close surveillance of Juan Vincente Gomez. He died in h is sleep  
la te  in  December, 1935 . Hatreds suppressed  for tw enty-seven  years 
were suddenly re leased . Mobs looted or destroyed much of the property 
of G o^ez and his re la tiv e s . In the larger c itie s , crowds poured into 
the s tre e ts , rioting and dem onstrating. Xenophobia sw ept the country: 
Gom ez's po litica l collaborators were m assacred , the Foreign Club was 
razed , and the wives and children of a lien  oil men had to  be rushed to 
sa fe ty . Venezuela in  December, 1935, and January, 1936, had a ll the 
makings of a genuine so c ia l revolution—but none w as forthcoming. 
Confusion reigned. The d iverse elem ents tha t rejo iced  over the 
d ic ta to r 's  death  were incohesive; they offered no positive program to
replace the d ic ta to rsh ip . Their only common bond w as the ir mutual
f  47  hatred of Gomez.
46I b id . , 21- 22 .
4^Alexander, Communism in Latin America. 255; Lieuwen, 
Venezuela, 51; and M arsland, V enezuela. 246-248.
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Confusion w as not lim ited to the opposition , for V enezuela's 
trad itional e lite  was momentarily stunned following the death  of 
th e  andino. I ts  bewilderment w as brief, however, for its  members had 
had some experience in leadersh ip . H astily , the gom ecista congress 
named as provisional president Tachira-born General E leazar Lopez 
C ontreras, M in ister of W ar. The only d isc ip lined  body remaining by 
January, 1936, w as the armed forces; and General Lopez C ontreras' 
s tra teg ic  m ilitary command w as the only hope of preserving the p o si­
tions of the gom ecista o ffic e rs , large landowners and p lit ic ia n s . 
Troops were d ispatched  to q u e ll the d istu rbances, and Lopez 
Contreras attem pted to  ree s tab lish  a functioning government. This 
became increasing ly  d ifficu lt, for as news of the death of Gomez
sw ept the hem isphere, ex iles poured into Venezuela aggravating the
4ftalready tense atm osphere.
Although le ad e rle ss , th e  Venezuelan m asses , in  th e ir hatred of 
anything or anyone connected w ith the d eceased  d ic tato r, could not be 
ignored. The troops could contain  sporadic d istu rbances, but Lopez 
Contreras soon realized  th a t an  excess show of force would only spawn 
further re s is tan ce  tha t even the armed forces might be unable to  a rre s t. 
Aware that h is  po litica l life depended upon relaxation of the d ic ta to r­
sh ip , Lopez Contreras emptied the dungeons of political p risoners,
 1--— _ - ___________________________________________   S.
^^Lieuwen, V enezuela, 51; and M arsland, V enezuela, 246.
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permitted freedom of the press and the return of the more notorious
ex ile s . The relaxation  of the d ictatorsh ip  and the restoration  of c iv il
49liberties mollified public opinion/ and order soon w as resto red .
Among the returning e x ile s / the most popular were the members 
of the Venezuelan Student Federation (FEV), who had led the resis tan ce  
ag a in s t Gomez in  1928. The people trusted  th ese  young men im plicitly; 
fo r, having been out of the country for several y e a rs , they were the 
only po liticans com pletely free of the Gomez ta in t. The members of 
the Generation of 1928 sought to provide the c iv ilian  leadership  n ec e s­
sary to retain  the recen tly  granted concessions from the government 
and to gain new ones; "they harangued crowds from s tree t corners, 
founded new spapers, and talked po litics from morning to  n ight.
For fourteen m onths, the Generation of 1928, supplem ented by students 
who dubbed them selves the G eneration of 1936, attem pted to  f il l  a 
tw enty-seven  year po litica l vacuum and rep lace a century-old trad i­
tio n . They nearly  succeeded.
The firs t te s t  of civ ilian  strength came on February 14, 1936.
On February 10 acting P resident Lopez Contreras announced tha t 
severa l constitu tional guarantees would be suspended, particularly  
freedom of the p re ss . FEV President Jovito V illalba responded with an
49naLieuwen, V enezuela. 51-52.
- S^Marsland, V enezu ela , 248 .
open le tte r to the government demanding restoration  of constitu tional
guarantees and prosecution of remaining gom ecistas. To back up
these  dem ands, the FEV called  for a general strike on February 14.
Felix Gala v is , a notorious henchman of Gomez and governor of the
Federal D istric t, already angered by the virulence of the new spapers,
was pushed beyond endurance by the open circulation  of V illalba's
le tte r . On the morning of the fourteenth , approximately 25,000 people
gathered a t the P laza Bolivar and heard FEV members rant aga inst
gom ecistas s t i l l  in  office. At 10:30 A .M ., w ithout w arning, soldiers
appeared on the balconies of the neighboring C asa  Amarilla and fired
into the crowd. The troops ac ted  under orders from G alavis; 200 were
wounded and eigh t k illed . The se n se le ss  s laugh ter inflamed the
crowd. Led by Villalba and FEV members, the crowd sw elled to
30,000 as  i t  made its  way to  M iraflores, the p residen tia l p a lace , for
a face -to -face  confrontation w ith Lopez C ontreras. The provisional
president knuckled under and subm itted to a ll the demands of the FEV:
freedom of the press was resto red , most of the remaining gom ecistas
were removed from office, and Felix G alavis w as arrested  and charged 
51with murder. W riting of th is  inciden t in 1954, Amy and William 
M arsland observed, "The people had won a g reat dem ocratic victory , 
their firs t and, to  th is  w riting, the ir l a s t . " 52
5*Servando Garcia Ponce, Apuntes Sobre la  Libertad de Prensa en 
Venezuela (C aracas: Universidad Central de V enezuela, 1961), 62-66.
52M arsland, V enezuela, 248; M artz, "Generation of '2 8 ,"  23-24.
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The political future of Lopez Contreras was shaky. Catering
to the le f tis t  leanings of the students did not gain him any popularity
with V enezuela's conservative elem ents. A ctually, Ldpez Contreras
had no intention of moving to  the le ft. He w as using public press ure,
temporarily behind him , as a th rea t against a  possib le reca lc itran t
gom ecista congress, which would se lec t the next p residen t. This
strategy yielded re s u lts , for in  April, 1936, Lcipez Contreras was
elec ted  President of V enezuela. His po litica l future assu red  and calm
resto red , the new president dem onstrated to  conservatives th a t th e ir
fears were groundless. He continued to ta lk  like a  libera l but ac ted
53more and more like a conservative .
During th is same period of tim e, sign ifican t po litica l develop­
ments were taking p lace outside offic ial government c irc les which 
would greatly  affect the future of V enezuela. The w inter and spring of 
1936 saw the creation  of V enezuela's firs t popularly based po litica l 
p a rtie s . Four of th e se  achieved importance: the N ational Republican 
Union (UNR), the Progressive Republican Party (PRP—the legal arm of 
the Communist Party), the N ational Democratic Block (BND) and the 
Venezuelan Organization (ORVE). Of g rea tes t contemporary significance 
was ORVE, founded on March 1, 1936, and staffed chiefly  by the more 
mature rebels  of 1928 and the newly-em erging generation of 1936. Its
^ M a r s la n d , V enezu ela . 250 .
membership was filled with the elite of the FEV, Jovito Villalba,
Raul Leoni, Romulo Betancourt and Gonzalo Barrios. Venezuelan 
Organization w as not a po litica l party in  the s tr ic te s t se n se , but a 
coalition  front dedicated  to  uniting a ll the forces opposing d ic ta to r­
sh ip . When rumors caused  fear that the scheduled April meeting of 
the Congress might be postponed, three po litica l groups, ORVE, PRP 
and UNR, announced the formation of the April Block. This Block was
i
formed to strengthen the position of c iv ilian  groups demanding govern­
m ental reform. Congress met a s  planned, but the influence of the 
April Block remains questionab le , for Lopez Contreras a lso  w ished 
Congress to  convene. After April, 1936, th ese  parties continued to 
push for broader e lecto ra l partic ipation , while the government 
increasing ly  re s is ted  such a d e v e lo p m e n t.^
The same Congress that convened in April took under considera­
tion and later passed the Lev Lara, a law which allowed the president, 
in times of crisis, to suspend civil liberties for the defense of public
i
order. To the forces of opposition, th is  leg isla tion  implied legalizing 
to ta lita rian ism . Unable to  stop its  p assag e , the newly formed civ ilian  
organizations planned the ir firs t show of strength to  dem onstrate their 
opposition to the Ley L ara. The three members of the April Block formed
S^Alba, H istoria del Movlmlento Obrero. 178; Blank, Venezuela 
Election Factbook, 8; Alexander, Communism in Latin- America, 255; 
and M artz, "Generation of '28 , " 24-27.
a coordinating body ca lled  the Democratic Defense Committee, com­
posed of high ranking members from each group. The Committee 
ca lled  for a general protest strike on June 9, 1936. The strike was 
planned to  la s t  for tw enty-four hours and w as lim ited to metropolitan 
C aracas. The strike came off a s  scheduled , but popular enthusiasm  
and advance publicity  caused impromptu, haphazard strikes to develop 
in  M aracaibo, Valencia, Barquisimeto and several o il f ie ld s . Instead 
of la sting  tw enty-four hours, the strike lingered for five days and 
ended ignom iniously. Government concessions were not forthcoming; 
and w orkers, valuing the ir pay more than th e ir lib e rtie s , straggled 
back to  the ir jo b s . It was obvious from the beginning th a t the 
Democratic D efense Committee did not have control of the situation . 
This lack of d isc ip line  and poor ta c tic a l implementation resulted  in  a
defeat for democracy and loss of prestige for V enezuela's civ ilian
55politic ians and s tu d en ts .
As adversity  continued to  plague the forces of dem ocracy, i t  
became increasing ly  apparent th a t regimented ac tion , possib le  only 
through civ ilian  unity , would be the sole solution to obtaining po litica l 
concessions from the military based  government. To th is  end, on 
October 28, 1936, three po litica l parties , ORVE, PRP and BND, term i­
nated their ex istence and mutually formed the N ational Democratic
55 Martz, "Generation of '2 8 ,"  28; and M arsland, Venezuela , 250 .
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Party (PDN). A ssociated members of the PDN were the Venezuelan 
Student Federation and two fledgling labor un ions, the Workers Front 
and the N ational Industrial Front. Named secretary of the new party 
was Romulo Betancourt. With the organizational structure estab lished  
and d iscip line a rea lity , PDN members en thusiastica lly  began pre­
paring for the ensuing January, 1937, e lec tio n s . The P resident, h is
1
military comrades and the trad itional oligarchy had other p lan s, how­
ever, for the ir patience w ith the forces of democracy w as exhausted . 
The government refused to extend legal recognition to  the PDN, thus 
rendering i t  ine lig ib le  to compete in the e le c tio n s . A showdown 
became in e v ita b le . ̂  ®
Since th e  oil industry represented the backbone of the Venezuelan 
economy, the PDN and its  labor a ffilia tes  called  for a petroleum 
w orkers' s tr ik e . A few days before C hristm as, 1936, 20,000 o i lf ie ld  
workers le ft th e ir  jo b s , demanding higher w ages, better working con­
ditions and union recognition. These exploited laborers had legitim ate 
grievances, and they were determined not to  submit un til the ir demands 
were met. The strike la s ted  until January 22, 1937, when President 
Lopez C ontreras, citing the constitu tion , ordered the strikers back to 
work with a  very sm all pay in c rease . The w orkers, forgetting the other
56Martz, "Generation of *28," 2 8 -2 9 .
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demands and believing they had won the b a ttle , returned to work over
i
PDN p ro test, The economy was hardly dented .^7
Lopez Contreras did not like the im plications of the petroleum 
w orkers' strike. O il w as the chief source of national revenue.
P o litic an s1 tampering w ith this industry  was not in  the best po litica l 
in te re s t of the Tachira dynasty. The elections of January 28, 1937, 
convinced the already doubting P resident of the w orth lessness of 
p o litica l parties. The new constitu tion  adopted in  1936 had extended 
the ind irec t system of selecting members of Congress and the p res i­
d en t, but the suffrage had been broadened—now only seventy per cent 
of V enezuela's m ales were inelig ib le (all females were inelig ib le to  vote). 
D esp ite government neutra lization , a  few opposition leaders managed
C  Q
v ic to rie s , notably Barrios, Leoni and V illalba. This show of civ ilian  
strength  was too much for Lopez Contreras; accordingly he moved to 
end V enezuela's b rie f democratic experience . On February 3, 1937, 
five of the six  groups tha t had formed the abortive N ational Democratic 
Party (ORVE, PRP, th e  Venezuelan Student Federation, the Workers 
Front and the N ational Industrial Front) were ordered to  cease  a ll 
a c tiv ity . Hardly had the opposition taken  to the s tree ts  in p ro test, 
when they were met by armed forces and thoroughly d ispersed . The
^ Ib id . , 29-30; and Blank, Venezuela Election Handbook, 8 .
S^When th@ N ational Democratic Party was declared ine lig ib le , 
the le g a l parties th a t  had merged to  form the PDN were revived in  order 
to  com pete in the January elections .
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governm ent's next step  w as to remove from office the recently  
e lec ted  opposition congressm en. The following week saw the 
e lection  of those opposing the Establishm ent nullified  in a federal
i
court. To insure continued dom estic tranqu ility , on March 13, 1937., 
V enezuela's fo rty -seven  most in fluen tia l civ ilian  po litica l leaders 
were expelled from the country. Among these  were Betancourt,
V illalba, Leoni and B a rr io s .^  V enezuela's second dem ocratic 
episode was term inated.
The fourteen months following the death of Juan Vincente Gdmez 
presented to the forces of civ ilian  democracy in Venezuela an oppor­
tunity  to  achieve lasting  recognition, y e t they did not even achieve 
surv ival. In sp ite  of the ir constant struggle for unity , d isunity  
characterized  the infrastructure of the ir various o rgan iza tions. TheI
FEV w as no longer the power i t  had been . O riginally, its  members had 
been drawn together by the ir mutual hatred of Gomez, but with his death 
th is  cohesive force was gone. The most serious sp lit in  the Venezuelan ’ 
Student Federation occurred when C atholic members bolted the organiza­
tion  and formed the N ational Student Union (UNE). They were unable to 
agree with the an ti-c le ric a l views of FEV President Jovito V illalba, and 
an FEV-backed law calling for the secu larization  of religious schools.
The young leader of th ese  more orthodox Catholic students w as one of
Mars land , Venezuela, 251; Blank, Venezuela Election Factbook, 
8; and M artz, "Generation of '2 8 ,"  30 -32 .
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the most capable members of the fa s t rising generation of 1936, Rafael
(
C a ld e r a .^
Attempts a t party unification suffered from sim ilar in ternal 
d issen sio n . The PRP, composed mostly of crypto-com m unists, and 
the UNR, composed of bankers, businessm en and p ro fessiona ls, were
i
never able to  work harmoniously together a s  had the members of the 
April Block or the Democratic Defence Com mittee. Common in te rest 
and the moderating influence of ORVE managed to  hold the coalition  
together. When the  N ational Democratic Party w as formed, the 
in fluen tia l and financially  w ell-endow ed UNR remained aloof, thus 
contributing to the w eakness of the PDN.^* As in 1928, i t  is  possib le 
tha t the forces of c iv ilian  po litica l power lacked the physical strength 
to  overthrow the m ilita ry -estab lished  government of Venezuela in 
1936-1937. Even complete c iv ilian  unity might have been insufficien t 
to  im plant represen tative government in V enezuela, but certainly  
c iv ilian  disunity  w as no a s s e t  for the cause of dem ocracy.
N everthe less, the events of 1936-1937 were of profound impor­
tance for the future of dem ocratic government in V enezuela. This epoch 
saw the creation of Venezuelan veh icles necessary  to replace d ic tator­
ship with represen tative government. Torcuato S . D iTella, the noted
60Tugwell, "C hristian D em ocrats, 11 246-247.
6lM arsland , V enezuela . 251.
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Argentine p o litica l-so c io lo g is t, has labeled th ese  veh ic les "populist"
C O
po litica l p arties . According to  Professor D iTella, a populist party
can be described in  the following terms:
A political movement w hich enjoys the support of the mass of 
the urban working c la ss  an d /o r peasantry  but does not resu lt 
from the autonomous organizational power of e ither two se c to rs , ; 
It is  a lso  supported by non-working c la ss  sectors upholding an 
antt-status quo ideology . 33
This descrip tion  c losely  resem bles that of the po litical parties founded
in  the wake of the death  of Juan Vincente Gc&iez. As a  re su lt of the
economic developments which occurred during the long d ic tatorsh ip  of
Gomez, two new groups were brought into ex istence; a middle c la s s -
and an industria l working c la s s .  Both,were outside the equilibrium of
forces th a t made up the Gdmez coalition , and both met w ith  severe
64repression  in their attem pts to  organize. I t was th e se  two se c to rs ,
62Torcuato S . D iTella, "Populism and Reform in  Latin America, " 
in Claudio Veliz (e d .) , O bstacles to Change in Latin America (London: 
Oxford U niversity P re ss , 1965), 47-74. In th is  in teresting  a rtic le , 
DiTella se ts  up various categories of populist p a rtie s . V enezuela's 
po litica l parties are included but only generally  d isc u sse d . This 
artic le  offers several new con cep ts , but i ts  diffuse an a ly sis  leaves 
much to  be d e s ire d .
63Ib id . , 47.
3^Otto Feinste in , "The Role of Foreign Investm ent in the D evelop­
ment of Venezuela, " (Chicago: unpublished Ph .D . d isse rta tio n , 
U niversity of Chicago, 19 65), 178-179.
Until 1945, V enezuela's peasants remained backward and 
unorganized, but potentially  they were a g reat source of po litica l 
power; u ltim ately , th a t power would align i ts e lf  with Venezuelan 
populism .
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an urban middle c lass  and labor, together w ith students and in te lle c ­
tu a ls , which provided the leadership  and membership of the numerous 
po litica l parties created in 193671937.
Liberal or labor reform movements were not viable in  V enezuela.
In the 1930 's, a s  w ell a s  today , liberalism , the dominant ideology of 
most W estern countries, was identified  in  Latin America with 
im perialism  and foreign exp lo ita tion . It w as, therefore, unpopular 
in nationalistically -m inded  V enezuela. A stric tly  labor movement a s  
in England was a lso  im possib le . In the f irs t p lace , num erically, 
industria l workers were too few to support a national party; and, 
secondly, the in tensive partic ipation  and gradual acqu isition  of 
organizational experience n ecessa ry  for the formation of a powerful
65labor party were absen t from V enezuela's nascen t industria l unions.
A comparison of- Venezuela in  1928 with Venezuela in  1936-1937 
reveals more con trasts than s im ila ritie s . The warmth of public response 
and nvolvement indicated greater sympathy for the cause of c iv ilian  
democracy in  1936-1937 than  in  1928.®® Because of increased  ' 
c iv ilian  power, the departure of Go'mez or un erta in  po litical conditions, 
the governm ent's attitude w as more to leran t in 1936-1937 than  in  1928.
fit
D iTella, "Populism and Reform," 51-52. 
®®Martz, "Generation of '2 8 ,"  28.
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In e ssen ce , the Lopez Contreras regime had paved the way 
for la ter changes. It had modernized the governing structure 
by allowing unions and politica l parties to  present their ^
dem ands—a s  long as  they did not demand structural changes.
Perhaps the most sign ifican t difference between V enezuela's two demo­
cratic  reform efforts came in  the area of leadersh ip . W hile the same 
ind iv iduals, the Generation of 1928, held  commanding positions, 
different organizations led the struggle . Po litical parties replaced 
the Venezuelan Student Federation as the  vanguard of po litica l reform 
and civ ilian  power in V enezuela. This is  not to  say  th a t the po litica l 
influence of V enezuela's un iversity  studen ts d isappeared—it  did no t.
To th is  day, V enezuela's studen ts play an important role in the forma­
tion of po litica l opinion, but the ir zen ith  was reached in  1928. After 
1937 the m asses looked to po litica l p arties  for id e a s , programs and 
leadersh ip . The n§w secto rs emerging in  Venezuela desired  a more 
functional v eh ic le , one more responsive to the complex needs of 
modern socie ty .
Of these  new emerging sec to rs , the most important was organized 
labor. In the 1936-1937 period, the p o litica l wedding that was forged 
between Venezuelan labor and her p o litica l parties w as extremely 
im portant. Although weak and inchoate in  1936-1937, Venezuelan 
labor would grow to  become the single m ost powerful c iv ilian  secto r 
in the nation 's  so c ie ty . Eventually, lab o r's  subservience and
®7Feinstein , "The Role of Foreign Investm ent," 188-189.
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obedience to  Venezuela’s political parties gave the forces of c iv ilian  
democracy a strong countervailing force in  their struggle against 
d ic tato ria l m ilitarism .
During the remaining years of the Lopez Contreras adm inistra­
tion , p o litica l parties w ere not perm itted. Skeleton facsim ilies of 
outlawed parties  continued to  function clandestinely , and maintained 
contact w ith exiled le a d e rs , but government harassm ent allowed for 
little  a c tiv ity . About the only noteworthy event to occur during th ese  
years w as the official d isa sso c ia tio n  of International Communism from 
the N ational Democratic Party and, therefore, from Venezuelan popu­
lism . In la te  1937, the Progressive Republican Party withdrew from 
the PDN and came out openly as the Venezuelan Communist Party 
(PCV). N ationalism  caused  the break. The PRP withdrew  when the 
noncommunist members of the PDN, comprising a large majority, voted
e g
to break a l l  connections w ith  the in ternational communist movement. 
This development is  s ign ifican t for sev era l reasons: i t  helped to 
remove the aura of Marxism from much of the c iv ilian , political 
leadership of Venezuela, thus permitting participation by hitherto 
re luc tan t, y e t reform ist, bourgeois elem ents; it gave assurance th a t 
Venezuelan populism, exemplified by the PDN, would proceed along
t
iCO
G arcia Ponce. Apuntes Sobre la  Libertad. 66; Alexander, 
Communism in  Latin America, 255-257*
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dem ocratic lines; and it  boosted the indigenousness of Venezuelan 
reform, thus creating a more responsive , effective brand of Latin 
American populism.
The government of President Is a ia s  Medina Angarita (1941-1945) 
permitted many ex iles  to  return and po litica l parties to  function. 
Representing the le ft was the now leg a l Venezuelan Communist Party . 
Representing the right was the government party, the Venezuelan 
Democratic Party (PDV) and the disgruntled followers of former 
P resident Lopez C ontreras, who formed the Bolivarian C ivic Group. 
Somewhere to the le ft of center and ea s ily  the country 's largest sing le 
p o litica l party w as Democratic Action k (AD), V enezuela's populist 
party . AD's ranks were made up of former ORVE and PDN members; 
i ts  leadership  came from the G eneration of 1928. The party was
k
rechristened  Democratic Action on September 15, 1941, after which 
it  immediately began organizing party m achinery. AD's recruitm ent 
and atten tion  were devoted overwhelmingly to aligning V enezuela's 
workers and peasan ts behind the party . The c lo sest thing to a cen tris t 
party in  the Venezuela of Medina Angarita was N ational Action, a sm all, 
floundering organization formed by the  UNE, the orthodox Catholic 
student movement founded in 1936. Later, National Action was 
influenced by the in ternational C hristian  Democratic movement; and , 
in  1946, its  name w as changed to  the Independent Committee for 
P o litical and E lectoral Organization (COPEI). But a s  long as the
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m ilitary government of Medina Angarita controlled the electoral
m achinery, party d isc ip lin e , numerical strength or popularity meant
69nothing. In every e lec tio n , the PDV always won safe m ajorities.
In 1945, however, the whole Venezuelan po litical situationt
changed, and democracy received a push from an unexpected quarter.
A group of young m ilitary officers, unhappy with the ir lo t, staged a 
su ccessfu l golpe de estado  and turned the country over to the forces 
of dem ocratic reform. These young officers intervened in the name of 
democracy and c iv ilian  government. Because of their sta ted  ob jec­
tiv e s , the m ilitary rebels were able to  secure the advance cooperation 
of Democratic Action, the na tio n 's  la rgest and best-o rgan ized  po li­
tic a l party. This cooperation served the rebels' pragmatic aims as 
w ell, for i t  afforded them the wide public support necessary  for 
su c c e s s . The coup took place on October 17, 1945. After two days 
of interm ittent fighting, a provisional government dominated by civ ilian  
reformers was organized. ^
A seven man "Revolutionary Junta" was es tab lish ed  to  rule the 
country until free elections could be held to write a new constitu tion  
which would, in  turn , create a permanent government. Democratic
Holmes, "Army Challenge in Latin America, " 171; Blank, 
Venezuela Election Factbook, 9; and Tugwell, "C hristian D em ocrats," 
247-249.
70See Chapter III for more on th is  ep isode.
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Action dominated the revolutionary government. Romulo Betancourt
was the ju n ta 's  p residen t. Other members were Raul Leoni, Gonzalo
Barrios and Luis B. Prieto Figueroa (all of AD), Edmundo Flores, a
civ ilian  independent, and two of the rebellious m ilitary officers,
Colonel Carlos Delgado Chalbaud and Captain Mario Vargas. For
over two y ea rs , Provisional P resident Betancourt, who w as a lso  the
head of AD, ruled by decree . M ost of these  decrees originated as
d irec tives drawn up by AD's N ational Executive Committee; Democratic
71A ction 's program of revolutionary reform became the law of the land .
Prior to  1958, the th ree -y ear rule of AD marks the apogee of 
dem ocratic, c iv ilian  endeavor in  V enezuela. The men who governed 
Venezuela during the tr ie n io , a s  th is  th ree -y ear era is  sometimes 
ca lled , were p o litic ian s . Like most po litic ians operating w ithin a 
dem ocratic framework, they were acu tely  aware th a t the retention of 
power by c iv ilians w as dependent upon the su ccessfu l implementation 
of represen tative p ro cesses . Because of th is ,  po litica l reform was the 
firs t ta sk  undertaken by the provisional government. Bans of freedom 
of speech , press and assem bly were a ll  lifted . On March 15, 1946, 
a revolutionary e lecto ra l law was promulgated. It granted the suffrage
^ L ieu w en , V enezuela, 70-71; Blank, Venezuela Election Fact- 
book, 9 . The best account of the trien io  can be found in John D . M artz, 
Accion D em ocratica; Evolution of a Modem Political Party in 
Venezuela (Princeton: Princeton U niversity P re s s , 1966), 256-322.
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to every Venezuelan over eighteen years of age , it  lifted  previous 
voting restric tions on women and ill i te ra te s , i t  enabled parties of a ll 
shades to nominate cand idates, and i t  alo tted  representation  according 
to  the D'Hondt sy stem . 72
The e lec to ra l law ca lled  for the se lec tion  of a constituent 
assem bly on October 27, 1946, for the purpose of writing a new con­
stitu tion  for V enezuela. Taking advantage of the liberal provisions of 
the e lecto ra l law , numerous po litical parties were founded. They began 
campaigning and named candidates for e lection  to the constituen t 
assem bly . Besides AD, three parties are noteworthy. Ideologically , 
n earest to Democratic Action, but of no prior an cestry , w as the 
Democratic Republican Union (URD). I t  was founded shortly afte r the 
October, 1945, coup by many former ORVE members, the most notable 
being Jovito V illalba, who had never joined AD because of personal 
d ifferences w ith Romulo Betancourt. Ad's strongest com petition came 
from the Independent Committee for Politica l and Electoral O rganization, 
a  C hristian  dem ocratic oriented party formed by the more orthodox 
Catholic members of the generation of 1936. Although c ritica l of 
Democratic Action, COPEI's position differed little  from the govern­
m en t's . COPEI’s religious view s coupled with its  position a s  chief
72The D'Hondt system  u tilize s  party lis ts  as the basis for pro­
portional represen tation . M artz, "P olitical Parties in Colombia and 
Venezuela," 325-326.
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opposition party, caused many Tightest elements to sw ell its  ranks;
but i ts  founder, Rafael C aldera, never allow ed the m ilitary to  use his
party a s  a conduit. The w eakest party w as the Venezuelan Communist
Party (PCV). Split by in ternal d issension  and p lashes over personal
am bitions, the PCV fragmented in to  two groups during the trien io .
Weak and unpopular, i t  was never a th reat to  dem ocracy.
On October 27, 1946, 1 ,400,000 V enezuelans— "an astonish ing
74record for Latin America" —went to the polls to e lec t delegates to  
an assem bly tha t would write a  new constitu tion  for the ir country.
This was the firs t free and fa ir e lection  in  the history of Venezuela; 
and for most c i tiz e n s , th is  e lec tio n  a lso  marked the f irs t voting 
experience. Democratic Action won a stunning v ictory , a clear 
mandate to  continue its  program of p o litica l, so c ia l and economic
yc
reform. AD's overwhelming majority in  the constituen t assem bly
70
Holmes, “Army C ha llenge,"  171; Alexander, Communism in
Latin America, 261-262; Blank, Venezuela E lection Factbook, 9;
M artz, Accion D em ocratica, 316-322; and Edward J . W illiam s, Latin 
American C hristian  Democratic Parties (Knoxville; U niversity of 
Tennessee P re ss , 1967), 21.
74Holmes, “Army C hallenge, " 171.
^ T h e  offic ial resu lts  were a s  follows:





Source: New York T im es, October 30, 1946.
insured the framing of a constitu tion  favorable to  the party. According 
to  the new constitu tion , the President and Congress were to be elected  
by d irec t, un iversal suffrage. The P residen t's  te rn  w as se t a t four 
years , w ith no re -e lec tio n  permitted for eight years . The s ta te  
assum ed responsib ility  for education, health , housing and the national 
economy. AD's po litica l debt to  organized labor w as sa tis f ied  by 
inserting  into the constitu tion  guarantees such as  the right to  organize, 
to s tr ik e , to receive pensions, sick  pay, v acations, severance pay and 
profit sh a re s . Under the new constitu tion , national e lections were 
held on December 14, 1947. For the f irs t time in the ir h isto ry , 
Venezuelans were able to  e lec t a President by direct v o te . The victor 
was AD's Romulo G allegos, the country 's best-know n n o v elis t.
COPEI's Caldera and the PCV's G ustavo Machado fin ished second and 
third, respec tive ly . AD a lso  won su b stan tia l m ajorities in  both houses . 
of C ongress. The new government assum ed office on February 15,
1948 .76
Relative to  the future of dem ocracy in  V enezuela, the most sign i­
fican t development during the trien io  w as the tremendous growth of
^ O ff ic ia lly , G allegos received  871,752 votes,- Caldera 262,204 
and M achado.36 ,514 . Democratic Action won th irty -e ig h t of the 
forty-tw o Senate se a ts  and e igh ty -th ree  of the 111 sea ts  in the Chamber 
of D eputies, New York Tim es, December 16, 1947; Lott, "V enezuela," 
242; Lieuwen, V enezuela. 75-76; Blank, Venezuela Election Factbook.
9; W aldo, "Why Latin America D istrusts Us , "  85; and Alexander, 
Communism in Latin America, 262-263.
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organized labor and i ts  unwritten a lliance  with V enezuela's two other
civ ilian  sectors advocating representative governm ent students and
77p o litica l p arties . The origins of organized labor in Latin America 
and Venezuela are recen t, lying to ta lly  within the present century. 
Two juxtaposed factors contributed m ost to the birth of organized 
labor in  Latin America: the growth of industria lization  caused  by the 
economic d islocations of World W ar 1; and the immigration to  the area 
of thousands of European workers carrying with them the ideologies of
7;
trade unionism , anarchism , syndicalism , socialism  and Bolshevism.
In V enezuela, sm all craft so c ie ties  existed a s  early a s  1919, 
but any rea l labor movement was out of the question under Juan 
Vicente Gomez. Once the andino had passed  from the scene, the 
movement took root. "Populism” w as the chief reform ist philosophy 
in  vogue in  the Latin America of 1936, and labor attached  its e lf  to  the 
rising s ta r  of populist po litica l p a rtie s . From the very beginning,
^ W h e n  th is d isserta tio n  refers to organized labor, labor or 
labor un ions, included are V enezuela's peasan ts . Beginning in 1936, 
V enezuela's po litica l parties in itia ted  attem pts to  organize peasant 
un ions, but little  w as accom plished un til the tr ien io . This jo in t 
treatm ent is  ju stified  because V enezuela's peasant unions were 
organized along the same lines as her urban and industria l unions. 
The strike  is  a lso  the p easan t's  chief method of ac tio n . Anibal 
Quijano Obregon, "Contemporary P easan t M ovem ents," in L ipset and 
Solari, E lites in Latin America, 308.
7 0
Carroll H aw kins, "Reflections on Labor's Relation to  Govern­
ment and Politics in  Latin America, " The W estern P olitical Quarterly 
XX (December, 1967), 939; and John D . M arts, “The Growth and 
D em ocratization of the Venezuelan Labor Movement, " Inter-American 
Economic Affairs XVII (Autumn, 1963), 6 .
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organized labor in Latin America was "part of the movement for basic
79econom ic, soc ia l and po litica l change. . . . "  Its goal was to  win 
a greater share of the n a tio n 's  bounty by bringing the worker, for 
years the victim  of a s tra tified , poverty-ridden society , into active 
partic ipation  in civic a ffa irs . For feudalistic  Latin America, th is w as 
a revolutionary ro le .
4
To a greater degree than in other parts of the w orld, Latin
Am erica's labor movements have been c lo se ly  tied  to p o litic s . There
are severa l reasons why organized labor turned? to p o litica l parties
and governments for so lu tions to  its  problem s. In most Latin American
countries, the structure of labor unions and the collective bargaining
process are regulated in  great de ta il by the government. Governments
have removed much from the realm of labor-management determ ination:
minimum w age, overtim e, length of vacations and h o lidays, health  and
pension plans are a l l  w ritten  into law . F inally , major economic
p o lic ie s—ta x e s , imports and exports, inflationary and counter-
inflationary  programs, employment and foreign exchange contro ls—
are in government hands. Since labor's standard of living is  so greatly
affected  by government, i t  seemed natural for labor to  try  to  influence
80government decisions in th ese  a rea s .
^ A l e x a n d e r ,  Organized Labor in Latin America, 8 .
^ H aw k in g s , "Reflections on Labor," 939; and M artz, "The 
Growth and Dem ocratization of Labor, " 6 . '
But if  labor needed p o litic s , po litics needed labor more. 
Particularly in the case  of V enezuela, "po litical circum stances a t 
the time of the labor m ovement's onse t a lso  contributed to  the po li­
tica liza tio n  of the trade unions. Two important m otives prompted 
strong po litica l party in te rest in  organized labor: one w as id e a lis tic  
and noble, the other w as opportunistic and v ita l . Many p o litic ian s, 
im pressed with the poverty and oppression experienced by most 
w orkers, desired  to  help labor w ith favorable leg is la tio n  abetting 
organization. But the pragmatic reason of po litica l parties w as more 
im portant. W orker's unions, potentially  p o ssessin g  a degree of d is ­
cipline unlike any other civ ilian  sec to r, might become capable of 
m ass ac tion  for or ag a in st a party or government. This is  crucial 
where the b a llo t decides power. In 1945, Democratic Action was 
both aware of th is  potential and able to do something about i t .
During the tr ien io , labor voted overwhelmingly AD; and , a s  a re su lt , 
AD never lo s t a national election.® ^
By the constitu tion  of 1946, the righ ts of Venezuelan labor 
became the law of the land, but th is  did not term inate the Betancourt 
and G allegos governm ents' support of the worker. Under AD
^ H e n ry  A. Landsberger, "Labor Elite: Is i t  Revolutionary? ,  ” 
in L ipset and Solari, E lites in Latin America, 290-291.
^ H aw k in g s , "Reflections on Labor, " 933; and Alexander, 
Organized Labor in Latin America, 1 7 - i8 .
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lead ersh ip  over 500 new labor unions were formed, causing labor 
membership to  quadruple. A landmark accom plishm ent for Venezuelan 
labor w as the crea tion , in November, 1947, of the Venezuelan Workers 
Confederation (CTV), a national labor o rgan ization .®3 The government 
put pressure on employers to  grant wage in c re a se s , then  spent millions 
of dollars subsid izing  foodstuffs and other basic  item s to  prevent 
in fla tion . Hundreds of schools were built in  worker neighborhoods, 
causing the number of children enrolled in  Venezuelan schools to  
double. These government program s, as w ell as o thers in  the areas 
of housing, agriculture and industry , were financed by a new o il policy 
which ra ise d  V enezuela's share of petroleum revenue to  fifty per cen t. 
To permit a fu ller degree of collaboration between labor and govern­
ment, a separate  M inistry of Labor w as c rea ted , headed by Raul Leoni. 
V enezuela's other po litica l p a rtie s , namely URD and COPEI, attem pted 
to  cut in to  AD's labor support, but could not gain sign ifican t v ic tories
®3Only a few PCV controlled unions were members of the CTV. 
Communist influence in  Venezuelan labor suffered a blow from which 
it  never recovered in  1944 when th e  Medina Angarita government 
withdrew legal recognition from a l l  PCV dominated u n io n s. This 
action  had been preceeded by a sp lit between AD and the PCV in  the 
Second W orkers Congress of the same y ea r. Both parties w ished to 
control organized labor in  Venezuela; when jo in t domination proved 
im possib le , the Congress w as d isso lv ed . The governm ent's move 
remains a m ystery, for President Medina Angarita stood to  gain more 
from aiding the PCV than AD. The net re su lt allow ed AD to take over, 
reorganize and reorient a majority of the country 's com m unist-controlled 
unions. Alexander, Communism in  Latin America. 259-264, and 
Organized Labor in  Latin America, 144; and M artz, "The Growth and 
Dem ocratization o f Labor, " 7 -8 .
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due to  Democratic A ction1 s control of the government and concomitant
0 4
ab ility  to deliver the goods.
Within th is general framework of Venezuelan labor, the great 
accom plishm ent of the trienio w as the m obilization and p o litica liza ­
tion of the Venezuelan peasan try . W ell over half of the local unions 
founded during th is  era were peasan t (or campesina) un ions. Tradi­
tio n a lly , peasan ts were po litica lly  neglig ible due to  iso la tion , poverty, 
backw ardness and government indifference. W ith AD in power, however, 
party leaders began working with both farmers and peasants in  an 
attem pt to  restructure Venezuelan agricu ltu re . The po litical arm of 
. the peasan ts became the Venezuelan P easan t Federation (FCV), headed 
by AD's Ramon Q u ijada .
A near-perfect marriage of functional capab ilities and needs 
w as thereby in itia ted : cam pesina m asses and the local leaders 
sought po litica l representation  and the organizational sk ills  
necessary  to  weld them selves in to  an  effective form of co llec ­
tive action: the leaders of the new po litica l parties sought a 
base of organized, m assive e lec to ra l support; in each other, 
the partners found the ir needs n ice ly  m e t.85
The G allegos government founded the Agrarian Reform In stitu te ,
backed by three per cent of the national budget. Its  objective was to
p A
°^Alba, H istoria del Movimiento Obrero, 405; Blank, Venezuela 
E lec tion  Factbook, 9; A lexander, Organized Labor in  Latin America, 
144-145; and M artz, Accion D em ocratica, 259.
85john Duncan Powell, The Role of the Pederacion Campesina in 
the Venezuelan Agrarian Reform Process (M adison: U niversity of 
W isconsin , Land Tenure C en ter), 3.
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re se ttle  V enezuela's 350,000 landless peasant fam ilies on idle or i l l -
u tilized  lan d s, justly  com pensating ow ners. N everthe less, the landed
oligarchy b itte rly  re s is ted  land reform a t  every tu rn . "It was probably
more than co incidental th a t the military coup aga inst AD in November,
1948, occurred very soon a fte r the passage of an agrarian  reform law
and before th is  law could be implemented.
The power of labor re s ts  on two p illa rs: num erical strength a t
the ballot box when e lec tio n s m atter, and the th rea t of violence as
87the ultim ate weapon when elections do not m atter. In the exerc ise
of th ese  pow ers, Venezuelan labor managed the former, but not the
la tte r . The reaso n  for th is  is  simple: Democratic A ction, like
V enezuela's o ther p o litica l.p artie s , assum ed—perhaps naively—th a t
represen tative  government would become a permanent feature of
Venezuelan p o litica l l i f e . During the trien io , labor w as organized to
function as a pressure group in  a  dem ocratic society  and not as an
armed in s titu tio n . The im plication by some au thorities to the effec t
th a t organized labor fa iled  "as a counterweight to  the armed 
89fo rces . . . ,  " or tha t trade unions, "as a po litica l counterpoise to
o 6
Quijano Obregon, "Contemporary Peasant M ovements, " 307- 
309; Lieuwen, "Political Forces in V enezuela," 349; and Martz,
Accion D em ocratica, 273-276.
^L an d sb e rg e r, "Labor E lite, " 294.
^ B e tan co u rt, Politica y Petroleo, 461-470.
^ M a r tz ,  Accion D em ocratica, .260.
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the armed fo rces. . . proved ineffective in the  revolution of
q nNovember, 1948, is  unfair criticism .
Criticism  of labor for its  lack of m ilitancy is  more ju s tified  after
1948. The m ilitary coup which overthrew President G allegos in  the fall
91of tha t year nullified  the gains made by labor under Democratic Action.
A pro-labor government w as replaced by a pro-management government.
Programs for improved housing, schools and m edical fa c ilitie s  were
scrapped in favor of plush o fficers ' c lubs. Those 350,000 land less
p easan t fam ilies w aiting for th e ir small parce l of land were to  have a
long w ait. Along with her students and p o litica l p artie s , V enezuela's
workers and peasan ts  were v is ite d  by rep ressio n . Compared to  the ten
*
years of d ictatorsh ip  that followed 1948, the  trien io  resem bled a  poli­
t ic a l parad ise . "It was a period of activ ity  and accom plishm ent on a 
scale  never before experienced. "92 This memory, with th a t of the
^ L ieu w e n , "Political Forces in  V enezuela, " 354-355.
^ M o re  c ritica l of V enezuela's c iv ilian  government than the 
military were the country 's other political p a r tie s . They viewed AD's 
position as unfair com petition and encouraged the armed forces to 
in tervene. There w as a com plete absence of civ ilian  un ity . Various 
explanations of why the m ilitary decided to  h a lt V enezuela's demo­
cratic  experim ent can be found in the following: Edwin Lieuwen, "The 
M ilitary: A Revolutionary F orce, " The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science CCCXXXIV (M arch, 1961), 36, and 
Arms and P o litics , 86; and H olm es, "Army C hallenge,"  172-174.'
92M artz, A ccion D em ocratica, 62.
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oppression of the Perez Jime'nez d ic ta to rsh ip , forged an unwritten triple 
a llian ce  between s tu d en ts , po litic ians and labor that proved a far more 
formidable opponent of m ilitarism  than the challengers of 1928, 1936- 
193 7, or 1945-1948.
Like the studen t rebellion  of 1928 and th e  political panaceas of 
1936-1937, the civ ilian-dem ocratic  forces of the trienio fa iled  because 
those  who controlled the n a tio n 's  physical power were determ ined to 
rep lace  po litic ians w ith m ilitary officers and  democracy w ith m ili­
ta rism . But like i ts  p red ecesso rs, the 1945-1948 era made a  contribu­
tion to  the cause of freedom. During the tr ie n io , Venezuelans d is ­
covered not only th e  economic and socia l advantages of represen tative 
government, but a ls o  the dignity  inherent in  being able to  express 
openly an opinion, to  have a vo ice  in the a ffa irs  of one 's country and 
to  vo te  for a chosen candidate without fear of rep risal or e x ile .
Of the three h isto rica l experiences w hich  comprise V enezuela's 
sp arse  civ ilian  p o litica l trand ition , the 1945-1948 trienio did the most 
to  incu lca te  dem ocratic values in  the minds of the people. But in  1945, 
unlike 1928 or 1936, the im petus for reform came from without the 
civ ilian -dem ocratic  secto r. I t w as almost a s  i f  the armed fo rces, 
having given dem ocracy to Venezuela in 1945, retained th e  righ t to 
rep o sse ss  i t  in 1948. The course of represen tative government in 
Venezuela in  1948 dem onstrated to  its  advocates a sir,v:ie le sso n : only 
c iv ilian  unity plus a w illingness to  pay w hatever price n ecessa ry  would 
transform  their dream of democracy into a perm anent rea lity .
CHAPTER V
THE PATRIOTIC JUNTA: PART I
In the summer of 1957, the main top ic of conversation in  Venezuela 
w as the national e lec tions scheduled for th e  la tte r  part of the year. 
Everyone knew th a t e ither President Marcos Perez Jime'nez or a close 
m ilitary a sso c ia te  would be V enezuela's nex t chief execu tive . Specula- 
tiv e  d iscussion  in  the s tre e ts , homes, s ide-w alk  cafes and particularly 
in  th e  country 's censored press centered around political parties and 
the role they would play in  the forthcoming e le c tio n s . The governmeit 
had made a near su ccessfu l attem pt a t eradicating  po litica l parties; but 
w ith P. J . 's  f iv e -y ea r term drawing tov a c lo se , URD and COPEI, 
V enezuela's only remaining legalized  parties of any sign ificance, 
began preparing candidates and programs for entry into the campaign. 
Democratic Action, V enezuela's largest party  prior to 1948, had been 
outlawed for nearly  a decade. I ts  leadership w as either dead , impri­
soned or ex iled , and its  membership d ispersed  and persecu ted . In 1952, 
the Venezuelan Communist Party was also  outlaw ed. The Democratic 
Republican Union, temporarily banned after its  strong showing in the 
1952 elections had been re in sta ted  by 1957. However, i t  w as impotent 
w ithout its  exiled  leader, the ubiquitous Jovito Villalba. The only
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po litica l leader of national reputation not exiled w as Rafael C aldera, 
the leader of the Independent Committee for Po litical and Electoral 
O rganization. U nofficial speculation in the summer of 1957 expected 
URD and COPEI to  unite behind the candidacy of C aldera, the only 
individual given the rem otest chance o f w inning. Speculation on the 
role of p o litica l parties in  V enezuela's next election  ceased  on
August 21, 1957, when Rafael Caldera was arrested  and im prisoned.
1
There would be no repeat performance of the 1952 e lec tio n s .
Although po litica l parties seemed to  be the number one ta rg e t of 
the Pelrez Jimdnez regime , other groups were singled out for govern­
ment rep ression . The Central U niversity of Venezuela, the trad itional 
repository of the country 's dem ocratic v a lu e s , w as under constan t 
surveillance by the au th o rities . By 1957, the prolific population 
growth of Venezuela had produced a nation of young people (seventy 
per cen t of a l l  Venezuelans are under th irty  years of ag e ), a factor 
giving spec ia l w eight to  student po litica l ac tiv ity . Aware tha t univer­
sity  students were a  po ten tia l source of un rest, P . J. d isregarded, 
a s  early  a s  1952, the academ ic inv io lab ility  estab lished  by the
1 "Venezuelans Choose Freedom, " World Today XIV (February, 
1958), 48-49; "P. J . in  Command, " Newsweek XLVUI (January 27, 
1958), 48; Feinste in , "The Role of Foreign Investm ent, " 220; and 
Tugwell, "C hristian D em ocrats, " 252-253. Chapter III contains a 
d iscu ssio n  of the 1952 Venezuelan e lec tio n s .
U niversity Reform Movement. Since the  death of Juan Vincente Gomez, 
the huge C entral U niversity had enjoyed autonomy; but when students 
protested the 1952 e lection  farce, P. J . invaded and closed the 
U niversity . In February, 1956, when trouble arose over a  stric tly  
academ ic controversy, the police were again sen t in  to end the  dispute 
and temporarily close the U niversity . It was about th is  time tha t a 
U niversity Front was c rea ted . It w as composed of students of a ll 
p o litica l ideologies and dedicated to  the overthrow of the d ic ta to rsh ip . 
However vocal and ded icated , the U niversity  Front, as dem onstrated 
by its  third confrontation with the government, seemed help less 
ag a in st the m ilitary regim e. In the la s t  week of November, 1957, in 
reaction  to  the announcement by Perez Jime'nez th a t the forthcoming 
national e lections would be a “p le b isc ite 1 rather than a co n tes t, the 
students started  a dem onstration w ithin un iversity  grounds and began 
a  march toward M iraflores. About half-w ay to the p residen tia l palace 
they  were met by police using te a r  g a s , chased back to  the University 
C ity , sought out with clubs and sub jected  to  m ass a rre s t. The Central 
U niversity  of Venezuela w as closed  and remained so as long as  Marcos 
Pe'rez Jimdnez ruled V enezuela.^
O
In th is  November, 1957, confrontation between students and 
po lice , sev era l d istinguished  professors having nothing to  do with the 
dem onstrations were severely  beaten by po lice. Humberto Cuenca, 
"Revolucion de los M a n ifie s to s ," in  Asi Se Praquo La Insurreccion: 
Documentos C lan d estin o s, 1956- 1958 (Caracas: Edicidnes de la 
Revista Cruza d e l Sur, 1958), vi; S . W alter W ashington, “Student •
(continued)
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Organized labor in Venezuela w as a lso  on the government's
"black l is t .  " It was crushed. The effective Venezuelan Labor
Confederation (CTV) w as d isso lv ed , Oil w orkers' unions and peasant
unions were destroyed , bu t most urban unions continued to  function
under reco n stitu ted , pro-P . J. leadersh ip . Perez Jimenez created a
n a tio n a l, governm ent-controlled and governm ent-financed union in
3
1952, but few genuine labor organizations became a ff ilia te s . After 
an  extensive investiga tion  cf the s ta te  of organizational freedom in 
V enezuela, the In ternational Labor Organization (ILO), a techn ical 
agency of the United N ations, condemned the d ic ta to rsh ip . W hen, 
a t  an in ternational o il conference, the IIO attacked  the government's 
labor p o lic ie s , P. J . withdrew Venezuela from the organization. A 
CTV-in-exile functioned a s  a propaganda organ, and the various 
po litica l p artie s , AD, URD, COPEI and PCV (Red Communist), a ll
^Politics in  Latin America: The Venezuelan Example, " 
Foreign Affairs XXXVII (April, 1959), 463-469; Tannenbaum, Ten Keys 
to -Latin America, 110; Eisenhower, The Wine is  B itter. 34; Lieuwen, 
"Political Forces in V enezuela ," 354; and United N ations S ta tis tica l 
Bulletin for Latin America, V, 29.
3Marcos Perez Jimdhez w as attem pting to  emulate the labor- 
m ilitary based government of Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina. Since 
V enezuela's population was becoming increasingly  urban, Perez 
Jimdhez w ished to construct a po litica l system  based  upon the military 
and the caudillo  as the champion of the urban w orker. F einstein , "The 
Role Foreign Investm ent, " 212-213.
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m aintained sm all, clandestine labor organizations; but th e se  remained
4
ineffective during most of the d ic ta to rsh ip .
There was s ti l l  one more distinguishable secto r of Venezuelan 
life that, became disenchanted with Perez Jim enez. The Venezuelan 
Catholic Church, never a rea l po litica l power in the country, declared 
its e lf  opposed to  the New N ational Id ea l. This unusual position taken 
by the normally acqu iescen t Venezuelan Church can only be understood 
when se t ag a in st certain  developments w ithin in ternational C atholicism . 
On May 1, 1955, Pope Pius XII declared the institu tion  of the fe a s t of 
Saint Joseph the Worker for the firs t day in  May. This w as a revival 
of the concept f irs t expounded by Pope Leo XIII (Rerum Novarum— 1891), 
which called  on the Church to  turn its  a tten tion  to  the tem poral, as 
w ell as  the sp ir itu a l needs of the worker. Pius XII’s su ccesso rs  con­
tinued to  push th is  movement. Currently, th is "New Catholicism " 
em phasizes litu rg ical innovations, theological reforms and ecum enicity; 
but i t  a lso  caused  a c r is is  in  the Church—especia lly  pronounced in  the 
Church south of the border. The Latin American episcopacy is  under 
heavy pressure from the Vatican and various hierarchies w ithin the in te r­
national Church to  use  i ts  influence in  the cause of so c ia l and economic 
advancem ent. There are two important reasons for th is  concern . The 
f irs t is  th a t Latin America com prises one-third o f the C hurch's to ta l
^Alexander, Organized Labor. 146-147; Accion D em ocratica, 261.
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baptized membership. The second is  th a t due to  so c ia l, economic and
po litica l unrest in  the a rea , Latin America appears to be particularly
vulnerable to communism.  ̂ N either the trad itional Latin American
Catholic Church, the ally of privilege and conservatism , nor the
trad itional Venezuelan Catholic Church, com placent and subservient
to d ic ta to rsh ip , ,-fits into th is  new , se lf-defined  role of the universal 
6
Church.
^Ivan V allier, "Religious E lites: D ifferentiations and Developments 
in Roman Catholicism , " in L ipset and Solari, Elites in  Latin America, 196- 
200; Francois Houtart and Emile Pin, The Church and the Latin American 
Revolution (New York: Sheed & W ards, 1965), 256-257. For comparison 
of the C atholic Church in Latin America today and the same institu tion  
th irty  years ago , see John J. Kennedy, "Dichotomies in the Church, "
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science CCLX 
(July, 1965), 20-29 . An excellen t exam ination of how the various C hris­
tian  Democratic parties of Latin America are complimenting the "New 
Catholicism " can be found in  Emilio M aspero,. "Latin America's Labor 
Movement of C hristian Democratic Orientation a s  an Instrum ent of Social 
C h an g e ," in W illiam V. D'Antonio and Fredrick B. Pike (e d s .) , Religion. 
Revolution, and Reform: New Forces for Change in  Latin America (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 163-181.
*
One of the most progressive Latin American prelates is  the Rev. 
Holder Camara, Archbishop of Recife, Brazil. The following offering 
was given by His Excellency in 1956 a t the Second Annual k a tio n a l 
Conference of the C atholic Inter-American Cooperation Program. In a 
few w ords, it  dem onstrates what is  happening to  the Church in  Latin 
America.
Lord, make us love the Eucharist more and more in  the man 
who is  poor. May we recognize in  the image of his misery the 
presence of your Son. Help u s , for the love of th is  man who is  
poor, to wage a fight to  the death ag a in st the causes of his 
poverty .
These days of study present a panorama: unjust so c ia l struc­
tures in  Latin America; grave so c ia l c rises shaking the countries 
of the continent; a so c ia l revolution which everywhere imposes 
i ts e lf .  Revolution, not in  the meaning of armed and bloody 
revo lt, but of rapid and su b stan tia l change.
(continued)
153
Since Juan Vincente Gomez, the Church in Venezuela had been 
making a comeback. Gcfmez removed the property-holding and educa­
tional restric tions in stitu ted  by Antonio Guzmcfn Blanco in the la s t
century, allowing the Church to  become gradually w ealthier and more
7
independent of the S tate . By the early 1950‘s , the Church hierarchy 
fe lt secure enough to le t i t  be unofficially known th a t the Venezuelan 
Church disapproved of the governm ent's treatm ent of COPEI, a C hristian 
Democratic party . In 1953, e igh ty-three copeyano congressm en were 
a rrested  when they boycotted the assem bly chosen by the 1952 e lecto ra l 
fraud. By 1954, COPEI was s t i l l  legal but was unable to  carry out its  
a c tiv itie s . In 1955, the d ic ta to rsh ip  apparently succeeded in cementing 
a  rapprochment with the Church by permitting Catholic instruction in
Q
public schoo ls . The mortar, however, proved to be very w eak. On 
Sunday, May 1, 1957, a pastoral le tte r  from Rafael Arias Blanco,
6 (continued)
Woe be to  a ll C hristians if the lowly become convinced tha t 
the Church has abandoned them in th is  dark hour. They cannot 
but believe tha t relig ion is  indeed the opium of the people and 
C hristianity  an a lly  of privilege and explo itation .
Quoted in John J. Considine (ed .) , Social Revolution in  the  New Latin 
America: A Catholic A ppraisal (Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, 1965), 
v ii .
7
Lieuwin, " Po litical Forces in  Venezuela, " 53. For more on the 
rela tions between Guzman Blanco and the Venezuelan Catholic Church 
see Chapter III.
Q
Tugwell, “C hristian  D em ocrats, " 252; and F einste in , "The Role 
of Foreign Investm ent, " 218.
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Archbishop of C aracas, was read from a ll Church pulpits in  Venezuela. 
I t was an unm istakable indictm ent of the New N ational Id ea l.  ̂
The Archbishop did not "beat around the b u s h ," He opened his 
le tte r by ridiculing those who would put the M arxist tag on anything 
connected with labor, organized and unorganized. Between com­
munism, "which considers the individual a  mere instrum ent of the 
S tate , " wrote the p re la te , and cap ita lism , "which sees the worker a s
ju s t an instrum ent for production, " i s  the dignity of human rights as  
*
found in the G ospel. After quoting from the w ritings of Popes Leo 
XIII, Pius XI and Pius XII, Arias Blanco lashed  out a t the New National 
Id ea l.
No one can dare say  tha t the w ealth of Venezuela is  evenly 
d istribu ted , for an immense number of our people are living 
in subhuman cond itions. Unemployment is  driving many 
Venezuelans to  discouragem ent and desperation; cap ita lis ts  
are reaping unheard of profits, yet w orker's wages are unjustly 
meager; there are no schools where the sons of workers (who 
have every right to it) can acquire an  education in  order to 
built a better life; credit for the worker is  unavailable; the 
government constantly  v io la tes the righ ts of the workers by 
removing legal defenses; and women are toiling a t jobs under 
unjust conditions. All of these  facts are lam entable, they 
prevent Venezuelans from enjoying the God given richness of 
their country. ^
q
The fu ll tex t of Archbishop Arias B lanco's le tter can be found in 
Asi Se Fraquo La Insurreccio'n, 13-17. For a d iscussion  of the effect 
of the le tte r on Venezuela see "Venezuela: For Harmony, " Newsweek 
LI (January 20, 1958), 44; "Venezuela's D ictator Is O u t." Business 
W eek (February 1, 1958), 80; and S zu lc , Twilight of the T yrants, 296- 
297. For the reaction of the C atholic press in the United S tates to 
Archbishop Arias Blanco's le tte r see "When Is a P leb isc ite , " 386.
~^&si Se Fraquo La Insurreccidh , 15.
During the re s t of 1957, the relations between the government 
and the Church grew w orse. The highly respected  Venezuelan Catholic 
daily , La Religion, critic ized  P. J. for the a rre s t, on August 21, of 
Rafael Caldera on the ludicrous charge of inciting the Catholic Church 
ag a in st the government. In -late November, when students demon­
stra ted  aga inst the Pelrez Jimenez announcement tha t a  p leb iscite  instead  
of elections would be held in December, La R eligion, in defiance of 
censorship  o rders, came out for the students and ag a in st the proposed 
p leb isc ite . Caldera w as re leased  on December 24, 1957, and given 
two weeks to leave the country. W hen, after only a few days, agents 
of the N ational Security began inquiring as to  h is w hereabouts, Caldera 
• w as given diplom atic asylum  by the Papal Nuncio. The resu lt was 
strained  rela tions between Perez Jime'nez and the V atican. Following 
the abortive January 1, 1958, coup ag a in st the New N ational Ideal,
P. J . ordered a l l  new spapers to print front page ed ito ria ls denouncing 
the uprising. The colorful editor of La Religion. Rev. Jesus Hernandez 
C hapellin , refused and landed in ja i l .  On January 4 , four more priests 
who had been openly c ritica l of the government were a rrested . Not even 
the moral force of the Church seemed to  weaken the d ic tatorsh ip .
^ H ispanic American Report (Tanuary, 1958), 30-31; Tugwell, 
"C hristian D em ocrats," 252-253; Kantor, "AD De V enezuela," 246; 
"Venezuelans Choose Freedom ," 47; Goldenburg, The Cuban Revolution, 
94; "Jets Over C a raca s , 1 Time LXXI (January 13, 1958), 24; and 
"Freedom Over V enezuela, " America XCVIII (February 8 , 1958), 532-533.
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The numerous repressive policies of the Perez Jimenez regime, 
the harassm ent of po litical p a rtie s , the ja iling  of p rie s ts , press 
censorship , m ilitary occupation of the university and the persecution 
of organized labor, adversely  affected  specific  identifiable civilian  
secto rs of so c ie ty . These and other p ractices of the d ic ta to rsh ip , 
p ractices not directed toward any particular elem ent in the population, 
served to draw condemnation of the regime from th a t great fa c e le s s , 
untitled  m ass, the Venezuelan general public. Excessive police 
brutality  in quelling university  and high school dem onstrations, in 
addition to unnecessary  indignities in flic ted  upon faculty  members, 
caused concern among many, .especially  in te llec tu a ls  and paren ts.
The New N ational Id ea l's  "iceberg principle" of econom ics— to  spend 
m illions on the one-ten th  of the country that was v is ib le , notably 
C aracas—could not hide growing slum s, increasing  unemployment and 
rising food p rices . C itizens became increasingly  edgy in  the precarious 
atmosphere created  by the N ational Security. For the firs t time in the 
nation 's  h isto ry , women saw the inside of prison w a lls . "Venezuela 
became a huge po litical ja i l  where men were enclosed  without the
12benefits of being charged, without legal counsel and without tr ia l. " 
Pedro Estrada, chief of the N ational Security, was a t once the most 
hated and the most feared man in  V enezuela. Venezuelan public opinion
^ C u e n c a , "Revolucic&i de los M anifiestos, " v .
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began to express m isgivings about the country 's im age. In 1955, 
Argentina ousted i ts  m ilitary d ic tato r, Juan Peron, who,, in 1956, . 
took up residence in  C aracas. In June, 1957, Argentina broke re la ­
tions with Venezuela when Peron began using Venezuelan fa c ilitie s  
to  d irec t, by remote control, a sabotage campaign in  his country.
Peru and neighboring Colombia had recently  overthrown their military 
d ic ta to rs , Manuel Odria and Gustavo Rojas P in illa . To help celebrate 
Venezuelan Independence D ay, July 5 , 1957, P. J . could find only onej
availab le  friend , General Alfredo S troessner of tiny  Paraguay. It was
publicly known th a t c itizens of other countries were beginning to  make
paralle l com parisons between Perez Jim enez's Venezuela and the
13Dominican Republic of the notorious Rafael Trujillo.
The government of General Marcos Perez Jime'nez was not blind 
to  th is  growing tide of resentm ent. Yet, the effect of th is increasing 
unpopularity seem ed to  embolden the d ic ta to rsh ip . In November, 1957, 
the Venezuelan Congress obediently approved m odification of the
^A lberto  Ravelle, "Los Valores M o ra le s ," La E sfera, January 29, 
1958; Mariano Picon Salas e t al  ̂ (e d s .) , Venezuela Independien te, 
1810-1960 (C aracas: Fundacion Eugenio M endoza, 1962), 297-298; 
Szulc, Twilight of the T y ran ts . 293-297; Porter and Alexander, The 
Struggle for Democracy, 111-118; M artz , Accion D em ocratica, 298- 
299; Johnson, The M ilitary and Society in  Latin America, 139; 
"Venezuela's D ictator Is O u t,"  80; "P. J. in  Command," 48; "Friendly 
Strongm en," 42; The New York Tim es, Septem ber 14, 1956; and 
H ispanic American Report (Tanuary, 1958), 29-30.
country 's e lecto ra l law . V enezuela's G eneral-President announced to 
the nation th a t, on December 15, 1957, a p leb iscite  would be held in 
place of an e lec tio n . Lareano V allenilla Lanz, M inister of the 
In terior, and Pedro Estrada, N ational Security C hief, P. J. 's  two 
c lo se s t ad v ise rs , had no illu sio n s concerning the P resident's  popu­
la rity—Pelrez Jime'nez could never win an honest e lec tio n . The p leb iscite  
was the brain child of V allenilla Lanz. Voters would be asked  whether 
they wanted Pe7rez Jime'nez to  remain in  office, the sole name on the 
ballo t would be Perez Jim enez, and there would be no campaign. On 
December 15, voters were given two cards: a  blue one, to  vote yes; 
and a red one, to  vote no. There w as only one P residen tial candidate 
on the ballo t (P. J .)  and only one s la te  of candidates for Congress 
(P. J . ’s ) . Two hours after the polls c lo sed , Vallenilla Lanz 
ca lled  in foreign correspondents to announce th a t eighty-five per cent 
of V enezuela's reg istered  voters had re -e lec te d  Perez Jimenez by a four 
to  one m ajority. In rea lity , polling p laces on December 15 resem bled 
m orgues. Only government em ployees voted. Ink .stains on the finger 
indicated  th a t a person had partic ipated  in  the election; for a person 
hoping to keep a government job , to return to work-without ink sta ins 
w as dangerous. ^  Although Venezuela had never been a haven
•̂ T he New York T im es, December 18, 1957; "When Is a P leb isc ite ,"  
386; Kantor, "AD De V enezuela," 20; and Szulc. Twilight of the T yrants, 
296-299.
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of dem ocracy, even her most venal d ictators paid lip service to demo­
cratic  procedure by a t le a s t  going through the motions of being
f  /  15re -e le c te d . Perez Jimenez did not.
Scholars, journalists  and observers of Latin America and 
Venezuela are in  unanimous agreem ent tha t i t  was th is  "plebiscite 
farce" which turned nearly a l l  of Venezuela ag a in st the d ic tatorsh ip . 
Even for those Venezuelans who had accepted  the government of Perez 
Jimenez w ith immense patience and p assiv ity , the episode of 
December 15 proved to  be more than they could to le ra te . V enezuela's 
cup of endurance had overflowed. The p leb iscite  in stilled  in 
Venezuelans from a ll w alks of life a desire  to  strike back a t the 
d ic ta to rsh ip . Since th ese  c iv ilians lacked physical modes for accom­
plishing the ir d es ire s , they were drawn to  the banner of the Patriotic 
Junta,. which offered a  symbolic method for denouncing the government. 
The Patrio tic Junta, in  hand-circulated  le a f le ts , requested that 
Venezuelans show th e ir disapproval of the regime by boycotting the 
p leb isc ite . O fficially, Marcos Perez Jimenez w as re -e lec ted
President of Venezuela on December 15, 1957; unofficially , th is
1 fiday marked the f irs t of many v ic to ries for the Patriotic Junta.
15Porter and Alexander, The Struggle for Democracy. 4; and Lott, 
"V enezuela," 243,
1 fi■LOThe following sources are a l l  in agreement regarding the sign i­
ficance o r ' 15, 1557, p leb iscite  as  the single most
imp: ' he unpopularity of the Perez Jimenez
(continued)
The Patriotic Junta was a to ta lly  clandestine organization 
dedicated  to the overthrow of the military based regime of Marcos 
Perez Jimenez and to  the establishm ent of representative government 
in Venezuela. I ts  origins are obscure. Following the 1948 counter­
revolution , Democratic A ction's exiled p o litica l leadership had tim e 
to  re-exam ine i ts  achievem ents and m istakes. There was complete 
agreem ent as  to  what constitu ted  AD's b iggest blunder: civ ilian  
d isunity  and w eakness caused  by mutual enmity among V enezuela's 
p o litica l p a rtie s—with Democratic Action the  most hostile  contributor. 
URD, PCV, and COPEI, eager to  fill the vacuum created by the depar­
ture of AD from the Venezuelan po litica l scene in 1948, were not as 
quick to  realize  the value of po litica l un ity . By 1952, however,
P. J. 's  persecution  of the Communist Party of Venezuela, and the 
provisional m ilitary ju n ta 's  th e ft of a c lear e lecto ra l victory from the 
Democratic Republican Union dem onstrated to  these  two groups the 
advantages of concerted ac tio n . At a 195 6 conference, AD exiles 
adopted a "New T actic" which ca lled  for fu ll and active cooperation
16 (continued)g0vernmen ;̂ but  none of th ese  sources mention the roll 
of the Patriotic Jun ta , Mancera G a lle tti, Civilismo M ilitarising, 
18-19; Blank, Venezuela Election Factbook, IQ; Szulc, Twilight of 
the T yrants, 298-300; Coldenburg, The Cuban Revolution, 93-94; 
'Porter and Alexander, The Struggle for Dem ocracy. 4; Lieuwen, 
V enezuela, 100-101; "Venezuela's D ictator Is O ut,"  80; Lott, 
"V enezuela," 243; "Venezuela Topples a D ictator, ” Senior Scholastic 
LXXII (February 14, 1958), 9-11; "V enezuela," Time XI (February 3 , 
1958), 30-32; and "Farce in  C aracas, " Nation CLXXV (November 30, 
1957), 398.
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with V enezuela’s other po litica l p artie s . Since the expatriated 
leadership  of the PCV and URD a lso  favored in ter-party  coordination 
aga inst the d ictatorsh ip  and a l l  three parties in exile maintained 
c lose  contact w ith their underground counterparts in V enezuela, 
the way was c lear for some form of jo in t ac tion . COPEI was reluctan t
to  cooperate for fear of jeopardizing its  legal sta tu s; but the arrest of
I l
Rafael Calder in  August, 1957, convinced V enezuela’s C hristian
Democrats of the n ecess ity  of civ ilian  un ity . The stage was se t for
1 7the formation of the Patriotic Junta.
' Prior to the summer of 1957, the Patrio tic Junta w as ju s t an
id e a . Three of V enezuela's four major po litica l p a rtie s , URD, PCV
and AD, were being persecuted by the government and were forced to
operate party machinery c landestine ly . By pre-arrangem ent, the
presidents of the underground URD and PCV se t a date and place for
the firs t meeting of a jo int committee—the future Patrio tic Junta—
lftto  coordinate the anti-governm ent ac tiv itie s  of both p a rtie s . For
17  sEl N acional, January 24, 1958; M artz, Accion D em ocratica, 330-
332; Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution, 136-139; Tugwell, "C hristian
D em ocrats," 253; and M artz, "Growth of Venezuelan Labor," 11.
■^A very brief account of the ac tiv itie s  of the Patriotic Junta can 
be found in  Philip B. Taylor, J r . . The Venezuelan Golpe De Estado of 
1958: The Fall of Marcos Perez Timenez (W ashington. D .C .:  Institu te  
for the Comparative Study of Political System s, 1968), 51-55 . This 
monograph (p. 50) s ta te s  th a t a l l  in ter-party  cooperation w as directed 
from New York by the exiled  leadership  of AD, URD and COPEI, and th a t, 
by mutual agreem ent, the PCV would not be included. In a published 
new spaper interview  of February 14, 1958, Jovito V illalba, Romulo
(continued)
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the sake of harmony and secu rity / the party chiefs estab lished  two 
important principles to  govern the relationship  between the parties 
and the coordinating committee: both parties would abide by dec i­
sions of the committee and only the. presidents would know the 
identity  of h is p arty 's  rep resen ta tive . The firs t meeting of the 
Patriotic Junta took place on June 1 4 , 1957 , a t the home of Fabricio 
O jeda, a young reporter and member of the URD.
Present a t th is  f irs t gathering were Guillermo Garcia Ponce of the 
PCV and Amilcar Gomez, Jose/ Vincente Rangel and Fabricio Ojeda of 
the URD. With the exception of Gomez, these  were young men, who, 
a t the  tim e, could have been c la ss ifie d  a s  po litica l unknowns—a d is ­
cree t fac t influencing the ir se lec tio n . Amilcar Gomez, an in fluential 
URD member and close friend of the ex iled  m aestro, Jovito V illalba, 
apparently dominated th is  f irs t se ss io n  of the com mittee. The first 
business to  be d iscu ssed  was security , for the arm of the N ational 
Security seemed long and om nipresent. Legitimate names were 
abandoned and supplanted by code names; each  of the four politicos 
se lec ted  an a lia s  and introduced him self to  the group. (Ox course ,
18 (continued)'Betancourt and Rafael Caldera refuted th is a llocation  and 
clearly  sta ted  th a t only informal ta lk s had taken  place in New York, 
resu lting  so lely  in  the encouragement of in ter-party  harmony. Actual 
collaboration and the Patriotic Jun ta 's policy of national unity were a ll 
developed and implemented in C aracas . El N acional, February 14, 1958.
19 El N acional, January 24, 1958, May 30, 1958; and D aily 
Journal, March 27,11958.
URD members knew each o ther's  legitim ate names; but in Patrio tic 
Junta m eetings, code designations were alw ays u sed .)  This measure 
w as introduced to  prevent members from divulging v ita l information in 
c a se  of capture and torture by the N ational Security. Each se ss io n  of 
the committee w as to determine the date and location of its  next 
gathering, w ith a l l  future m eetings taking place in  the autom obiles of 
i ts  various members. F inally , a  name for the coordinating committee 
w as chosen. I t  would be ca lled  the Tunta P atrio tica. The name had 
been suggested by Jovito Villalba in  h is correspondence with Amilcar 
Gomez and other URD members. The term was drawn from a revolu­
tionary organization by the same name formed on October 15, 1858, 
and dedicated to  the overthrow of the tyrannical regime of General
/ O f|
Jose Tadeo M onagas.
A few days following the firs t meeting of the Patriotic Junta, 
the party chiefs of the Venezuelan Communist Party and the Democratic 
Republican Union began negotiations with powerful Democratic Action. 
AD's positive response to  suggestions th a t i t  jo in  the coordinating 
body and thereby lim it its  penchant for individual action  p leasan tly  
surprised its  former com petito rs. By early  August the necessary
2^Gil Fortoul, H istoria C onstitucional De V enezuela, III, 134-135, 
Picon S alas, Venezuela Independien te , 113; El N acional, January 24, 
1958, January 31, 1958, May 30, 1958; and Daily Tournal, March 27, 
1958.
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arrangem ents had been made, and Democratic Action's M oises Gamero 
became a member of the Patriotic Ju n ta .21
August, 1957, w as a momentous month for the Junta in  s t i l l  
another w ay. It w as in the early  part of th is  month th a t the people of 
Venezuela firs t heard mention of the Patriotic Junta. This was made 
possib le by the appearance of the Junta’s maiden publication,
22"M anifesto No. 1: The Patrio tic Junta to  the Venezuelan People.
^ G a rc ia  Ponce, Apuntes Sobre la Libertad, 108; and El N acional, 
January 24, 1958.
The early  m anifestos, bulletins and leafle ts  d istributed by the 
Patrio tic Junta were not a s  numerous as the Jun ta 's la ter pub lications. 
This was due simply to  a lack of dem and. As the popularity of the 
Patriotic Junta in c reased , so did the demand for i ts  c ircu la rs— 
particularly  following the December 15, 1957, p le b isc ite . Police 
were ordered to  destroy anything signed by the Patriotic Junta.
Immediate a rre s ts  and imprisonment by the N ational Security w as in 
store for anyone caught w ith Junta literature on h is person, or for 
anyone seen  reading Junta litera tu re  th a t w as nailed  to posts or w a lls .
In m id-1958, the Patrio tic Junta-backed provisional government ruling 
Venezuela w as shaken by several attem pted m ilitary co u p s. Two en ter­
prising ed ito rs , to help rally  the c iv ilian  population behind the govern­
ment (and to s e ll  a few volum es), published accounts of the great 
achievem ents of V enezuela's c iv ilian  c itizen s under the Patriotic Junta. 
One of th ese  / j o s d  Umaha Bernal, Testimonio de la Revolucion en 
Venezuela (C aracas: Tipografia Vargas, 1958}/ is  highly opinionated, 
subjective and inaccura te , (It is  th is  source which forms the b as is  of 
the previously c ited  Taylor study .) The other /A si Se Fraquo La 
Insurreccion; Documentos C lan d estin o s. 1956-1958 (C aracas:
Ediciones de la Revista del Sur, 1958)7, however, is  extrem ely valuab le . 
Prefaced by a short, introductory e s sa y , i t  contains a near complete 
collection of a ll the publications of the Patriotic Ju n ta . It is  the only 
collection  of i ts  kind known to  th is  w riter. Even the volume its e lf  is  
ou t-o f-p rin t and v irtually  in a cce ss ib le .
The members of the Patriotic Junta wanted the ir c landestine organiza­
tion to  become the conscience of V enezuela. With freedom of speech  
and press im possib le , they w anted the Junta to  serve a s  a vehicle of 
national expression  and opinion. This would n e c e ss ita te , however, 
a  fairly  soph istica ted  printing facility  unavailable in the tightly 
clutched Venezuela of Marco Perez Jim enez. It w as a t th is  juncture 
tha t V enezuela's communists made the ir most sign ifican t contribution 
to the su ccess  of the Junta. "Padilla" (the code name of Guillermo 
Garcia Ponce of the PCV) informed his comrades tha t the printing press 
and s ta ff of the Tribuna Popular would be put a t the d isp o sa l of the 
Patrio tic Junta. The Tribuna Popular w as and is  the o ffic ial organ of 
the Venezuelan Communist Party . It w as es tab lish ed  in  the early 
1940 's , but i t  rem ained underground even afte r the PCV w as leg a lized . 
Since the number of Venezuelan communists was never large, the 
circulation  and influence of the Tribuna Popular remained minimal,
but i ts  plant w as perfectly su ited  to the needs of the Patriotic Junta.
i
None of the Jun ta 's  members, including Garcia Ponce, knew the lo ca ­
tion of the p re ss . D irectives of the Patrio tic Junta were authored jo in tly  
by a l l  members; a l l  preliminary drafts were destroyed; and the fina l copy 
w as taken  by "Padilla" who, in  turn, en trusted  the trac t to his party 
chief for ultim ate deposit w ith the printing press of the Tribuna Popular. 
U sually , the fin ished product w as prepared in  time for the Junta 's next
i
m eeting, when Garcia Ponce arranged for i ts  delivery to  the
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Patriotic Jun ta . To minimize r is k s , Junta members never d istributed 
the ir own litera tu re . In stead , members deposited  the printed trac ts 
w ith their respective party ch ie fs , who made the necessary  arrange­
ments for d istribu tion .  ̂3
"M anifesto No. 1: The P atrio tic  Junta to  the Venezuelan People" 
w as dated August, 1957, and signed La Tunta P atrio tica. A four-page 
e s sa y , th is  f irs t m anifesto w as mildly worded and critica l of P. J .— 
but not an ti-m ilitary . I t had a s  its  main them e the coming elections 
scheduled for December. Except for a vague allusion made to  "repre­
sen tative  sectors of national life , " nothing w as said regarding the • 
iden tity  of the Patriotic Jun ta . Its purpose, however, w as more 
succinctly  expressed:
We asp ire  only for re sp e c t of the righ t of direct, se c re t and 
universal suffrage; th a t candidates be allowed to campaign 
for office and debate openly—in other w ords, to allow  the 
w ill of the public to be expressed through the suf f rage. . . .
All candidates should be welcomed, c iv ilian  or m ilita ry . ^
After a  d iscreet reference to  the recen t overthrow of d ictators in
Argentina, Peru and Colombia, the tract demanded free and honest
elections in  December, implying that if they  were not forthcoming,
the government of Perez Jim enez might meet a  sim ilar f a te . This firs t
9*3 /
Asi Se Fraguo l a  Insurreccion, xi; and El N acional, January 24, 
1958, January 31, 1958, M arch 7, 1958.
24 Manifiesto No. 1: La Junta Patrio tica a l Pueblo Venezolano, " 
in Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion. 26-29.
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of many Patrio tic Junta publications was summarized with the following 
ca ll for unity:
The Patrio tic Junta makes a c a ll on a ll countrymen, both in  and 
out of government, to  a c t a s  one, without hatred  or vengeance, 
for national peace and prosperity . , . . On the s tree ts , in 
the facto ries and o ffices , on the countryside, in the educational 
in s titu tio n s , in the fo r ts , wherever one may b e , we must struggle 
for the resp ec t of our sacred  rights and sovereign w ill. ^ 5
The m anifesto ended with a  forthright statem ent of i ts  position: "against 
presidential su ccession ;"  "for representative government;" " f o r a  p resi­
dent who w ill resp ec t the nation;" and "for p eace , tranquility , and calm for
!i
the Venezuelan Fam ily ."2 ®
The month of August, 1957, continued to  hold  significant events 
for the P atrio tic  Junta. For Pdrez Jim enez, preparing for the December 
elections m eant the elim ination of com petitors. In mid-August the 
government began a crack-dow n on potential p o litic a l troublem akers .
Among those a rrested  were th ree  members of the Patrio tic Junta: Amilcar 
Gomez, Jo se ' Vincente Rangel and M oises Gamero. Fortunately for the 
Junta, th ese  men were apparently arrested  for overt political ac tiv itie s  
and were not subjected to in tense  interrogation— the government simply 
wanted them sa fe ly  "put away" in  order to avoid possib le  em barrassm ent. 
The N ational Security 's most unpopular move came on August 21, with 
the arrest of Rafael C aldera, the highly respected  head of COPEI. The
25Ib id .
2 6ib id .
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jailing of Caldera caused  his su ccesso r, Pedro del Corral, together 
with most of V enezuela's C hristian D em ocrats, to  lose whatever 
qualms they possessed  regarding entry into the struggle to  overthrow 
the d ic ta to rsh ip . Pedro Raul Aguilar of COPEI joined the Patriotic 
Junta. He w as a rres ted , however, after attending only one Junta
27meeting; Pedro del Corral named him self as A guilar's replacem ent.
By the beginning of September, the Patrio tic Junta took final form. 
For equalization  of represen tation  and for reasons of security , URD did 
not name replacem ents for Amilcar Gomez and Jose7 Vincente Rangel; 
Fabricio O jeda became i ts  sole rep re se n ta tiv e . S ilvestre Ortiz 
Bucaran w as se lec ted  by AD to rep lace the imprisoned M oises Gamero, 
while Pedro del Corral represented  COPEI. Guillermo Garcia Ponce 
represented  the PCV. The membership of the Junta rem ained unchanged 
un til January 1, 1958, when Pedro del Corral w as a rrested . His copeyano 
replacem ent w as Enrique A ristiguieta Gramko, w hose appointm ent marked 
the final change in Junta personnel. These four young po litica l unknowns, 
Ojeda (age 29), Garcia Ponce (age 33), Ortiz Bucaran (age 33) and 
A ristiguieta Gramko (age 24), speaking for V enezuela's four great po li­
tic a l p a rtie s , URD, PCV, AD and COPEI, were to  undermine and eventually
27El N acional, January 24, 1958, January 31, 1958, February 1, 
1958, February 5, 1958; Daily Journal. January 26 , 1958; and Tugwell, 
"C hristian D em ocrats, " 253-258.
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topple one of the most entrenched military d ic tatorsh ips in Latin
9 pAmerica. °
"M anifesto No. 2: The Patriotic Junta to  the Venezuelan People, " 
the second publication of the Jun ta , made its  appearance in September,
1957. The basic  them es s tre ssed  in th is trac t were the same as  those 
of its  predecessor: a demand for free , honest e lec tions in December 
and a plea for c iv ilian  unity to  strengthen th is  demand. This m anifesto 
differed from the f i r s t r how ever, in  its  sub tle ty . In d iscussing  P. J . ’s 
re la tions with the Venezuelan m ilitary , em phasis w as placed on the 
condescending manner in  which specifica lly  named officers, d isag ree­
ing with the po lic ies of the New N ational Id ea l, were hustled  out of 
the country on m eaningless diplom atic assignm ents. General Perez 
Jimenez was portrayed as being completely dominated by the corrupt 
"gangsters " holding high government portfo lios. The innuendo was 
c lea r. The armed forces of Venezuela were being u sed . A cab a l— 
headed by Laureano V allenilla Lanz and Pedro E strada—was enriching 
its e lf  a t the expense of Venezuela and with the a ss is ta n ce  of 
V enezuela's armed fo rces. "M anifesto No. 2" a lso  vehemently c riti­
cized  the government's a rres t of Rafael C aldera. The eulogizing of
28El N acional, January 24, 1958, January 26, 1958, January 31,
1958, February 1, 1958, February 7, 1958, February 8 ,̂  1959; Daily 
Journal, January 26, 1953; Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion , xi; and 
W illiam s, Latin American C hristian  Democratic P a r tie s , 272-273.
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C aldera, which revealed COPEI influence within the Patriotic Jun ta , 
gained the la tte r  growing recognition and support from the C atholic, 
more conservative elem ents in the popu la tion .3®
During the months of October and November, 1957, no "m anifestos"
were issued  by the Patriotic Junta. Although the second m anifesto
expressed  the Jun ta 's  "deep appreciation for the way in  which our first
30m anifesto w as received . . . , " its  members felt a new approach was 
needed to a ttra c t greater in te re s t in the Patriotic Junta and its  work. In 
lieu  of lengthy tre a tis e s , the Junta would publish news bu lle tin s .
I
Several reasons prompted th is  decision: b u lle tin s , by nature shorter 
and more p rec ise , would require le ss  time to  compose; news re le a se s , 
based  along jou rnalis tic  lin e s , would demand le ss  time a t the printing 
press and permit quicker distribution; an d , most im portant, since a ll 
ev en ts , both local and in ternational, were subject to  to ta l press 
censorship by the government, any sources of realiab le  information would 
become a prime object of acqu isition  in a Venezuela hungry for n e w s .^
29 M anifesto  No. 2: La Junta Patriotica a l Pueblo Venezolano, " 
in Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion, 29-30.
3QIb id . . 29.
3 ̂ Interview with Enrique A ristiguieta Gramko, July, 19 67. In the 
summer of 19 67, when th is paper was being researched , Senor A ristiguieta 
Gramko was the only member of the underground Patrio tic  Junta availab le  
for comment. Pedro del Corral was out of the country. Guillermo Garcia 
Ponce was e ither in  exile or hiding somewhere in Venezuela. His party, 
the PCV, had been declared illeg a l for i ts  terrorist a c tiv itie s , and , by
(continued)
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A to ta l of six  Patriotic Junta bulletins appeared during October 
and N o v e m b e r . 32 These d ispa tches were approximately the same 
length a s  the m anifestos (three to four pages) but differed in format.
In jou rnalis tic  fash ion / the pages of the bu lle tins were in terspersed  
with h ead lin es , followed by a brief three or four sentence paragraph 
elaborating on the head ing . Though accu ra te , the ir content was 
s lan ted . Every item challenged the d ic ta to rsh ip . Typical examples 
of news re le a se s  on local is su e s  are as follow s: "the U niversity 
Front, representing th e  s tu d en ts , is  backing the Patrio tic Junta in i ts  
slogan of unity . . "Dr. V illalba, leader of URD, made the follow­
ing declaration: 'D r. Caldera . . .  is  the  symbol of everything
31 (continued) 1967, Garcia Ponce had become one of V enezuela's 
leading com m unists. Reliable communist sources a t the Central 
U niversity of Venezuela informed the w riter th a t an interview  with 
Garcia Ponce' would not be p o ss ib le . S ilvestre Ortiz Bucaran, on 
the losing  end of sev era l sp lits  w ithin Democratic Action, re fu sed  
to d iscu ss  any a sp ec t of h is former affilia tion  w ith th a t party. Very 
em bittered, Ortiz Bucaran fee ls th a t he did not receive a "fair shake" 
from AD. Fabricio Ojeda committed suicide in  1963. A m ilitant 
urredista and fervent admirer of Fidel C astro , Ojeda joined the FLAN 
and became a guerrilla cap ta in . In 1963 he w as captured by govern­
ment troops and imprisoned; several days la te r he w as found dead. 
Using his b e lt, he hanged him self from the ceiling  of h is c e ll. Much 
of the intim ate background m achinations of the underground Patriotic 
Junta were supplied by Sehor Enrique A ristiguieta Gramko. The w riter 
is  deeply indebted to  Sehor A ristiguieta Gramko for th is  valuable ! 
inform ation.
3^xhese bu lle tins were undated, but from the nature of their news 
content arid from conversations with Venezuelan h is to rian s, political 
s c ie n tis ts , jo u rn a lis ts , po litic ians and c itiz e n s , their appearance in  
time can be fixed from early  October to  la te  November of 1957.
172
opposing the violence and terror imposed by Pe'rez Jime'nez;’" "new
threats aga in st the editor of La Religion, it  is  sa id  th a t Father
Hernandez Chapellin has taken the pulse of Venezuela and through
h is w ritings the heart of the martyrized nation speaks;" and
Director Pedro S ilveira , Jr. of the M inistry of Finance siphoned 
off three million dollars from the issuance  of fraudulent liquor 
import tax  s tic k e rs . . . . Mr. S ilveira delcared tha t Perez 
Jimenez did not mind for h i s ^ r u e  friends' to  profit by helping 
them selves to  public fu n d s.
On the in ternational sc e n e , i t  w as v ia the new s bu lle tins of the 
Patriotic Junta th a t Venezuela discovered its  government had been 
censured by the International Press A ssociation for i ts  interference 
w ith freedom of the p re s s . The nation a lso  learned th a t a C hristian  
Democratic Conference in  Sao Paulo, Brazil, named Rafael C aldera, 
then  held in a N ational Security prison, Honorary President of the 
C onference. Comments from various Latin American papers on the 
conditions w ithin V enezuela, contained in  the b u lle tin s , were of 
particular in te re s t to  read ers . El Labaro (Panama C ity , Panama) sta ted  
"the imprisonment of Dr. Caldera in d ica tes the Venezuelan government’s
4
intention of transforming the country 's e lection  into a bloody fa rce . "
i
La Nacion (M ontevideo, Uruguay) observed "the e lection  of Perez 
Jime'nez without opposition w ill come a s  no surprise to  America's
O O /  /
Boletin Informativo de La Junta Patriotica:^ No. 1, " "Boletin 
Informativo de La Junta Patrio tica: No. 2 , “ "Boletin Informativo de 
La Junta Patrio tica: No. 3 ,"  and "Boletin Informativo de La Junta 
Patrio tica: No. 4 , 1 in Asi Se Fraquo La Insurreccion , 33-46.
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dem ocrats." El Tiempo (Bogota, Colombia), probably Latin America1 s
\
finest new spaper, noted "the government of Perez Jime'nez is  reactionary
ik
3^to  the point of abolishing p o li t ic s . "
As much for the ir accuracy as for the tan taliz ing  nature of their 
con ten t, the bu lle tins were a su c c e s s . It was obvious to  those who 
read the re lease s  of the Patrio tic  Junta th a t th ese  publications repre­
sented responsib le journalism . The Junta had two efficien t sources of 
inform ation. At i ts  d isposal were the e laborate , clandestine m achinesI
of AD, URD, COPEI and the PCV. Party members and sym pathizers 
held positions in  a l l  areas of Venezuelan life , and many served a s  
inform ants. The Patrio tic Ju n ta 's  second important source of news 
came from w ithin i ts  very membership. Fabricio Ojeda (URD) and 
Guillermo Garcia Ponce (PCV) were reporters; Garcia Ponce w as a free­
lancer, while Ojeda worked for one of the country 's la rgest and fin est 
new spapers, El N acional. These two men (especia lly  Ojeda) had acce ss
to  the in ternational wire serv ices and local news re lease s  prior to  the ir ■
35trip to  the censor.
®^During h is entire tenure a s  a member of the Patriotic Junta, 
Fabricio Ojeda w as a regular attendant a t the numerous press con­
ferences of Perez Jim enez's in fluen tia l M inister of the Interior, 
Lareano V allenilla Lanz. El N acional, January 31, 1958.
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The government's attem pted emulation of the modus operand! of 
the Patriotic Junta is  testim ony to  growing public in te rest in the Junta 
created by the b u lle tin s . Leaflets signed by the various po litica l 
parties urging the people to rebe l, loot and destroy property were 
distributed by the N ational Security . A Patriotic Junta news bulletin  
quickly appeared to  divulge the source of the leafle ts  and the motives 
of the N ational Security—to justify  future a rre s ts  before the upcoming 
elections and to  capture any m ilitant responden ts. £1 H eraldo, owned 
and published by Laureano V allenilla Lanz, tried  to  undermine the unity  
theme of the Junta by fabricating  accounts of in te r-party  h o s tility , 
particularly  between Romulo Betancourt (AD) and Rafael Caldera.(COPEI). 
"Information Bulletin of the Patriotic Junta: No. 3 ,"  citing the edi­
to ria ls  of the audacious Father Hernandez C hapellin , labeled  these  
efforts "blasphemous.*"®®
During the la s t  week in  November, President Marcos Perez 
Jimenez announced the governm ent's in tention of holding the p leb iscite , 
rather than  an e lection  on December 15, 1957. The v isib le  d isgust fe lt 
by most Venezuelans following P. J . 's  proclamation was not m issed by 
the Patriotic Junta. From the la s t week in  November to  December 15, 
the date of the p leb isc ite , the Junta embarked on a  stepped-up campaign 
ag a in st the government and the p leb isc ite . Patriotic Junta bulletins
®® "Boletin Informativo de La Junta Patrio tica: No. 3, *' in  Asi 
Se Fraquo La Insurreccion, 42-43 .
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No. 5 and No. 6 appeared in rapid su ccess io n , but they were no longer 
dedicated to printing new s. They w ere, in rea lity , a ca ll to arm s. All 
sectors were called  upon (1) to form "little"  Patriotic Juntas subservient 
to the parent organization and (2) to  "incite the people to fight for their 
r ig h ts . " Since P . J . had violated the constitu tion {which he had drawn 
up himself) and, by doing so , had insu lted  a l l  Venezuela, the new slogan 
of the Patrio tic Junta became the following:
Defend the constitu tion!
Repudiate the p leb isc ite !
Unite ag a in st unsurpation and tyranny!
United under the Patriotic Junta!
For the liberty and dignity of Venezuela!
As part of its  campaign, the Patriotic Junta released  directives 
addressed  to  specific  sectors of so c ie ty . In a trac t addressed  to  the 
Venezuelan m ilitary, the Junta, after citing the section  of the constitu ­
tion  (Article 103) w hich gave any qualified  Venezuelan the right to 
campaign and run for the office of p residen t, desired  to  know why the
37 *"Boletin Informativo de la Junta Patrio tica: No. 5 , " in Asi Se 
Fraguo La Insurreccion . 52-55. Bulletins numbered 5 and 6 were the 
la s t two such publications of the Patriotic Junta. No. 6 dea lt exclu­
sively  with the student strike and dem onstrations which followed the 
announcement of the p leb isc ite . The students were lauded for their 
courage in  the face of tyranny, while the government was condemned 
for ex cess iv e  brutality in  quelling the student p ro tests . "The Patriotic 
Junta sa lu tes  the students of V enezuela. They are not a lone. Soldiers, 
clergy, w orkers, p ea san ts , in te llec tu a ls  and professional men and 
women u n ite . . . for the defense of the C onstitution and to impede the 
p leb isc ite . . . . "  "Boletin Informativo de la  Junta Patriotica: No. 6 ,"  
in  Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccidn. 56.
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armed forces had shifted  in the ir role as  guardians of the constitu tion 
to  one of constitu tional desecra to rs . "The nation a s k s , " asserted  the- 
Patriotic Junta, "are the Armed Forces going to  v io late the constitution 
or defend it?  W ill the Armed Forces ac t in the same serv ile manner as  
the C ongress? 8 Three other such appeals appeared: one addressed
to  the women of V enezuela, one to the workers of V enezuela, and the 
la s t  to the large Ita lian  community of C aracas. The women were asked  
to give "moral" support to  th e ir men, while the workers and Ita lians 
were urged to  boycott the p leb isc ite . The lea fle t addressed  to the 
Ita lians a lso  served to  d ispel any xenophobic accusa tions directed 
ag a in st the Ju n ta .3®
Although the name of Marcos Perez Jimenez w as the only one 
appearing on the e lection  ballo ts of December 15, 1957, there was an 
opposition cand idate . Campaigning from an automobile c ru is in g  the
O O00 “A Las Fuerzas Armadas N acionales, M anifiesto  de La Junta 
P a trio tica ,"  in Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion , 60-62.
39 La Junta Patriotica A Las M ujeres V enezolanas, " "La Junta 
Patriotica A Los Trabajadores Venezolanos, " and "La Junta Patriotica 
A Los Immigranti I ta lian i, " in Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion, 62-79. 
Shortly following the announcement of the p leb isc ite  and without 
precedent anywhere in  the world, the government decided tha t foreigners 
would be allowed to  v o te . This step w as aimed a t  throwing the ballo ts 
of thousands of new immigrants (mostly Ita lian s), presumably grateful 
to the regime for employment, to Pe'rez Jime’n ez . The resu lt was enmity 
between the a liens and more sen sitiv e  V enezuelans, particularly  native 
laborers who viewed th is  foreign com petition a s  unfair. Szulc,
Twilight of the Tyrants'. 298; and Daily Toumal, January 25, 1958.
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s tree ts  of C aracas was the Patriotic Junta. Po litical party and labor 
union members, clergymen and students were joined by thousands of 
other Venezuelans in  casting  their vote for the Patrio tic Junta. These 
d issa tis fied  Venezuelans voiced their opinion by observing the Junta’s 
c a ll for mass absten tion  from the p o lls . At several news conferences 
prior to  e lection  day, V allenilla Lanz jokingly rid iculed the Junta by 
re itera ting  th a t governments were not overthrown by p ieces of paper. 
N everthe less, those "p ieces of paper" won a stunning victory on 
December 15, 1 9 5 7 .^
In the remaining two w eeks of 1957, the Patriotic Junta issu ed  
two declarations and two le a f le ts . The declarations were very sim ilar 
to  the m anifestos, but they were not en titled  "M anifestos. 1 Both 
long e s s a y s , they.w ere en titled  "N atiohal Unity Against the Usurpation" 
and "D eclaration of the Patrio tic Junta. " The f irs t, afte r congratulating 
the Venezuelan people on the ir performance of December 15, articu lated  
the numerous grievances suffered by each  sector of Venezuelan society  
and re itera ted  th a t only organized c iv ilian  res is tan ce  could halt th ese  
hum iliations. This publication strongly em phasized that the Patriotic 
Jun ta 's  fight aga inst the government w as ju s t beginning. The second 
declaration is  very sign ifican t. The "D eclaration of the Patrio tic Junta"
40D aily Tournal, February 2 , 1957, February 5 , 1957; Asi Se 
Fraguo La Insurreccion, ix; and Szulc, Twilight of the Tyrants, 299.
178
revealed , for the firs t tim e, th a t the Junta represented no particular 
po litica l party, candidate or ideology, but stood simply for "progress, 
liberty and human d ignity . " Another sa lien t feature of th is document 
was th a t it  ind icated  ju s t how the Junta intended to  overthrow Perez 
Jime'nez—Venezuelans were asked  to begin preparations for a general 
s tr ik e . The Patriotic Junta w as to  announce its  decision  regarding the 
date of the strike in  the near fu tu re . The two lea fle ts  were short (one 
page) and su cc in c t. One, "A New Coup d 'E ta te , " declared the 
p leb isc ite  synonymous with a golpe de estado  minus force; the other,
"To the Armed Forces, “ insinuated  th a t the m ilitary 's ta c it approval 
of the p leb iscite  compromised the ir in tegrity .
The Patriotic Jun ta 's bout w ith  the government over the p leb iscite  
issu e  gained for the Junta increased  re sp e c t, prestige and renown. The 
Patriotic Junta w as on the lip s  of nearly a l l  V enezuelans. Hundreds of 
people made typew ritten and even handwritten copies of Junta literature 
to  send to  friends and re la tiv es  in  the provinces. Po litical party leaders 
tac tfu lly  informed inembers th a t the Junta w as non-partisan  in  nature and 
th a t it  had the complete confidence of V enezuela's po litica l p arties .
Also complementing the fame of the Junta w as the creation of numerous 
"little"  Patrio tic Jun tas. The members of the Junta, operating anonymously,
a \  , /‘ "Unidad N acional Contra La U surpacion, " "D eclaracion de La
Junta P atrio tica , " "Un Nuevo Golpe de Estado, " and "Integrantes de 
la s  Fuerzas Armadas, “ in Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion , 63-70.
179
by te lephone, contacted thousands of Venezuelans, urging them to 
form coordinating committees to  expedite m obilization aga inst the 
government. A Feminine Committee, a Student Committee, a Labor 
Committee, a Pharm acist Committee, an Engineering Committee and 
a P hysic ians ' Committee were formed, to  mention but a few . These 
"little"  Juntas were in  d irec t communication with the parent Junta,
■ with members of the la tte r using the ir code names and making contact 
via te lephone. This anonymity added to the excitem ent and in te rest 
surrounding the Junta. W ho, w hat, where was the Patrio tic Junta? 
Perhaps the Junta w as a group of exiled po litica l lead e rs , some 
prominent businessm en, a few valian t in te lle c tu a ls , several outstand­
ing professional men, or, be tte r y e t, a team of former m inisters. 
Speculations were legion re la tive  to  the iden tity  of the organization 
th a t  had spread a spider web across C aracas and V e n e z u e la .^
The firs t day of the new year, 1958, w as of profound importance 
for the future of the Patriotic Junta and V enezuela. On th is  day, a 
m ilitary uprising ag a in st the government of General M arcos Perez 
Jimenez occurred . For severa l m onths, the Patriotic Junta had been 
vaguely aware th a t certain  m ilitary o fficers, disenchanted with P. J . , 
were plotting aga inst the government. These officers had contacted
^ M a r tz . Accion D em ocratica. 95; Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion. 
xii; Kantor, "AD De V enezuela, " 245; Daily Toumal, January 24, 1958, 
March 27, 1958; and El N aclonal, February 8 , 1958.
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known Democratic Action leaders in  hope s of concocting a reenactment 
43of 1945. AD represen tatives lis tened  to the conspiring officers, 
prudently encouraged them and informed the Patriotic Junta of these 
developm ents. Those numerous Junta leafle ts  addressed to  the armed 
forces had been primarily directed a t  th is disgruntled m ilitary elem ent. 
For most V enezuelans, the January 1, 1958, uprising w as the resu lt of 
the work of the Patrio tic  Junta. This w as not to ta lly  tru e .^ 4
As in  1945, a number of o fficers, but principally younger 
officers of middle grade rank, were unhappy with their superiors and 
their com m ander-in-chief, General M arcos Pe'rez Jim enez. Their 
reasons were num erous. P. J . showered senior officers w ith privi­
leg es , po litica l appointm ents and opportunities to grow rich  (mostly 
by corruption), but junior officers w ere neg lected . Many officers fe lt  
in secu re , for Perez Jimdnez broke a l l  records in  sending abroad as 
a ttach es or advisors officers regarded a s  untrustworthy. V enezuela's 
Navy and young Air Force were re s tle s s  under a regime run largely by 
and for the Army. F inally , many younger officers were eager for
4 ̂ In October, 1945-, a group of young m ilitary officers called  the 
Patriotic M ilitary Union (UPM) collaborated with Democratic Action in 
the overthrow of the government of G eneral Isa ia s  Medina Angarita. 
Chapter III contains a fu ll treatm ent o f th is  sub ject.
^ J o s e x C ayuela, "Hugo Trejo: H istoria de un Coronel que Puedo 
Ser P re s id e n te ," Elite N o. 2181 (July 15, 1967), 52-59; and El N acional, 
February 1, 1958.
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advancement and politically  am bitious, ju s t as  P. J. had been in 
1945-.45
As early  as  November, 1957, a sm all group of young Army officers, 
led by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Trejo, an instructor a t the military 
academ y, were conspiring to  overthrow the government. The conspiratorial
45Johnson, The M ilitary and Society in Latin America, 124-135;
"P. J. in Command," 48; and "An Air of Hail and Farewell in V enezuela," 
Life XLIV (January 20, 1958), 31. Another reason given by some 
authorities is  tha t most of these  disgruntled , younger officers had 
received training in the United States and , as  a  re su lt , became imbued 
w ith dem ocratic values and the belief in  a  rigid separation  of profes­
sional and po litica l in te re s t. Their argument is  based  on the fact tha t 
most of the young officers who led an unsuccessfu l golpe de estado  on 
January 1, 1958, aga inst the government of Perez Jimenez had attended 
m ilitary schools in the United S ta te s . This motive is  advanced by John 
D. M artz, a po litical sc ien tis t from the U niversity of North Carolina 
(Accion D em ocratica, 310-311), Edwin Lieuwen, a h istorian  from the 
U niversity of New Mexico (Generals v s . P resid en ts , 87), and John J. 
Johnson, a h isto rian  from Stanford U niversity (The Role of the M ilitary 
in  Underdeveloped Countries , 129). It is  undeniable th a t the m ilitary 
rebels of January 1, 1958, were partially  educated in  the United S tates; 
i t  is  questionab le , however, that th is training alone in s tilled  in these  
men an understanding of po litical democracy and the tradition of an 
apo litica l m ilitary. A socio logical study by Philip B. S p rin g er/^S o c ia l 
Sources of Po litical Behavior of Venezuelan M ilitary O fficers; An 
Exploratory A nalysis, 1 Politico XXX (Tune. 1965), 348-355_J7, has 
revealed ju s t the opposite. Springer’s findings (pp. 351-353) suggest 
th a t the most politically  inclined officers of the Venezuelan armed forces 
were those specifica lly  trained in  the United S ta te s . C iv il-m ilitary  
rela tions in  Venezuela since 1958 tend to support the sociological study. 
The officers who grumbled under Perez Jim enez, notably Hugo Trejo, 
Wolfgang Larrazabal and Jesus M aiia C astro Leon, were the same 
officers who endeavored, constitu tionally  and unconstitutionally, to 
influence Venezuelan po litics after the d ic ta to r 's  o uste r.
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group,which had no specific  name, met secretly  and inform ally. It
i
had estab lished  contact w ith sym pathetic Navy and Air Force officers 
and a few c iv ilian s . However, as dem onstrated by the re su lts  of the 
uprising, the conspirators represented only a minority of V enezuela's 
m ilitary officers. The insurrection w as precipitated  by the a rre s ts , 
on December 31, 1957, of Army General Hugo Fuentes and Air Force 
Colonel Jesus M aria Castro Leon. Though neither were parties to the 
p lo t, their unofficial opposition to Perez Jim enez, the cause of their 
a r re s ts , moved the youthful cabal to  panic. At six  o ’clock in  the 
morning on the firs t of January, 1958, the large a ir base near the 
city  of M aracay (forty m iles w est of Caracas) w as captured by 
rebellious Air Force personnel under M ajor Luis Evencio C arrillo . 
Lieutenant Colonel Trejo, taking command of a tank battalion 
ostensib ly  to  put down the rebellion , took control of the sm all Army 
base a t Los Teques (about 10 miles from Caracas) and pronounced 
ag a in st the government. The superiority in  arms and number of the 
m ilitary forces loyal to Perez Jimenez ended the rebellion before the 
d ay 's  end. The thirteen Air Force officers, including Major Carrillo 
who led the revolt a t M aracay, escaped by plane to Colombia. On 
January 2, in a solemn ceremony, Lieutenant Colonel Trejo and 
twenty other Army officers were degraded and i m p r i s o n e d .  ^
^6C ayuela, "Hugo T rejo ," 52-59; "Jets Over C a racas ,"  24; 
H ispanic American Report (January, 1958), 29; Szulc, Twilight of
(continued)
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"Although the m ilitary action of January 1 fa iled , its  conse­
quences were soon to be se e n . . . . The myth of the unity of the
army w as crumbling. The th e s is  of 'government by the Armed Forces' 
47was cracking. The above lin e s , w ritten in  m id-1958 by a 
” Venezuelan editor, vividly describe the effects of the January 1,
1958, uprising . M ost Venezuelans believed tha t certain  courageous, 
patriotic military officers had responded to  the pleas of the Patriotic 
Junta. I t now seemed possib le  to  cement a civ ilian-m ilitary  coalition; 
it  appeared , a t le a s t p artia lly , tha t the instrum ents of force, repre­
sented  by the m ilitary, might be on the side of the Patrio tic Junta.
The Junta took full advantage of its  apparent im p lica tions.
In the days im m ediately following the unsuccessfu l coup, the 
members of the Patriotic Junta worked feverish ly , not a t composing
(con inued)t |le  ty r a n ts , 3o0; and Qarcia Ponce, Apuntes 
Sobre La L ibertad, 107. Philip B. Taylor, Jr. / The Venezuelan 
Golpe De Estado of 1958: The Fall of M arcos Perez Timenez 
(W ashington, D . C .: In stitu te  for the Comparative Study of 
Po litical System s, 1968)_ty?'m ain ta ins th a t a  conspiratorial group 
composed of senior officers w as a lso  plotting the overthrow of the 
government (pp. 47-52). The group was ca lled  the N ational Libera­
tion  Movement (MLN), and , according to Taylor, i t  w as the MLN 
whose hand was tipped on December 31, 1957. Taylor c ite s  no 
source for th is  contention.
47  /Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion, x i i i .
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48propaganda, but a t m obilization. With civ ilian  m ilitancy ac tivated
by the m ilitary action of January 1 and with the armed forces re la ­
tive ly  confused, the Patriotic Junta decided the  time was ripe for 
backing the ir printed pages w ith ac tion . The U niversity Front 
became the m ilitary arm of the Patrio tic Junta. The Ju n ta 's  new est 
member, the young Enrique A ristiguieta Gramko, a law student 
h im self, took over responsib ility  for coordinating action between 
students and the Patriotic Ju n ta . The ch ief weapons for the rioting 
and dem onstrating students were s to n es , bo ttles and, particu larly , 
Molotov co ck ta ils . Male studen ts furnished the gaso line and their 
female counterparts supplied the g lass  ja rs  and clo th . According to
4 q
A ristiguieto Gramkp, "the g irls made beautiful bom bs." The chief
48Only one Junta publication , a New Year's Day m essage to 
V enezuela, appeared in  early  January, 1958. Its  very t i t le ,  "People 
and Armed Forces United Against U surpation, " confirmed what most 
Venezuelans thought they already knew. "But on January 1, " s tressed  
the e s sa y , "the Armed Forces. . .answ ered the popular c a ll in 
defense of the C onstitu tion, . . .the  situation  created by Perez 
Jim enez, Vallenilla Lanz and Pedro Estrada is  in tolerable for 
the army a s  it  is  for the people. " "Pueblo y Ejercito Unidas Contra 
La U surpacion, " in  Jose'"Rivas Rivas (ed .) , El Mundo'y Epoca de 
Perez ■ Jime'nez II (C aracas: Pensam iento Vivo, 1958), 17. Except 
for th is m anifesto of the Patrio tic Junta, th is  source, a s  w ell as  Los 
M anifiestos de la Liberacion: Recopilacion de los M anifiestos que 
Circularon Clandestinam ente desde e l Primero Hasta e l 23 de Enero 
de 1958, Dia de la Liberacion Venezolana (Caracas: Pensam iento 
Vivo, 1958), contains copies of m anifestos w ritten by various organi­
zations (doctors, law yers, engineers and other homogeneous groups) 
under the guidance of the  Junta . These docum ents, not meant to be 
c lan d estin e , were circulated  openly. As a re su lt, they were more 
ac ce ss ib le  than those trac ts  appearing prior to  January, 1958.
4SJulio Barreota Lara, "Enrique A ristiguieta Gramko, " El 
N acional, February 5, 1958.
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ta rgets of the students were police and N ational Security v eh ic le s , 
but any object identified  with the government w as subject to  destruc- 
tion .( Public resentm ent toward the regime grew as  P. J. resorted to 
tear g as , clubs and , finally , bullets to  maintain him self in  power.
M ass student dem onstrations soon became m ass popular dem onstra­
t io n s .50
W ith the authorities occupied by rio ts and dem onstrations, the 
Patriotic Junta finalized  plans for the coming strike and entered into 
in tensive ta lk s  w ith numerous in fluential groups, urging them to pro­
nounce openly ag a in st Perez Jim enez. M eanw hile, V enezuela's high 
m ilitary command became concerned. The th rea t of complete socia l 
d isin tegration  and the asso c ia tio n  of the armed forces with a highly 
unpopular regime precip itated  a cabinet c r is is .  On January 9 , 1958, 
Chief of S taff, General Romulo Fernandes, speaking for most of the 
m ilitary, and echoing the words of the Patrio tic  Junta, demanded the 
formation of a new cab inet and immediate d ism issa l of Lareano 
Vallenilla Lanz and Pedro E strada. Before midnight, V allenilla Lanz 
and Estrada were en route to the Dominican Republic, and a new
50 M ariano Picon S a la s , "Grandes Anales De Quince D ias, " El 
N acional, January 25, 1958; "Venezuelans Choose Freedom ," 49;
Garcia Ponce ,-Apuntes Sobre la L ibertad, 108; W ashington,"Student 
Politics in Latin America: The Venezuelan Example, " 463-473; H ispanic 
American Report {January, 1958), 37; and S zulc , The Winds of 
Revolution, 97.
cabinet w as sworn in the following day. G eneral Fernandes was
named M inister of D efen se . M ost Venezuelans assum ed th a t he was
their country 's new strong man. Six other m ilitary officers were
given cabinet p o sitio n s. S ignificantly , one of the firs t a c ts  of the
new chief of the secre t police was to free the  five p riests  and
General Hugo Fuentes and Colonel Castro Leo'n. For Perez Jim enez,
submitting to  these  demands meant preserving military unity , the
base of h is  power; for G eneral Fernandes and his follow ers, the
concessions represented  national tranquility—the demands of the
51
Patriotic Junta were sa tis f ie d .
Tranquility was not forthcoming. The cabinet shakerup  was 
not rep resen ta tive , nor w as i t  a step toward dem ocracy. I t w as simply 
another in te rna l struggle among m ilitarists dedicated to perpetuating 
government by the armed fo rc e s . The Patrio tic Junta w as not sa tis  -
i
fied . Contacting a l l  subsid iary  units , Junta members ordered more 
dem onstrations, and the response was gratify ing. M anifestos m ulti­
p lied. Through the works of the Junta 's Feminine Committee, a 
"M others' M anifesto" appeared , vehem ently protesting the  regim e's 
treatm ent of both students and V enezuela's educational in s titu tio n s .
51 "Venezuela for H arm ony,11 Newsweek II  (January 20, 1958),
44; Kantor, "AD De V enezuela, " 246; H ispanic American Report 
(January 1958), 30-31; M artz , Accion D em ocratica, 94; Szulc,
Twilight of the T yrants, 302-303; and "Venezuelans Choose Freedom,"
49.
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52It contained the signatures of hundreds of m others. The "M others' 
M anifesto" was followed by the so -ca lled  "In tellectual M a n ife s to .1 
Dated January 10, 1958, th is document contained a lis t of nine 
demands ranging from freedom of speech  to representative govern­
m ent. I t  was signed by over eighty of V enezuela's most'.famous men
of le t te r s . At the top of the lis t w as the signature of Mariano Picon
53S a la s , V enezuela's foremost living h isto rian . Finally, the official
position  of the Junta w as revealed in a trac t ca lled  "The Labor Front
of the Patriotic Junta on the C abinet Change. " I t read as follow s:
The labor front of the Patrio tic Junta says th a t Venezuela 
is  not contented with the sudden changes in  the cabinet 
made to harmonize V enezuelans. A change of government 
is  n ecessa ry . . . . We a ll know that the end of the d ic ­
ta torsh ip  is  nearer than ever because Venezuela is united 
to  conquer i ts  f re e d o m .^
52 "M anifiesto de las M adres Venezolanas Ante Los Ultimos 
Acontecim ientos E stud ian tiles , " in  Rivas R ivas, El Mundo y la 
Epoca, 15; and Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion , x ii i .
53 * /"D eclaracion Sobre la S ituacion Politica N acional, " in
Rivas R ivas, El Mundo y la Epoca, 6; El N acional, January 25,
1958; and Daily Tournal, January 26 , 1958. A sim ilar lis t of demands 
in  the form of a petition  was signed by the professors of the Catholic 
Andres Bello U niversity and the facu lty  members of C aracas' four 
large C atholic high schoo ls . "Ante La Clausura D el Liceo Andres 
B ello ,"  in Rivas R ivas, El Mundo y la Epoca, 5. Dated January 12, 
1958, there was a lso  published and widely c ircu lated  a petition 
drawn up by university  studen ts. I t contained no signatu res. , 
"M anifiesto  No. 1 Del Estudiantado U niversitario , " in Rivas R ivas, 
El Mundo y la Epoca, 3 .
54 "El Frente Obrero de la Junta Patriotica an te el Cambio de 
G abinete, " in Rivas R ivas, El Mundo v la Epoca, 6; El N acional, 
January 25, 1958; and Daily Tournal. January 26, 1958.
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W hatever General Fernandes hoped to  accom plish by demanding 
cabinet changes did not m ateria lize . Indeed , the situation  grew more 
c ritica l, W ithinithe m ilitary, Fernandes' failure hurt h is  prestige.
This fact, coupled with the new Defense M inister's  dec ision  not to 
press his advantage over Perez Jime'nez, spelled  his dem ise. On the 
morning of January 13, 1958, when G eneral Fernandes drove to 
M iraflores, o stensib ly  to demand the resignation  of the President, 
he was a rrested  and ex iled . The presiden tia l palace surrounded by 
tanks and armored cars , Perez Jim enez, in  a radio b roadcast, 
announced th a t he had taken over the D efense M inistry. P . J . 's  
victory meant th a t he had won a power struggle within the armed 
fo rces, but m ilitary  command w as no longer tantamount to  political 
command.55
In C a ra ca s , dem onstrations, s tree t fighting, sporadic bombings, 
police ca rs , s iren s and curfews abounded. I t  was c lear th a t peace 
would not v is i t  Venezuela un til President Perez Jimenez and the New 
National Ideal were extirpated . On Tuesday, January 15, 1958, a 
sm all leaflet signed by the Patrio tic Junta revealed the date  of the 
g reat strike . The opening paragraph read as  follows:
C  C
H ispanic American Report (January, 1958), 30-31; Szulc, 
Twilight of the  T yrants, 302-303; Asi Se Fraguo la  Insurreccio 'n. 
x iii; "P. J. in  Command," 48; and "Venezuela for Harmony," 44.
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General Strike: From tw elve noon un til further no tice .
Next Tuesday: a t 12 noon the church b e l ls , factory 
w h is tle s , and auto horns w ill sound for five m i n u t e s .  ^  6
During the same w eek, various organizations, a t the urging of 
the Patriotic Junta, openly critic ized  the d ictatorship  and demanded 
reform s. G enerally, th ese  m anifestos demanded tha t the government 
permit c itizen s to  exercise b as ic  c iv il lib e rties  and th a t i t  follow the 
principles of constitu tional democracy by allowing the" formation of a 
popularly chosen government. Every day a  new petition appeared: on 
January 15, th a t of the Engineering Society of Venezuela; on January 17, 
the Venezuelan Bar A ssociation; on January 18, the Venezuelan M edical 
A ssociation; and on January 19, the Venezuelan Pharm aceutical A sso­
c i a t i o n .^  When the N ational Security began distributing pamphlets 
announcing different da tes for the strike , the Patriotic Junta re leased  
i ts  la s t  c landestine  publication. It was a sm all leafle t directing the
people to  d isregard these  fa lse  instructions and to  look "without fear
58to  the General Strike se t for Tuesday, January 21, 1958, a t noon."
56"Un Mandamiento de La Junta P atrio tica Para M artes e l 21 
de Enero, " in Asi Se Fraguo La Insunreccion, 99.
5?La Esfera, January 26, 1958; and "Colegio de Ingenieros 
D eclara Que e l Pais N ecesita Derechos Humanos, " "Miembros del 
Colegio de Abogados ante la Situacion P o litica , " "El Gremio 
'M edico a l Pueblo de V enezuela ," and "Miembros del,Colegio de 
Farm aceuticos, " in  Asi Se Fraguo La Insurreccion, 7-12.
5®"Huelga General de La Junta P a trio tica , “ in Asi Se Fraguo 
La Insurreccion, 99.
The stage w as se t for the Patriotic Jun ta 's  g rea test production.
Preparatory to  the general strike scheduled to  begin a t noon, Tuesday,
January 21, 19S8, the U niversity Front of the Patriotic Junta called
a student strike for Monday, January 20. On Friday, January 17,
a s  much from th is command as from the possib ility  of v io lence ,
C aracas school officials informed parents and students th a t schools
would not reopen on Monday. The firs t phases of the general strike
began on the afternoon of January 20, when ed ito rs , repo rters , lino-
typ ists  and even copy boys w alked off the ir jo b s . Throughout th a t
night, agen ts of the N ational Security sought out new spaper personnel
in  order to  force them back to  work and turn out their d a i l ie s . The
agents were u n su ccessfu l. Radio and te lev is io n  personnel were a lso
supposed to  leave the ir posts on the evening of January 20, but the
National Security  moved fa s t enough to  force skeleton  s ta ffs  to remain
on tie  job . The next day , radio and te lev ision  sta tions were on the a ir
but only w ith recordings and film s. Commercial establishm ents
remained open into the night on Monday, January 20, 1958, for they
59were filled  w ith foresighted housewives laying in  su p p lie s .
Garcia Ponce, Apuntes Sobre la L ibertad, 108-109; "Venezuela 
Time XI (February 3, 1958), 30; l a  E sfera , January 24, 1958; H ispanic 
American Report (January, 1958), 31; Kantor, "AD De V enezuela," 246; 
Porter and Alexander, The Struggle for Dem ocracy, 120-121; and Daily 
Tournal, January 26, 1958.
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On the morning of Tuesday, January 21, 1958, the Patriotic 
Junta and its  many followers were reassu red  when C aracas' usually  
crowded new stands were empty ̂  There were no papers to buy or 
s e l l .  Promptly a t noon the iron grills on the front of businesses 
came hurtling down. Then, from steep le  after s te ep le , bells clanged 
out the C hurch 's defiance of the d ic tatorsh ip  and signaled  the s ta rt 
of the s tr ik e . Automobile ho rns, u sua lly  mute under th rea t of a  f in e , 
blared out in alm ost deafening to n es. (Factory w histles were not 
blown because the government posted police in a ll factories to  pre­
vent such an occurrence.) Police rushed to  block off stree ts  leading 
to  the c ity 's  downtown squares to prevent crowds from gathering. 
N onetheless, crowds m assed  in  the s tre e ts ,  breaking w indow s,
throwing ro ck s, stones and Molotov cock tails  and overturning police 
60cars and b u se s . Police tried  to enforce an emergency 6 P . M .  curfew, 
but fighting raged into the n ight. Eventually, quiet returned to 
V enezuela's ca p ita l. I ts  normally bustling night life disappeared; 
only police patrols moved through the deserted  s tre e ts . Caracas 
resem bled a ghost city.®^
The bus driver's union was not sym pathetic to  the Patriotic 
Junta nor to the general s tr ik e . The Junta instructed i ts  student wing 
to  search  for a l l  buses not cooperating w ith the strike and put them 
out of com m ission. Daily Tournal, January 26, 1958.
®■L"Venezuela, " 30-31; H ispanic American Report (January, 1958), 
31; "Venezuela Topples a  D ictator, " 11; "A Place in  the Sun, " Newsweek 
XT (February 3 , 1958), 49; La Esfera, January 24, 1958; M artz, Accion 
D em ocratica. 95; and Daily Tournal, January 23, 1958, January 24, 1958.
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W ednesday dawned bright and c lear. The morning w as tranqu il,
but in the afternoon rioting broke out again a ll  across C a ra c a s . Those
citizens not ac tive ly  dem onstrating cheered, as mobs continued to
overturn police cars and b u s e s . Reports of revolts in provincial
c itie s  were beginning to  c ircu la te . On national radio and te lev ision
hookup, the government constantly  issu ed  bulletins to  the effect th a t
the members of the Patriotic Junta had been arrested and found to be
communists or known crim inals. The people were asked  to  keep the
peace and return to  work. But there were s t i l l  no new spapers to read;
schoo ls, b u s in e sse s , factories and banks were a ll shut tigh t; and
stree t fighting continued with greater in te n s ity . Through it  a l l ,
automobile horns continued to  honk; it  w as a s  if the peop le , many
iso la ted  in the ir hom es, were reassuring and encouraging one another
62and vowing not to  surrender.
W ithin the armed fo rces, the Patrio tic Junta 's strike  created a 
c r is is . Venezuela w as in  a  s ta te  of chaos and anarchy. C learly , the 
government of Perez Jimenez had no control over the nation . 
Venezuelans were killing Venezuelans and there was no end in  sigh t. 
Enlisted men openly sym pathized with the Patriotic Junta, and many 
were supplying arm s to  c iv ilian s . The future of V enezuela's armed
^ La Esfera, January 23, 1958; Daily Tourn^?, January 24, 1958; 
"A Place in the Sun," 49; and Szulc, Twilight of t ie  T yran ts, 303.
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in stitu tio n , a s  w ell as  the future of the nation i ts e lf ,  w as in jeopardy. 
At 6 P .M.  on W ednesday, January 22, 1958, nine of V enezuela's 
h ighest ranking military commanders, representing a l l  branches of 
the country 's armed fo rces, met secrete ly  a t a C aracas military 
academ y. They drew up an ultimatum giving G eneral Perez Jime'nez 
un til 10 P .M .  to  resign . To enforce the ir demand, Navy destroyers 
off C aracas’ port of La Guaira trained the ir guns on the cap ita l, and 
Army commanders mobilized their units for ac tion . P. J. requested  
neg o tia tio n s, but the m ilitary stood firm . In the early  morning hours 
of January 23, 1958, an e lev en -car Army caravan raced from M iraflores 
Palace toward C aracas’ sm all m unicipal a irfie ld , Carlota Airport. By 
2 A . M . , M arcos Perez Jime'nez, his wife and two daughters were on
C O
a plane bound for the Dominican Republic.
A decade of Venezuelan h isto ry , the era of Perez Jim enez, was 
over. With few exceptions, most foreign jou rnalis tic  accounts of 
P. J . ’s o uste r, along with more serious stud ies th a t follow , cred it the 
d ic ta to r’s overthrow to the m ilitary . This was not the c a se . The New
^ V ic to r Alba, H istoria del Fuente Popular (M exico, D. F .:
Libro Mex Editores, 1959), 289; H ispanic American Report, {January, 
1958), 31; "V enezuela,” 31; Kantor, "AD De V enezuela," 246; Asi 
Se Fraguo La Insurreccion , xiv; Lott, "Venezuela, " 243; Szulc, 
Twilight of the T yrants, 303-304; and Goldenburg, The Cuban 
Revolution, 94. Excellent photographs of many of the individuals 
involved and illu stra ted  scen es of many of the events of January 21- 
22-23,  1958, can be found in  “Venezuela Gives D ictator the Bum's 
Rush. " Life XLIV (February 3 , 1958), 16-21.
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N ational Ideal w as term inated by civilian  opposition and ac tion , led 
and directed by the Patriotic Junta. Except for a few politically  
am bitious o fficers, the Venezuelan military w as not unalterably 
opposed to  P. J. 's  regime. But Perez Jimenez imposed an archaic 
political system  upon a nation undergoing rapid so c ia l and economic 
m odernization. Venezuela desired  to  dem onstrate its  po litica l 
maturity; she w anted to renovate her po litical system  in  order to  
bring i t  in line w ith the re s t of the country and th e  w orld . The military 
forced the ir com rade, General M arcos Perez Jime^nez, to  abandon the 
presidentia l office; but i t  was the Patriotic Junta which forced the 
military to  a c t .  T echnically , one might say th a t th e  end of the New 
N ational Ideal resu lted  from jo in t c iv ilian-m ilitary  ac tion , but th a t 
is  a gross over estim ation of the role of the la tte r.
V enezuelans, however, knew the significance of January 23,
1958. According to  Alberto R avelle, "all moral fo rce, the entire 
opinion of every po litica l tendency , worked together toward the same 
goal in  order to  reach  a definite v ictory. . . . These events have a 
value in dem onstrating the categoric determ ination of the Venezuelan 
people never again  to  to lerate the creation of ty ran n y ,1,64 For Ramon 
Escobar Solom, the events of January, 1958, signified  “the po litica l 
and sp iritual maturity of V enezuelans, who, w ith marvelous and rapid
64Alberto Ravelle, "Unidad De Accion, ” La Esfera, January 26,
1958.
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65organization, la id  the b as is  for dem ocracy. " "It is  a custom to
christen  our revolutionary movements w ith chronological names tha t
correspond to the date on which they occurred, " observed Humberto
C uenca, "but our future h isto rians might w ell label the popular and
m ilitary ac ts  of January 23, 1958, not the Revolution of 1958, but the
6 6'Revolution of M anifestos . '"
For the firs t time in  the history of V enezuela, c iv ilians had 
succeeded in removing from office an unacceptable adm inistration.
Much credit goes to  the Patrio tic Junta for i ts  sk illfu l management 
of propaganda and o rgan ization . At great r isk s  to  i ts  members, the 
Jun ta 's ab ility  to conceal its  identity  and m aintain the secrecy  of its  
strategy  w as no mean accom plishm ent. Though sa lien t, the Patriotic 
Jun ta 's  overthrow of M arcos Perez Jimenez is  of secondary sign ifi­
cance . The Patriotic Ju n ta 's  principal contribution w as its  influence 
on the po litica l culture of V enezuela. S tuden ts , po liticans and 
organized labor were no longer V enezuela's sole po litica lized  elem ents. 
Many groups and ind iv iduals , such a s  docto rs , pharm acists, clergymen, 
engineers and m others, who were never particularly  in te rested  in
CC y
Ramon Excobar Solom, “Un Gobiem o De C o n v a len c ia ,"
El N acional. January 25, 1958.
66  /Humberto C uenca, "Revolucion de los M an ifiesto s, " in Asi
Se Fraguo Un Insurreccion , v ii.
p o lit ic s , suddenly fe lt the need and the ab ility  to  partic ipate in and 
influence government- By providing a po litica l vehicle accep tab le  
to  most V enezuelans, the Junta was able to  help transform a normally 
ap a th e tic , qu iescen t population into one w illing to pay w hatever 
price necessary  for po litica l em ancipation: The banner to  which 
these  m ultitudes were drawn, the banner of the Patriotic Junta, 
sym bolized po litica l party coordination and cooperation, po litica l 
to lerance and resp ec t for the constitu tion . The staunch adherence of 
so many Venezuelans to  th is philosophy, and the ir proven ab ility  to 
enforce i t ,  is  fundamental to  understanding the recent su ccess  of 
dem ocracy in  Venezuela.
CHAPTER VI
THE PATRIOTIC JUNTA: PART II
Venezuela in the days immediately following the overthrow of 
Marcos Perez Jimenez developed into a remarkable replica of 
Venezuela in  the days immediately following the death  of Juan Vincente 
Gomez. Venezuela w as ju b ilan t. Automobile horns honked, church 
bells rang , factory w histles blew; and V enezuelans, smiling and 
laughing, extended abrazos (embraces) to everyone they encountered. 
Venezuela f irs t heard of the departure of Perez Jimenez and the forma­
tion  of a new government a t two o 'clock  in  the morning. The bulletin  
was issu ed  over C aracas radio and te lev ision  by a m ilitary officer, 
Major Gregorio Lopez G arcia. M inutes la te r the s tree ts  of the cap ita l 
were filled  with shouting c itiz e n s . For the next three days C aracas 
w as engulfed by impromptu f e s t iv it ie s .
Nation-w ide celebrations and joyous dem onstrations developed 
a s  news of the term ination of the New N ational Ideal made its  way 
throughout V enezuela. One area  in which th is sp irit did not p revail, 
however, w as the C aracas home of the hated N ational Security.




Several m obs/ many led by fam ilies and friends of prison inm ates, were 
besieging N ational Security headquarters. They had already beaten 
four agents to  death , when the trapped agents broke out guns and began 
firing. The battle  raged for several hours until the civilians were 
joined by the m ilitary in army tan k s. The police fortress was razed , 
and the surviving agents were trucked off to prison under m ilitary esco rt. 
By the w eekend, Venezuela was alm ost back to norm al. At the cost of 
300 dead and over 1,000 wounded, V enezuela’s c iv ilians had won their 
freedom . ^
The new government w as a provisional five-m an Junta Gobierno 
(Government Junta), composed entirely  of military officers. I ts  p resi-
3
dent was Rear Admiral W olfgang Larrazabal. For three reaso n s , the 
young (forty-six), handsome Navy Chief of Staff w as immediately 
popular w ith the Venezuelan m asses: f irs t, the Navy had always 
been unpopular with Perez Jimenez; second , i t  had played a key role 
in  the d ic ta to r’s demise; and th ird , Admiral Larrazabal, in h is every 
u tterance , never ceased  to identify him self with the Patriotic Junta
9
El U n iversa l, January 23, 1958; Daily Journal, January 24,
1958; "A Place in  the Sun, ’’ 49; "The Bum's Rush, " 20-21; and 
"Venezuela, " 31.
^The com position of the  Government Junta w ill undergo several 
m odifications dpring 1958. C ivilians w ill be added and there w ill be 
resignations and new appointm ents, but the number of members w ill 
remain a t five. These various changes in the Government Junta w ill 
be outlined below .
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and its  g o a ls— political freedom, honest e lections and respect for 
the w ishes of the e le c to ra te . The Government Junta (particularly 
Wolfgang Larrazabal) and the Patriotic Junta became the two most 
publicized groups in V enezuela. But for approximately one month 
following January 23, 1958, both were overshadowed by the publicity 
given to revelations of the New N ational Id e a l 's  brutality , graft and
4corruption.
Out of the numerous government prisons came evidence of 
a tro c itie s  rem iniscent of N azi Germany. From, the basem ent dungeon 
of the N ational Security—its  w alls striped black from whip la sh e s— 
eighty corpses were removed. Girls with the ir heads shaved, students 
who had been tortured by e lec tric  shock and beaten , and po litica l 
prisoners whose genitalia  had been burned with c igarettes or tatooed 
w ith needles were the more extreme examples of what took place 
during the P&rez Jimenez regim e. Added to  th ese  examples were, the 
names of severa l hundred individuals who had ju s t vanished, never to  
be heard from again . The papers were filled  with reports of murky 
financial dealings like those of a trucking firm owned by M rs. Perez
4E1 N acionai. January 29, 1958; Daily Tournal. January 25,
1958; "Venezuela, " 31; "The Bum's R ush," 19; and "First Week of 
Freedom ," Time LXXII (February 10, 1958), 32.
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Jimenez that netted $3,500,000 on a $30,000 investment.® After 
P. J. purchased a Miami, Florida, mansion for $400,000 cash , in v es­
tiga tions of the ex -d ic ta to r 's  private and public financial affairs were 
begun. These inqu iries, which eventually  led to Perez Jim enez's 
extradition from the United S tates on charges of fraud and em bezzle­
ment, revealed th a t he had am assed a personal fortune of something 
over $200, 000,000 and had obligated the nation for a sim ilar amount 
in questionable debts.®  The Patriotic Junta w as already receiving 
wide acclaim  for its  superb manipulation of the general s tr ik e , but 
the d isc losed  im proprieties of the New National Ideal caused many 
Venezuelans to  appreciate more fully the labors of the Patriotic Junta 
and the principles for which i t  stood.
In the early  morning hours of January 23, 1958, most Venezuelans 
were listening  a tten ta tive ly  to  the ir rad io s . News flashes of dynamic 
po litica l developments were being re leased  in rapid succession . As
®E1 U niversa l, January 25, 1969; El N acional, January 26,
1969; La E sfera, January 24, 19 69; Pablo P u jades, D ictadores 
Americanos: e l Oca s o , e l Tusticialismo de Peron (Bogota: Minerva 
P ress , 1958), 192-205; "The Bum's R ush," 20-21; "First Week of 
Freedom ," 32; H ispanic American Report (Tanuary, 1958), 33; and 
Bocca, "The Rape of Venezuela, " 125-132.
C
U. S. Agrees to Extradition of Ex-President of V enezuela ,"
The Department of State Bulletin XIL (September 2 , 1963), 364-367;
"A Taste of Prison, “ Time LXXX (December 21, 1962), 24; “P .J . 's  
Return," Newsweek IXV (April 19, 1965), 52; Andreski, Parasitism  
and Subversion. 76; Porter and Alexander, The Struggle for Democracy, 
1 2 1 .
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dawn approached, an  announcer's voice made an introduction,
"C itizens, the President of the Patrio tic Junta, Fabricio O jeda. " 
Although most Venezuelans had never heard of O jeda, an entire nation 
settled  bach to learn the identity  of an  organization that already com­
manded the ir a lleg ian ce . "A co a litio n , in effect, has been made, " 
declared O jeda, "until the proposition of a dem ocratic form of govern- 
ment for Venezuela h as  had a chance to  so lid ify . " Ojeda revealed  the 
po litical parties included in th is "truce" to be Democratic Action, the 
Democratic Republican Union, the Independent Committee for Political 
and E lectoral Organization and the Communist Party of Venezuela. He 
called  upon a ll Venezuelans to w ear the ir new garments of freedom 
with dignity and honor and to forego ac ts  of vengeance. "We have 
found, " Ojeda concluded, "that a l l  po litica l parties ea t from the same 
tab le . "8
Fabricio Ojeda w as not the P resident of the Patriotic Junta. The
Junta had no P residen t. According to  Enrique A ristiguieta Gramko, a
member of the Patrio tic Junta, Fabricio Ojeda simply walked into a
Caracas radio sta tion  where he w as known as a member of the staff
of El N acional, provided proof of h is  membership in  the Junta and
secured a nation-w ide introduction a s  President of the Patriotic
*
n
Daily Tournal, January 25, 1958.
8Ib id .
Junta. By midday, O jeda 's many friends in a ll  areas of communica­
tions had made his name a household word. His picture and numerous 
pronouncements to reporters dominated the many new spaper "extras" 
already being issu ed  by V enezuela's recently  em ancipated p ress . 
P resented with a fa it accom pli, the remaining members of the Junta, 
w ishing to maintain a united front, accep ted  O jeda 's self-appointm ent. 
Although the young newspaperman received the most publicity , the 
entire membership of the Patriotic Junta became "symbols of libera­
tio n . They were besieged everywhere by autograph seek ers , they 
were constantly  ca lled  to M iraflores for consultation with the 
Government Junta, they  were sought out by radio and te lev ision  new s­
men for comments on various issu es  of the day, and they were con­
tinually  requested to  serve as guest speakers at various civic and 
educational functions. In addition, Julio Barreota Lara of El N acional 
ran a  se rie s  of biographical a rtic les  Qn Professor Soria (Fabricio
g
Interview with Enrique A ristiguieta Gramko, July, 1967 . 
Several knowledgeable politicos interview ed by the w riter confirmed 
A ristiguieta Gramko's account. From Fabricio O jeda's ac tiv ities  
following 1958, it  is  c lear tha t he was motivated by po litical 
am bition, both for him self and his party (URD).
]-0El N acional, January 24, 1958.
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O jeda), Padilla (Guillermo Garcia Ponce), Chito (Silvestre Ortiz 
Bucaran) and Jose (Enrique A ristiguieta Gramko) . 11
While hard ly  noticed in  the Northamerican p ress , the fame of
the Patriotic Junta spread throughout Latin America. On a vacation
trip  to Lima and Santiago (Chile), Fabricio Ojeda was given V .I.P ..
treatm ent and eagerly quizzed by local reporters for d e ta ils  concerning
the Patriotic Junta. Fidel Castro sen t his s is te r ,  Emma C astro , as an
envoy'to  the Junta. Of course, the Patriotic Junta (as everyone else)
sym pathized w ith the "2 6 of July" movement and a s s is te d  the Cuban
revolutionary struggle by supporting Miss C astro 's  efforts a t raising
funds. From C atam arca, Argentina, came reports of c iv ilians and
students forming a Patrio tic Junta to  deal w ith a  local ty rannical
o ffic ia l. Exiles from Rafael T ru jillo 's Dominican Republic journeyed
to  C aracas in  M arch, 1958, for a convocation, which labeled  itse lf
the Dominican Patrio tic Junta and estab lished  a s  its  goal th e  over-
12throw of Trujillo.
•^Daily Journal, January 25, 1958, February 7, 1958; El N acional. 
January 24, 1958, January 31, 1958, February 1, 1958, February 5>
1958, February 7, 1958; H ispanic American Report (Tanuary, 1958),
32-33; "Venezuela Topples a D ic ta to r ," 11; and "First W eek of Freedom," 
32. Dr. Antonio Ramos, a professor of music a t  the Central U niversity , 
composed a stirring march ca lled  Adelante (Forward) dedicated  to 
events of January 23, 1958. This melody w as played a t most of these 
functions. Its  lyrics can be found in  El N acional, January 25, 1958.
•̂ L a  Esfera, January 27, 1958, M arch 3 , 1958; El N acional,
March 10, 1958, March 25, 1958, March 30, 1958, A p r ils , 1958,
April 15, 1958; and Daily Toumal, February 6 , 1958, M arch 26, 1958.
As the New N ational Ideal became synonymous with brutality and 
corruption, its  an tith e s is , the Patriotic Junta, became increasingly  
identified  with service and benevolence. Venezuelans from a ll parts 
of the country, a t a rate of over 150 persons a day, flocked to 
Caracas for audiences w ith Junta members. Many came to express 
their g ratitu tde, but most came requesting a s s is ta n c e . There had 
always been unemployment in Venezuela, but the economic d is lo ca­
tions following the ouster of P. J. aggravated an already unhealthy 
s itua tion . Many jo b less  approached the Patrio tic Junta for employ­
ment, dwellings or a simple handout. In the same predicam ent, and 
of particu lar concern to the Junta, were the fam ilies of those ind iv i­
duals k illed  or wounded in  the struggle ag a in st the d ic ta to rsh ip . In 
an effort to  cope w ith th is  problem, the Patrio tic Junta became 
involved in para-charitab le  a c tiv itie s . The Junta temporarily rented 
two floors of a Caracas office building (Edificio M etropolitan), 
employed a modest secre ta ria t and so lic ited  funds. Public response 
was generous. Thousands of sm all donations were received , as  w ell 
as  substan tia l contributions from some of the nation 's  w ealth iest
13fam ilies . A lis t  of major donors resem bled a Venezuelan W ho's Who.
13
La Religion, February 28, 1958, March 17, 1958; El N acional, 
February 10, 1958; "Outlook for U .S . Investm ents in Oil-Rich 
V enezuela," U .S . ' News & World Report XLV (December 19, 1958), 59; 
and "Business Around the World, " U .S . News & World Report XLVII 
(December 14, 1959), 107-108.
But p o litic s , not public a s s is ta n c e , was the forte of the Patriotic
Junta . The power afforded the Junta by overwhelming public support
permitted it to s e t the nation 's  political to n e . "Unity" became the
slogan of the Patriotic Junta—not in the sense  of foregoing partisan
ac tiv ity , but in the sense of a po litical consensus for the cause of
dem ocracy. This was the theme em phasized in  a l l Patrio tic Junta
in
m anifestos and communiques. ‘ Venezuelan democracy must remain 
v ig ilan t. The members of the  Patriotic Junta, as  w ell a s  V enezuela's 
po litica l p a r tie s , strongly believed that only c iv ilian  unity in the form 
of b ipartisan  harmony could prevent their country from returning to  a 
Tightest d ic ta to rsh ip . On January 24, the Junta 's firs t m essage to  its  
liberated  countrymen sta ted  "that only a  prosperous clim ate of poli­
tic a l harmony would assu re  the public peace and allow  the completion
of our ob jec tives. Po litical forces should accord a prudential truce
1 5in  th e ir  po litica l fight to find the ir unity . " D eliberately , but
perhaps unknowingly, the Patriotic Junta w as attem pting to  e s tab lish
1 fi"cleavage and consensus" in  Venezuela.
14After January 23, 1958, Patriotic Junta literature was no 
longer published c landestinely  by the Tribuna Popular. A few copies 
were made and d istributed to  newsmen. The following day, Junta 
declarations were usually found on the front pages of V enezuela's 
new spapers.
"M anifiesto de La Junta Patriotica a La N a c i^ n ," El 
N acional, January 24, 1958.
•^Chapter I contains a discussion of "cleavage and consensus" 
as it pertains to a nation's political culture.
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In order to enhance its  already substan tia l influence on the poli­
tic s  of Venezuela, the Patrio tic Junta expanded its  membership. 
Thirteen new directors were named who, when added to the original 
four, brought the Jun ta 's to ta l membership to  seven teen . These addi­
tions are sign ifican t. Three of the new d irec to rs, Raul Leoni (AD), 
Ignacio Luis Arcaya (URD) and Lorenzo Fernandez (COPEI), were 
recently  repatria ted  ex iles representing the top echelons of their 
respective p artie s . The editor of La Religion, Reverend Jesus 
Hernandez C hapellin , was in itia ted . O fficially , Father Hernandez 
Chapellin represented the Venezuelan Press A ssociation , but the 
presence of a p riest on the Junta signified endorsement by the 
Venezuelan C atholic Church. ^  Organized labor w as represented
17 j'In  an extensive interview  with the w riter, Rev. Hernandez 
Chapellin em phasized tha t as  a priest he cannot be a member of any 
po litica l party or publicly advocate specific  po litical ideo log ies.
Before accepting membership in the Junta, Father Hernandez Chapellin 
consulted h is  Archbishop, Rafael Arias Blanco, who granted perm ission 
and encouragem ent. The C hurch 's o ffic ial position on the Patriotic 
Junta w as th a t i t  was above po litica l p a rtie s . When the writer queried 
the cleric concerning the fac t th a t, as a member of the Junta, he 
cooperated w ith a member of the Communist Party, Father Hernandez 
Chapellin rep lied , "At th a t tim e we did not look a t o n e 's  political 
be lie fs , w hether a man w as a communist, a copeyano or an u ired is ta— 
we were ju s t  Venezuelans trying to  m aintain dem ocracy. " The 
loquacious p riest em phatically reminded the writer th a t there was 
only one PCV member on the Patriotic Junta . Interview with Reverend 
Jesus Hernandez C hapellin, August, 1967.
Although the Venezuelan hierarchy remained s ilen t on the po li­
tic a l developments of 1958, ac tiv itie s  by q u as i-o ffic ia l groups 
indicated approval of the Patrio tic Junta. Whenever the Junta ca lled  
for dem onstrations, e ither in  protest or approval of some inciden t,
(continued)
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by a committee of five from the Labor Front of the Patriotic Junta,
while a delegation of four studen ts spoke for the U niversity Front.
In order to recognize the role of Venezuelan women in  the demise of
the dictatorship  as w ell as  the ir increasing  po litica l importance,
*
Doffa Irma Felizola of the Ju n ta 's  Feminine Committee w as appointed 
to  the Patriotic Junta. P rofessionals named to the Junta were Dr. 
Antonio Requena of the Venezuelan M edical A ssociation and Rene de 
Sola of the Venezuelan Bar A ssocia tion . The la tte r  w as a lso  M inister
17 (continued)students from V enezuela's Catholic co lleges and high 
schools were in  the forefront. La Religion gave front page coverage 
of a l l  Patriotic Junta pronouncements and a c tiv itie s  and published 
a r tic le s  by laymen advocating the cause of unity . D istinct indications 
of the Church's position came on January 30, 1958, when the Arch­
bishop of C aracas, Rafael Arias Blanco, celebrated  a Requiem 
Pontifical M ass for the departed souls of those indiv iduals who were 
k illed  in the movement to end the d ic ta to rsh ip . In attendance were 
the Government Junta, the C abinet and the Patrio tic Junta. La 
R eligion, January 23, 1958, January 25, 1958, January 29, 1958, 
January 30, 1958, January 31, 1958; La E sfera, January 30, 1958;
El N acional, January 30, 1958; and El U niversal, January 30, 1958.
^^Doffa Irma Felizola is  the widow of former P resident Isa ia s  
Medina A ngarita. A significant by-product of the Patriotic Junta 
was the extreme in te rest taken by V enezuela's women in its  work, 
and, therefore, p o litic s . Under the direction of the Feminine 
Committees of the Patriotic Junta , women took part in  dem onstrations, 
issu ed  m anifestos urging unity and , as  elections approached during 
the la s t  month of 1958, formed "car pools" to transport unregistered 
acquain tances to inscrip tion c e n te rs . Socially , In tercam bio, a very 
a ris to cra tic  charitable organization operated by the e lite  female 
members of Venezuelan soc ie ty , consented to  "cooperating (in 
so c ia l and charity work) with the Comite Femenino de La Tunta 
P a trio tica ."  D aily Journal, February 14, 1958; El N acional.
March 8 , 1958, March 9, 1958, March 19, 1958, July 16, 1958;
La Religion, March 6, 1958; and Tribuna Popular. March 8 , 1958.
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of Justice in the nation 's  new- cab inet. Representing the country's 
industria l and commercial secto r were Angel Corvini, Vicente 
Lacuna, Jr. and Andres Boulton. Lecuna and Boulton rank as two of 
the rich e s t men in  V enezuela. This new amplified Junta issued a 
press re lease  stating th a t i t  would d irec t a ll of its  efforts toward the 
following four fundam ental ob jectives:
1. Support the Government Junta in  its  dem ocratic aims and 
aid in making them re a l i t ie s .
2 . M aintain a united front.
3 . M aintain the dem ocratic process through leg a l repre­
sentation by means of general e lections for a l l  public 
offices a s  soon as  p o ssib le .
4 . Encourage indiv idual p o litica l parties th a t form the 
Patriotic Junta to  maintain the ir separate doctrines and 
organ izations, but a t the same time e s tab lish  a truce in  
the ir interparty ac tiv itie s  and continue working for the
. consolidation of a stab le dem ocratic regime in 
Venezuela.
All areas of news media kept the Patriotic Junta and its  ca ll for 
po litical unity in the lim elight. For the promulgation of its  numerous 
m anifestos, prime radio  and te lev is io n  time was provided. Also, .the 
Junta’s many brief communiques were always given top priority a s  
news features in b roadcasts and te le c a s ts .  All of th e se  dec lara tions, 
plus the many individual comments of Junta members, were reproduced 
in full in the nation 's p re s s . They focused around a  single thought: 
civ ilian  unity , unflaggingly v ig ilan t for the enem ies of democracy,
•^ La Esfera, January 28, 1958; El N acional, January 28, 1958;
and Daily Journal, January 28, 1958.
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was V enezuela's only hope of avoiding tyranny. Lifted from random 
Patriotic Junta pronouncements, the .allowing are examples of this 
theme:
With th is authority ,/public tru s j/ the Patriotic Junta proclaims 
tha t ju s t as  unity among the people overthrew tyranny, tha t 
same unity is  necessary  to lead the nation to  greater oppor­
tun ities under civilian ism . We first made th is delcaration 
when Venezuela was divided by figh ts, hatreds and enm ities.
In V enezuela, there is  no possib ility  for action w hile d iv i­
sion e x is ts ,  for such division k ills popular fo rc e .2^
In order to  avoid confusion it  is  necessary  to  say again  that 
the Patriotic Junta is  a civic institu tion  of popular charac­
te r. . . . Our ro le , . . .  is  to  maintain the unity of public 
opinion; to  contribute to the orientation of the press; coordi­
nate the po litica l efforts of p a rtie s , students and labor 
unions; and to  devote a ll our energy toward enabling 
Venezuelans to  live in  peace without fear and supported 
by an understanding governm ent, 2 ̂
The Patriotic Junta encourages the c itizens to partic ipate 
publicly in po litica l deba te , but always conserving serenity  
and resp ec t for o n e 's  po litica l enem ies. For a be tter under­
standing of V enezuela, we hope that a ll the c itizens w ill go 
along with our beliefs so th a t Venezuelan- unity w ill always 
remain strong . 22
The Patriotic Junta m anifests th a t any attem pt to destroy, 
national unity , to  d isturb  the government's plans or ac tion , 
to upse t the serene environment of mutual comprehension and 
re"- : . :  between the people and the armed forces w ill encounter 
a rgetic repulsion on behalf of a l l  the c i t iz e n s . 22
20J L . onal .nry 25, 1958.
2^Ib ia . , January z9 , 1958.
22La Religion, February 12, 1958.
23P aily  Journal, April 10, 1958.
The influence of the Patriotic Junta w as complemented by the 
formation of subsidiary Juntas throughout the country. Patriotic 
Juntas sprang up everyw here. Juntas were formed in a ll the larger 
provincial c i t ie s , such as M aracaibo, Valencia and San Cristobal; 
but they could a lso  be found in T ucacas, Urena and Bonaco, ham lets 
th a t most Venezuelans never knew ex is ted . When several Juntas 
formed in one community appealed to  the Patriotic Junta in the cap ital 
for recognition, the la tte r  was forced to  es tab lish  organizational 
gu ide lines. In order for recognition to be extended, provincial Juntas 
had to employ two procedures: I) follow the declaration  of principles 
promulgated on January 27, 1958 (cited on p ag e208); and 2) follow the 
same pattern of equal so c ia l, economic and po litica l representation 
in the formation of their lo ca l Juntas a s  was followed by the  original 
Patriotic Junta. By the end of February, lines of communication had 
been es tab lish ed  among a ll the Patrio tic Juntas of Venezuela. By 
virtue of its  p restig e , the C aracas Junta commanded the complete 
re sp e c t, obedience and em ulation of its  provincial counterparts.
When the Patrio tic Junta delved into charitable ac tiv ity , local Juntas 
began to a s s is t  the underprivileged of their communities; when the 
parent organization decided to make the office of President of the
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24Patriotic Junta ro tary , the parochial Juntas followed suit; and when 
the original Junta alerted  the country to the th rea t of conspiring 
perez jim en istas . local Patrio tic Juntas formed ''c iv il p a tro ls1 to 
alarm fellow c itizens in the event of a possib le  golpe de e s ta d o .^  
Organized labor, w hich, along with V enezuela’s studen ts , had 
furnished most of the Jun ta 's  support during the general s trik e , was 
a lso  m esmerized by the influence of the Patriotic Junta. With tyranny 
a thing of the p a s t, V enezuela's u ltra -p o litica lized  laborers began 
unionizing procedures imm ediately following the overthrow of Perez 
Jim enez. Emulating the Patrio tic Junta, a N ational Unified Union 
. Committee w as formed in  m id-February, 1958. ft was headed by a 
d irec to ra te , in  which a ll  po litica l parties were represen ted . Extremely 
powerful due to  its  size  and m ilitancy, the N ational Unified Union 
Committee ‘exemplified xenophobic tendencies disturbing to  the
24At a May 26, 19 58, meeting of the Patriotic Junta, i t  was 
decided tha t beginning on June 1, the office of P resident of the Junta 
would be ro tated among members a t unstated  in te rv a ls . Chosen as 
the new president was Dr. Antonio Requena. The four original members 
a l l  became v ic e -p re s id en ts . Although Ortiz Bucaran, A ristiguieta 
Gramko and Garcia Ponce were p leased  to  see Fabricio Ojeda re lin ­
quish a position he never really  p o sse ssed , i t  was Ojeda who first 
suggested the move. The young El N acional reporter had been recently 
se lec ted  a s  Secretary-G eneral of his party (URD), and he was eager 
to  devote more time to party a ffa irs . Daily Tournal, May 27, 1958; 
and El N acional, May 21, 1958, June 11, 1958.
25La Religion, February 9, 1958, March 1, 1958, March 31, 
1958, June 6 , I95S; La E sfera , January 27, 1958, January 29, 1958;
El N acional. January 28, 1958, February 28, 1958, March 3, 1958, 
March 23, 1958, July 8 , 1958; and El U niversa l, January 29, 1958.
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Patriotic Ju n ta . The possib ility  of a labor war between natives and 
re cent:'immigrants (particularly C aracas ' large Ita lian  community) 
would greatly reduce the strength of Venezuela's civ ilian  fo rces. The 
Patriotic Junta fe lt compelled to  issu e  a  major pronouncement on th is 
s itua tion . In a long declaration  dated February 22/ 1958/ the Junta 
accused  the New N ational Ideal of germinating th is  antipathy among 
V enezuela's workers by paying foreigners higher wages on public 
works p ro jec ts . The Patriotic Junta announced tha t i t  had demanded 
and received assu rances from the young Government Junta tha t wage 
discrim ination on public works projects would cease  and th a t/ as 
suggested by the Patriotic Junta, the government would follow the 
trad itional Venezuelan employment practice of hiring one foreigner 
for every four na tio n a ls . All parties seemed contented with the 
Patriotic Jun ta 's  settlem ent and in ternal unity returned to V enezuela's 
national labor m o v em en t.^
Although le ss  p ressing , two features endemic to  Venezuelan 
labor, partisan  unionizing and labor-management d isp u tes , were
^^M artz, Accion D em ocratica, 261; Porter and Alexander, 
Struggle for Democracy, 124; "Venezuelan Labor Movement, " 11-12; 
H ispanic American Report (January, 1958), 33; Daily Journal, 
February 22, 1958; and El N acional. January 24, 1958.
possib le sources of unrest th a t could have resu lted  in a divided 
civ ilian  populace. Due to the influence of the Patriotic Junta, these 
disruptive features were aba ted . In a lengthy trac t issued  on March 6, 
1958, the Junta “called  on V enezuela's po litica l parties to curb any 
se lfish  in te rest in the organization of labor unions and work together 
harm oniously. "2? Political party labor leaders interview ed agreed 
to abide by th e  Junta’s req u est, and “expressed  agreem ent with the 
Jun ta 's proposal th a t individual po litica l in te rests  in  labor unions 
must take second place to national in te re s ts  of maintaining the sp irit 
of unity w ithin the labor movement. “28 The key achievem ent of the 
Patriotic Junta, however, w as in  the field  of labor-pianagement re la ­
tio n s . Chaired by Raul Leoni and Andres Boulton, a committee of the
Patrio tic Junta drew up a unanimously approved report, which ca lled
29for a truce between employees and em ployers. The Junta demanded 
concessions from both s id e s . Management was requested  to decrease 
production costs  (in order to lower the co s t of living) and to create 
new employment opportunities. Labor w as warned th a t indiscrim inate
^ D a ilv  Tournal, March 6 , 1958.
2 Qjbid.
2% aui Leoni, former AD M inister of Labor during the tr ien io , 
was considered organized lab o r's  voice on the Patriotic Junta. Andres 
Boulton, one of the richest men in the w orld, represented management. 
The presence of these two men on the Junta is  evidence of its  motley 
composition; the ir ability  to work harmoniously together is  evidence 
of the Jun ta 's  un iqueness.
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wage increases might imperil an economy already suffering from inf la -
* tion . The report continued:
The Patriotic Junta, . . . m anifests its  sympathies for a good 
and sincere understanding between the forces th a t are joined 
in developing the economic ac tiv itie s  of the nation because 
the Junta believes th a t the app lication  of a truce agreement 
in possible differences between employers and workers w ill 
contribute tremendously to strengthening industria l peace 
and to  the su ccessfu l in ter-party  tru ce , 0
The culm ination of the Patrio tic Junta 's efforts in this field  came on 
April 24, 1958, when a two-year "Truce Declaration" w as signed by 
rep resen tatives of the N ational Unified Union Committee and the 
Venezuelan A ssociation of Chambers of Commerce. Management 
agreed to maintain wage le v e ls , increase  employment and cut pro­
duction c o s ts , while labor agreed not to  s trik e . Economic issu e s  
were s e t aside  in order to  achieve a settlem ent of the more urgent 
p o litica l s ituation . The country 's entire economic spectrum had 
endorsed the Patriotic Junta and civ ilian  dem ocracy. For the firs t 
tim e in ten  years , V enezuela's m assive May Day (Labor Day) demon-
O I
stra tions passed  without a single inc iden t of v io lence.
V enezuela's university  population had been the m ilitary arm of 
the underground Patriotic Junta, but many expected sustained
^ Daily Journal, February 27, 1958.
31E1 N acional, April 25, 1958, July 7 , 1958; Daily Tournal,
April 25, 1958, May 3, 1958; and Blank, Venezuela Election Factbook, 
26.
m ilitancy from the n a tio n 's  trad itionally  divisive studen ts. Strangely
enough, in terstudent relationships were characterized by harmony
and cooperation. Student-community relationships were manipulated
by the Patriotic Jun ta . Because of the ir accom plishm ents, but a lso
due to their extreme youthfulness, the  four original members of the
P atrio tic Junta exerc ised  a strong influence among V enezuela's
students . Numerous convocations a t  the Central University were
held  to  commemorate the work of the Patriotic Junta. During student
w eek, February 6 -12 , over 40,000 young people paraded the stree ts
of C a ra ca s , making the ir way to  four plazas where the four original
members of the Patrio tic  Junta delivered  o ra tions. The official
U niversity new spaper, the very professional Universidad C en tra l,
always contained Patriotic Junta declarations and communiques, plus
numerous artic les  by both students and faculty dealing with the
n ecess ity  for p o litica l unity due to  the omnipresent possib ility  of
32m ilita ris tic  resu rgence . As requested  in a widely publicized Junta 
declara tion , the Government Junta granted complete autonomy to  the . 
un iversity , in full accordance w ith ten e ts  of the U niversity Reform
33Pedro Espinoza Troconis, "El 23 de Enero Tambien Murio e l 
Peronism o," U niversidad C entral, January 29, 1958; Miguel Acosta 
S aignes, "Unidad en  e l Ambito U niversitario , " Universidad Central 
February 7, 1958; Edgard Rodriguez Leal, "Perezjim enism o," 
U niversidad C entral. March 17, 19 58; and Leopoldo Villalobos, 
"Universidad v D em ocracia,"  U niversidad C entral, May 12, 1958.
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Movement. The student government of the C entral U niversity of
Venezuela w as organized along the same lines a s  the Patrio tic
Junta. The eleven co lleges of the U niversity held e lec tions of
officers; and , in the sp irit of unity , voters had to  choose among
various s la te s  composed of members from various p a rtie s . The
*
eleven elected  presidents formed a Federation of Colleges in  charge 
of student government for the entire U niversity . The Central 
U niversity , the birth place of Venezuelan dem ocracy, now stood
q q
ready to defend its  crea tion .
Publicly and private ly , the communists of Venezuela a lso  sup­
ported the Patrio tic J u n t a . ^4 On March 1, 1958, the Tribuna Popular 
(official organ of the PCV) issu ed  its  firs t ed ition  following the ouster
33Universidad C en tra l. January 24, 1958, January 29, 1958, 
February 14, 1958, March 3 , 1958; La E sfera, January 25, 1958;
El N acional, February 13, 1958; Daily Journal, February 13, 1958, 
March 8 , 1958; and W ashington, “Student P o litics in  Latin America, " 
469. W ashington (p. 469) s ta te s  tha t the C entral U niversity elections 
of 1958 "show how the Communists profited from the truce to get into 
positions of influence in student governm ent." This is  the exact 
contrary of what ac tually  occurred. Although student po litical a ffilia ­
tion was greatly  factionalized , num erically, the PCV was probably 
the largest single party w ithin the U niversity and thus lo s t repre­
sentation  by participating in the truce .
^ F o r  two reaso n s, .the rela tions between the Patrio tic Junta and 
the Communist Party of Venezuela w ill be d iscu ssed  apart from the 
Junta 's re la tions with V enezuela's other po litica l p arties . The firs t is  
tha t the com m unists' reasons for endorsing the cause  of democracy and 
represen tative government are highly su sp ec t. The second and more 
important is  th a t V enezuela’s three major p a rtie s , AD, URD and COPEI 
gradually eased  out the PCV from in te r-party  conferences and programs. 
This does not m ean, how ever, tha t the PCV was critized  or d iscrim i­
nated ag a in st w ithin or w ithout the Patriotic Jun ta .
of P. J. Prior to th is d a te , V enezuela's independent journals gave the 
nation 's communists considerable notice; but, as the country 's major
35po litica l parties began to rebuild , PCV publicity approached oblivion. 
Eager to su sta in  communist ideology before the public , the Tribuna 
Popular appeared; i t  was dominated by favorable news of the
O C
Patriotic Junta. The com m unists' position v is - a -v is  the Junta was 
motivated by three fac to rs . F irs t, the popularity of the Patrio tic Junta 
was such th a t certain  anonymity aw aited any group th a t opposed i t .  
After a l l ,  a member of the PCV, Guillermo Garcia Ponce, w as a charter 
member of the Patrio tic Junta who had played a v ita l role in  the over­
throw of the d ic ta to rsh ip . I t w as only natural th a t V enezuela's 
communists should continue to  extend support to  a popular organiza­
tion  tha t they had helped c rea te . Even Pravda praised the 1958
37Venezuelan revolution. Second, "coex istence , " a doctrine sim ilar 
to the Patrio tic Junta's, was receiv ing  official sanction  from the Soviet 
Union and its  Premier, N ikita Krusechev. F inally , partic ipation  and
or
N eedier, Politics in P erspec tive , 40-41 . In 1959, the to ta l 
membership of the Communist Party of Venezuela w as 40 ,000 . 
Goldenburg, The Cuban Revolution, 308.
36^rjbuna Popular, March 1, 1958, March 12, 1958, March 29, 
1958, April 3 , 1958, December 12, 1958.
37Beatty, "V enezuela," 148. During 1958, the PCV tried  very 
hard to  convince th e ir  fellow c itizen s  tha t i t  placed the needs of 
Venezuela above those of the Soviet Union. Yet, is su e s  of the 
Tribuna Popular contained more news of Russia than of Venezuela,
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concurrence with the Junta and its  tenets  provided communists w ith an 
entree into many hitherto in access ib le  p la ce s . Even the h isto rica l 
schism s endemic to  the Venezuelan communist movement disappeared 
during 1 9 5 3 .^  This internal unity guaranteed, a t le a s t  for the 
moment, that V enezuela's normally m ilitant le ft would refrain from 
te rro rist a c tiv itie s . Since World War II, the m ilitary, in the over­
whelming majority of su ccessfu l golpes de estado  ag a in s t dem ocratic 
reg im es, cited communist terrorism  and the n ecess ity  of its  term ina­
tion  a s  i ts  primary purpose for in tervention . During th is  crucial era 
of p o litica l recuperation , V enezuela's armed forces were denied th is  
e x c u se .
The most im portant factor in explaining the profound po litica l 
influence of the Patrio tic Junta w as the strong support i t  received 
from V enezuela’s three dem ocratic po litica l parties , Democratic 
Action, the Democratic Republican Union and the Committee for 
Independent P o litical and E lectoral O rganization. These three groups 
were quick to  comprehend the fa c t tha t the Patriotic Junta had become 
much more than a simple conspiratorial clique to oust the d ic ta to rsh ip . 
The Junta had become a symbol of po litical to le rance , civ ic pride and, 
most of a l l ,  V enezuela's determ ination to  m aintain dem ocracy. By
^E 1  N acional, January 24, 1958, May 10, 1958, June 20, 1958; 
La Esfera, January 29, 1958; and Universidad C entral, March 3, 1958.
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continuing to support the Patrio tic Junta and its  g o a ls , V enezuela's
po litica l parties were helping to  crea te  an atm osphere conducive to
pacific po litica l m aturation. A ctually, the po litica l mood in  the
Venezuela of 1958 was benefic ia l to  party growth, for Patrio tic Junta
declarations never precluded partisan  ac tiv ity . On the contrary,
p o litica l party activ ity  w as encouraged. W hat the Junta stood
categorically  ag a in st was the ''c u t- th ro a t” type of party rivalry
39ch arac te ris tic  of V enezuela's c iv ilian -p o litica l p a s t.
January 2 3 ,  1958,  found Romulo Betancourt (AD), Rafael Caldera 
(COPEI) and Jovito Villalba (TJRD), V enezuela's th ree m ost famous 
p o litican s, exiled  in New York C ity . When informed of developments 
a t home, a l l  three praised  the work of the Patrio tic Junta and began 
holding a  se rie s  of conferences to  d iscu ss  the ir country 's po litical 
fu tu re .40 Influenced by the Patrio tic Junta, th ese  conferences gave
3^The only era of rea l p o litica l party ac tiv ity  in Venezuelan 
h istory  w as the 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 4 8  tr ie n io . Party re la tions were characterized  
by in tense  partisan  rivalry , with opposition parties encouraging the 
m ilitary to intervene in the Democratic Action dominated government, 
and AD attem pting to weaken V enezuela's other parties by allowing 
them no opportunity for growth and advancem ent. This in ter-party  
rivalry w as an important factor in  determining the armed fo rces' 
decision  to  in tervene. Chapter III contains more on th is  problem.
^ F o r  individual comments of Betancourt, Villalba and Caldera 
see La Esfera, January 2 4 ,  1958; and "Venezuela, " 3 2 .  Rafael 
Caldera left Venezuela the firs t week in January, 1958,  for a short 
exile in  New York. Jovito Villalba had resided  in New York for several 
y e a rs . Romulo Betancourt was living in Puerto Rico when P4rez 
Jimenez w as overthrown and he flew to New York on January 24 ,  1958 ,  
to  confer w ith h is old ad v e rsa rie s , Villalba and C aldera.
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birth to  the Venezuelan Civic Front. The Front was a personal commit­
ment by these  three men to avoid open po litica l struggle. In the words 
of V illalba, the Front would include "all parties and independent forces 
in order to  promote a national government able to avoid the return of 
m ilitary rule and to  advance economic and so c ia l progress.
The separate  return to Venezuela of these  three politicos occa­
sioned fe s tiv itie s  and public partisan  dem onstrations. The Patriotic 
Junta was designated  by each party to  extend official greetings to 
these  returning le ad e rs . At the three press conferences which followed 
the homecoming of Betancourt, V illalba and C aldera, Fabricio Ojeda 
introduced the party chiefs and served as  narrator. Each praised the 
work of the Patrio tic Junta and pledged continued support. Margot 
Bottome, a  Daily Toumal colum nist, fe lt that the ir sp eech es, par­
ticu larly  B etancourt's, were "unusually c o n c il ia to ry ." ^
As the year 1958 progressed , AD, URD and COPEI diligently  
rebuilt party m achinery. Party leaders backed the ca ll for civ ilian  
unity and a lso  urged the n ecess ity  for more functional represen tation , 
a need best a tta inab le  through individual po litica l p arties . Pressure
^ H ispanic American Report (January, 1958), 32.
A? Daily Journal, February 14, 1958; La E sfera . January 26, 1958, 
January 27, 1958, January 28, 1958; El U niversal, January 24, 1958; 
Kantor, "AD De V enezuela," 247; "V enezuela," 32; and Alexander, 
Prophets of the Revolution. 139.
for immediate national e lec tio n s was continually applied to  the provi­
sional govei'nment by the P atrio tic  Junta, the  single voice which spoke 
' for a ll p a rtie s . To the g ratification  of the nation’s p o litico s , the 
military^-dominated government responded accordingly. On a nation­
wide radio and te lev ision  add ress of February 19, Admiral Wolfgang 
Larrazabal, P resident of the Government Junta , declared th e  primary 
ta sk  of the la tte r  was to prepare for e le c tio n s . Toward th is  end, a 
thirteen-m an E lection Law Committee w as appointed to d raft a decree 
estab lish ing  procedures for national e le c tio n s . Twelve members of the 
Committee w ere c iv ilians, th ree  each from AD, URD, COPEI and the 
PCV; the th irteen th  member w as a military officer. On M ay 23, the 
Government Junta promulgated the e lecto ra l law drawn up by the 
Committee; e lec tio n s were to  be held on December 7, 1958, with a ll 
Venezuelans over eighteen years of age elig ib le  to v o te . On the same 
night the government announced the formation of a fifteen-m an Supreme 
Electoral C ouncil to oversee the December elections and take  charge of 
a l l  election m achinery. Ten of the members would be nam ed by 
V enezuela's po litica l p a rtie s , with the Government Junta naming the 
remaining f iv e . The provisional government was to re linqu ish  power
to  the choice of the e lecto ra te  on April 19, 1959. The significance of
these ac ts  are obvious, the m ilitary-based  Government Junta was being
43influenced by the Patriotic Ju n ta .
^3La E sfe ra , January 29 , 1958; El N acional, January 23, 1958, . 
May 24, 1958; Daily Tournal, February 20, 1958, March 3 , 1958,
April 15, 1058, May 23, 1958.
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Certainly the Government Junta had ample reasons to respect 
the power of the Patrio tic Junta. On more than one occasion the 
Patriotic Jun ta , in only a few hours, had been able to am ass multi­
tudes in the s tree ts  of V e n e z u e la .^  With the military s ti ll  in shock 
from the im m oralities of General Peres Jim enez, the government was 
virtually dependent on the civ ilian  Junta for its  survival. An equally  
se lf- in te re s ted  motive of the government in catering to the demands 
of the Patrio tic Junta w as the personal ambition of its  p residen t, 
Wolfgang Larrazabal. As chief of s ta te  the debonair sa ilo r used  the
advantages of public office to  promote sham elessly  h is personal 
a m b itio n s .^  In the summer of 1958, much d iscussion  centered
4^M ost of the m ass dem onstrations ca lled  for by the Patriotic 
Junta were in support of the government. One, however, was not. A 
popular m unicipal engineer, Celso Fortoul, was fired without apparent 
cause by the governor of the federal d is tr ic t, Lieutenant Colonel 
Vicente Antonio M archelli. The engineer had endeared him self to  the 
poor of C aracas by spending much extra time constructing needed sew age, 
drainage and other item s necessary  for proper san ita tion . A crowd of 
nearly 10,000 gathered before the p residentia l palace , while the Patri­
otic Junta demanded the reinstatem ent of Fortoul and the d ism issa l of 
Lt. Col. M archelli. The engineer was immediately given back h is job , 
and the governor was removed and replaced by a c iv ilian . El N acional, 
June 18, 1958; El U n iversa l, June 19, 1958; and Daily Tournal, June 18, 
1958.
45 On May 19, 1958, a c ris is  was precipitated when the two c iv i­
lian members of the five-m an Government Junta, industria lis t Eugenio 
Mendoza and econom ics professor Bias Lambert!, resigned . Among 
Government Junta members, i t  had bean agreed privately th a t no member 
would run for office in  December. Larrazabal1 s obvious hunger for 
publicity belied his in ten tions, and Mendoza and Lamberti resigned in 
pro test. Two other c iv ilians were quickly named to replace them . For 
the sake of unity , the Patriotic Junta agreed to  aquiesce in  these  
changes, but warned the government th a t it  must move more rapidly
(continued)
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around the possib ility  ox a unity cand idate . A single candidate, jointly
agreed upon by a ll po litica l parties , seemed to  many to be the logical
conclusion to a  year dominated by the Patriotic Junta . The name most
often mentioned as the possib le  unity candidate w as the popular
Admiral, who never ceased  to cater to  public opinion. Lairazabal was
contemplating a  po litica l career where b a llo ts , not b u lle ts , made the
difference. He used every opportunity to cooperate With the Patrio tic '
Junta, thus acquiring the Ju n ta 's , and the p u b lic 's , constant praise
46and endorsem ent.
On June 2 , 1958, under the au sp ices  of the Patriotic Junta, a
se ries of conferences composed of rep resen tatives from V enezuela's
47five major po litica l parties began. The purpose of these meetings 
was an attem pt to reach agreement on a sing le , "unity" candidate for
-5 (continued)towar(  ̂ fo ld ing  free e le c tio n s . Four days la ter the 
Government Junta promulgated the new electo ra l law . M artz, Accion 
D em ocratica, 96-97; El N acional. May 20, 1958, May 29, 1958;
Daily Tournal, May 19, 1959; and El U niversa l, May 20, 1959.
^ D a ily  Tournal, June 4 , 1958, June 9, 1958; H ispanic American 
Report (Tanuary. 1958), 33; Alexander, Prophets of the Revolution,
140; Porter and Alexander, Struggle for Democracy, 122; and M artz, 
Accion D em ocratica, 97.
4^In addition to  AD, URD, COPEI and the PCV, the Integrated 
Republican Party (IR) was included. IR was formed in  the spring of 
1958. Although num erically sm all, IR 's membership was made up 
mostly of p rofessionals—doctors, law yers, engineers and other 
relatively  affluent groups. The quality  of its  membership required 
i ts  presence in these nego tiations. Due to  their lim ited following,
IR and the PCV played minor roles in th ese  nego tiations.
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the coming e lec tio n s . N egotiations persisted  into autumn, but no 
accord was forthcoming. Democratic Action balked a t nearly a ll sug­
g es tio n s . Being the nation 's  la rgest single po litica l party, AD fe lt 
its  candidate would stand an excellen t chance in  December and thus 
argued for partisan  candidates w ith a subdued cam paign. Wolfgang 
Larrazabal's vacilla ting  statem ents rela tive to h is candidacy were 
fooling no one, w hile his lav ish  praise of V enezuela's communists 
was particularly  disturbing to  COPEI. The fac t th a t Admiral Larrazabal 
seemed to be the odds-on favorite—should a  unity candidate be agreed 
upon—caused COPEI to im itate Democratic A ction 's recalcitrance.^®
By m id-Septem ber, in te r-party  ta lk s  were getting nowhere, and 
December 7, the date of e le c tio n s , was approaching. The Patrio tic  
Junta moved to  break the deadlock. It authorized its  President,
Antonio Requena, to  contact the heads of V enezuela's three major 
parties and urge them , for the sake of c iv ilian  un ity , to reach a 
viable solution to th is  problem. The outcome of these  conversations 
w as the Pact of Punto Fijo, signed on October 31, 1958. This docu­
ment; named for the Caracas home of Rafael C aldera, w as signed by 
Romulo Betancourt, Raul Leoni and Gonzalo Barrios for AD; Jovito 
V illalba, Ignacio Luis Arcaya and Manuel L6pez Rivas for URD; and
4®La Religion, June 21, 1958; El N acional. June 20, 1958; and 
Daily Journal. June 1, 1958.
Rafael C aldera, Pedro del Corral and Ignacio Fernandez for C O P E I.^
By the Pact of Punto Fijo, the three parties agreed to  conduct vigorous, 
conciliatory and dignified cam paigns; to  honor the resu lts  of the 
e lections; and, subsequently , to  form a government of national unity , 
the winning candidate staffing his cabinet with members of a l l  three 
po litica l p artie s . The stage w as s e t. AD nominated Romulo Betancourt, 
COPEI nominated Rafael Caldera, and URD, with hopes of a certain  v ic ­
tory and with the approval of Jovito V illalba, nominated Wolfgang 
Larrazabal. The Admiral a lso  received the endorsem ent of the PCV. 
During the campaign the sp irit of conciliation  prevailed , and on 
December 7 , 1958, Venezuelans e lec ted  Romulo Betancourt.
Larrazabal fin ished  second and Caldera ran th ird . The Admiral had 
the moral support of the population but not i ts  e lecto ra l support.
Prior to e lection  day , The Economist summed up the thoughts of most 
Venezuelans in th is  fashion; "Dr. Romulo Betancourt has-in  his
favour the fact th a t he is  a civ ilian  in a nation sick  of uniformed 
50'c a u d il lo s '. " Betancourt, inaugurated on April 19, 1959,
A Q
It is  significant that three of these  s ig n ees, Leoni, Arcaya 
and Fernandez, were members of the Patriotic Junta; Pedro del 
Corral had been a  member of the Junta during its  clandestine 
period .
^ " V e n e z u e la 's  Next Government, 1 The Economist CLXXXIX 
(November 29, 1958), 804. ‘
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immediately proceeded to  comply with the principles of Punto 
F ijo . 51
Thus far, commencing with January 23, 1958, and ending with 
April 19, 1959, th is chapter has unfolded a rela tively  smooth process 
of dem ocratization for Venezuela. The Patriotic Junta, however, did 
much more than  simply influence the various p lu ralistic  elem ents of 
the nation 's  society  tha t shape its  p o litic s . The Patriotic Junta 
became the most powerful pressure group in V enezuela. I t  articu lated  
the po litical demands of the soc ie ty , it sought support for these  
demands among other groups, and i t  attem pted to  transform these 
demands by influencing the choice of po litica l personnel and the 
various p rocesses of public policy making and en fo rcem e n t.^  Prior 
to 1958, V enezuela's most powerful pressure group was its  armed 
forces; th is  crucial year would not pass without confrontation between 
the la tte r  and its  c iv ilian  riv a l, the Patrio tic Junta. Three conse­
quential c lashes between V enezuela's military (or certain  elem ents
51 El N acional, September 19, 1958; Blank, Venezuela Election
Factbook, 10; and Picon S a las , Venezuela In d e p e n d ie n te 298. When
Wolfgang Larrazabal became a candidate, he resigned as P resident
of the Government Junta. His place was taken by a civ ilian  member
of the Junta, Edgard Sanabria. An excellen t examination of the
December 7, 1958 elections and the ir resu lts  can be found in  M artz,
Accion D em ocratica, 103-106.
5 9
“The basis for th is definition of a pressure group w as taken 
from George I . Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin America, " 
American P olitical Science Review LIII (M arch, 1959), 108-109.
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in the military) and her c iv ilian  sectors m aterialized during 1958.
These c lashes took place in January, June and September, with the 
summer affair constitu ting  the most serious threat to c iv ilian  pre­
em inence. In each case  civ ilian  elem ents were led by the 
Patriotic Junta; and, in each c a se , c iv ilian  elem ents triumphed.
The firs t conflict of in te re s t between civ ilians and the military 
occurred on January 23 and 24, 1958, and, in  rea lity , was an exten­
sion of the general strike and sporadic s tree t fighting th a t overthrew 
Perez Jim enez. The a l l  military Government Junta, formed shortly 
after m idnight on January 23, w as composed of Rear Admiral Wolfgang 
Larrazabal (Navy), Colonel Roberto Casanova (Army), Colonel Abel 
Romero (Air Force), Colonel Carlos Luis Araque (National Guard), and 
Colonel Pedro Jos4 Quevedo (Police). The intent of the armed forces 
was to replace the government of General Perez Jim enez, which had 
become a liab ility  due to  civ ilian  resentm ent, w ith a new military 
regime. The Patriotic Junta, in a mid-morning v is it to  M iraflores, 
informed the government th a t un less c iv ilians were brought into the 
government the general strike and violence engulfing the country would 
continue. To back th is  ultimatum, several thousand demon- ,• 
strators paraded in front of the presidential palace carrying hundreds 
of placards demanding civ ilian  represen tation . Before noon, it was 
announced tha t two of V enezuela's most d istinguished  c itiz en s , indus­
tr ia l is t  Eugenio Mendoza and university  professor Bias Lamberti, had
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been added to  the Government Junta. Shortly thereafter, the nascen t 
government announced the appointment of a th irteen-m an cab inet. In 
an obvious attem pt to a llay  po litica l un rest, a l l  members of the cabinet 
were c iv ilian s except Colonel J e s is  Mario C astro Leon, M inister of 
D efense. ^
These concessions were not in sign ifican t, but they were not suf­
ficient to  placate V enezuela's angry c iv ilian  populace. The forces 
behind the Patrio tic Junta were very d issa tis f ie d  with two m ilitary 
members of the Government Junta, Colonels Roberto Casanova and 
Abel Romero. These men, former close a sso c ia te s  of P4rez Jim4nez , 
had been instrum ental in quelling the abortive golpe of January 1,
1958. On the afternoon of Thursday, January 23, the four members of ■ 
the Patriotic Junta returned to  M iraflores for a  second conference with 
Provisional President Larrazabal. They made it  c lear tha t un less 
Casanova and Romero were removed from the Government Junta, 
s trik es , v iolence and public protest would continue. In an interview  
with reporters upon leaving M iraflores, Fabric-io Ojeda opined, "We
^ La Esfera, Tanuary 24, 1958; Daily Tournal, January 25, 1958; 
"Venezuela's D ictator is  O u t," 80; "V enezuela," 31; and Goldenburg, 
The Cuban Revolution, 94-95. An excellen t biographical sketch of 
the in ternational financier, Eugenio M endoza, can be found in 
"Venezuela's Voice on Economics, " Business Week (April 19, 1958), 
104-108.
(Patriotic Junta) are not sa tisfied  with it  (Government Jun ta). We
v
hope i t  w ill be changed very quickly. But if  it  is  no t, we w ill not 
h es ita te  to organize opposition. "54 The next morning, workers failed  
to return to work and the stree ts  were filled with thousands of sign - 
carrying c itizens demanding the removal of Casanova and Romero.
Late that afternoon, the government issued  a communique stating 
th a t the two controversial officers had offered their resignations and 
these  had been accepted  im m ed ia te ly .^  The armed forces buckled 
under pressure from V enezuela's organized m asses . Instrum ental in 
the m ilitary 's decision  to pressure Casanova and Romero into resigning 
w as the fact th a t the armed forces would s ti l l  hold control in the 
government (three of the five members of the Government Junta 
were military o fficers). The armed fo rces, however, could not 
foresee the growing power of a un ified , m ilitant c iv ilian  populace 
and the po litica l am bitions of the ir comrade, Rear Admiral Wolfgang 
Larrazabal.
Through the remaining w inter and spring of 1958, Venezuela 
remained tense amid constant rumors of reactionary m ilitary plots and
54pajly  Journal, January 26, 1958.
55La E sfera , January 25, 1958; El N acional, January 24, 1958, 
January 25, 1958; Daily Tournal, January 25, 1958; "The Bum's Rush, " 
21; Kantor, "AD De Venezuela, " 246; H ispanic American Report 
(January, 1958), 32; and "Good Omens from C aracas, '■ The Economist 
CLXXXVE (February 1, 1958), 389-390.
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counter-plots These rumors were alw ays being reported by the
p ress , radio and te lev ision . By the "enemies of dem ocracy ," a s  
these  invisib le an tagonists were labe lled , the Venezuelan press 
had obvious reference to elem ents in the military who w ished to 
return to government by the armed fo rces . The key confrontation
^ A sid e  from those already d isc u sse d , the most noteworthy event 
to take place during the spring of 1958 w as the v is it to  V enezuela, on 
May 13, of the Vice President of the U nited S tates of America, Richard 
M. Nixon. As a represen tative of the Eisenhower adm inistration,
Nixon was identified  with the government th a t had aided and honored 
Marcos Perez Jim enez. Vice President and M rs. Nixon were stoned, 
sp it upon and extended other in d ig n itie s . These outbursts were not 
organized. Pent-up h atreds, however, are d ifficult to  suppress com­
p le te ly . At the m ost, only 2 00 people were involved. The Patrio tic 
Junta asked  for no dem onstrations, e ither for or aga inst the Vice 
P residen t's  v is i t .  Following N ixon's departure, the Patriotic Junta 
and V enezuela's new spapers, speaking for the great majority of 
Venezuelans, expressed  the ir ap o lo g ies . U niversidad C entral, May 19, 
1958; El N acional. May 15, 1958; La E sfera , May 15, 1958; and La 
Religion, May 15, 1958.
Considering the tense po litica l s itua tion , the Nixon v is it 
jeopardized democracy in  Venezuela and did nothing to  improve U .S .-  
Latin American re la tio n s . Investigations conducted into the Vice 
P residen t's  sojourn revealed the Northamerican Government's ignorance 
of Latin American a ffa irs . Statem ents by officials of the U .S . State 
Department revealed  conflict in inform ation, lack of communication 
and complete disregard for the future of V enezuela. Roy R. Rubottom,
Jr. (A ssistant Secretary of S tate for Inter-American Affairs), "United 
S tates Relations w ith Latin A m erica, " The Department of State Bulletin 
XXXVIII, no. 97 (March 31, 1958), 518-522; "A Review of the Relations 
of the United S tates and Other American Republics, " Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign 
A ffairs, 85th C o n g ., 2nd Sess . ,  1958, 3-71; "Report.of United S tates 
Relations with Latin America, " Bv me Subcommittee on Inter-American 
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign A ffairs, 86th C ong ., 1st S e s s 1958, 
1-8; and “U .S . Policy Respecting Latin America in the Light of the Vice 
P residen t's  Experiences in Venezuela and the Findings Made During his 
South American Tour, " (Replies Made by the Seem rary of State /Jo h n  
Foster D u lle s / to  Q uestions Asked a t a News Conference, May 20,
1958) American Foreign Policy, Cr.rrert  Documents, 1958, 372-375.
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between the forces of civilian!sm  and m ilitarism would not come until 
mid-summer, but the seeds of th is  co llision  originated much ea rlie r.
Next to the P resident, the h ighest ranking military officer in 
Venezuela is  the M inister of D efen se . Named to tha t post by the 
Government Junta w as Air Force Colonel Jesus Maria C astro Le6n.
The choice was an expedient one. He was acceptable to  the armed 
fo rces, for, a s  a ded icated  o fficer, he held the respect of his co l­
leag u es . His known disapproval of the New National Id ea l, and th e  
fac t th a t he belonged to a trad itionally  apo litica l branch of the armed 
se rv ices , the Air Force, made C astro  Le6n acceptable to  V enezuela's 
c iv ilian s . (It was the a rre s t of C astro  Le6n on December 31, 1957, 
tha t precipitated  the u nsuccessfu l coup of New Year’s D ay, 1958.)
In the field of public re la tio n s , however, the new M inister of D efense 
w as no professional. As the represen tative and spokesman of the 
m ilitary, his every utterance w as scru tin ized  by the many civ ilian  
sectors who feared the reappearance of m ilitarism . Frank and 
im patient, the short, swarthy Castro Leon gave the im pression of being 
a tough d isc ip linarian . His firs t public pronouncement, an address to  
the Government Junta, was brief and drew little  public reac tio n . ^
As weeks p assed , the patience of the M inister of D efense grew th in .
^ La E sfera, January 28, 1958; and El N acional, January 28,
1959 .
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The new spapers were filled  with d iatribes of m ilitary corruption under 
P. J .; during student w eek, the second week of February, a student 
m anifesto endorsed by the Patriotic Junta requested  the "purification" 
of the m ilitary; and many reporters, attem pting to squeeze a commit­
ment from C astro Le^n on the many rumors of q o lp e s , succeeded in
C  O
causing the Colonel to  question the value of a free p ress .
Although Castro Leon, in several in terv iew s, adm itted that the 
New N ational Ideal had made some "m istakes, " he constantly  main­
tained th a t i t  had not dim inished the "people 's respect for the armed 
59in s titu tio n ."  Many officers knew o therw ise . The continued viru­
lence of news items regarding the military eventually  convinced the 
M inister of Defense th a t something was necessary  to  clarify  the 
position of the armed fo rces. Toward this end, the m ilitary inaugurated 
a bi-m onthly te lev ision  show en titled  "Venezuela, Know Your Armed 
F o rc e s ." This firs t production, w hich took place on the evening of 
April 2 , 1958, consisted  of a lengthy address by Colonel Castro Le&n. 
The numerous minor irrita tions between the M inister of D efense and 
h is c iv ilian  an tag o n is ts , which would culm inate in the m ost serious
58Universidad C entral, February 24, 1958; and El N acional, 
February 21, 1953, March 22, 1958.
^ E 1  N acional, February 21, 1058; and Universidad C en tra l. 
February 24, 1958.
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threat to  Venezuelan democracy during 1958, can be traced from th is
60pronouncement of April 2 .
From watching and lis ten ing  to the ir new M inister of D efense,
Venezuelans learned two f a c ts . The firs t was th a t Castro Leon was
the an tith esis  of Perez Jim enez. He was a dedicated  officer who
seemed alm ost naively indifferent toward non-m ilitary ac tiv ity . To
Castro Leon's misfortune, however, Venezuelans a lso  learned of his
strong adherence to trad itiona lis t po litical beliefs: a modified approach
to w hat Chapter II of this study ca lls  the '‘superm ission '1 of the armed
forces—the concept which holds the m ilitary to  be the guardian of the
nation and, therefore, above the constitu tion  and the law . Two
passag es were particularly controversial:
This Institu tion  tha t yesterday w as based on the noble movement 
for independence, from now on w ill be the guardian of liberty , 
of that generous liberty granted to  men of good w ill. . . . 
Guardians of a liberty th a t does not authorize the asp ira tions 
of an ignoble leader threatening to  throw the people into the 
s tre e ts . . . , in other w ords, guardians of the N ational 
Sovereignty.
and
If great have been the mistakes- committed in the name of the 
Armed Forces, and we cannot deny i t ,  ignoble and unjust are 
those who would damage the Institu tion . . . If guilty was 
the armed organization, so  were politicians without sc rup les.
The Armed Forces of Venezuela have the ir own code, and i t  is
^ C o ro n e l Jesus Maria Castro Leon, "Venezuela Conoce a tus 
Fuerzas Armadas, " Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas: Organo del 
M inisterio de la D efensa no . 141 y 142 (Marzo-Abril, 1958), 2 -3 . 
This address w as published in a l l  the country 's newspapers a s  well 
as in the nations top military journal.
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about time th a t the campaigns calling for a demand for puri­
fication c e a se . The Institu tion  can solve its  own program; 
i t  a lso  demands to  be respected  as it re sp ec ts  o th e r s .^
The former ind icates Castro Leon's lack of comprehension regarding 
political modernization and the basic  function of p o litic s , while the 
la tte r is proof of h is growing irritab ility  toward those who would 
question the in tegrity  of the m ilitary .
Public reaction to the M inister of D efense 's  speech was cau­
tiously  c r itic a l. Although the Tribuna Popular declared that it  "left
62many points unclarified , " and the nation 's le f t i s t  press expressed  
vague d issa tis fa c tio n , the m ost severe criticism  of the address came 
from two secto rs of Venezuelan life traditionally  known for their 
po litica l qu iescence: professionals and the Church. In an open 
le tte r addressed  to the Government Junta, dated April 9, 1958, and 
signed by over 5,000 ind iv iduals , a large number of prominent 
Venezuelans voiced the ir "public nonconformity with some of the 
affirm ations made by the M inister of D efense, because we are afraid 
that these  affirm ations may revive undesirable f o r c e s ." ^  The le tter 
viewed the po litica l role of the military in the following manner:
^ Tribuna Popular, April 19, 1958.
^A ppended to the le tte r were over 5 , GOO signatu res, including 
V enezuela's most prominent doctors, law yers, businessm en and 
in te lle c tu a ls . El N acional, April 13, 2958.
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According to  the effective constitu tional arrangem ent, we 
understand tha t the armed forces— land, sea and a ir—are 
noble in stitu tions to whom the people tru st the weapons to 
defend the national sovereignty, to  respect its  (the nation 's) 
w ill, and to keep in ternal s tab ility . The armed forces are 
tech n ica l, professional and apo litical; mainly obedient and 
not d e lib era tiv e .
La Religion, went straigh t to  the problem. The remarks of Castro Leon
indicated  tha t "the armed forces s ti l l  portend . to  be the referee of the
dec isions made by the people expressing the ir free w ill. . . ."  For
the Church, its  role and the role of the m ilitary are sim ilar.
Just as a p riest cannot w ish for m aterial power, the soldier 
cannot w ish for po litica l power; the m ilitary cannot be the 
referee of h is country. His attitude must be of care-tak ing , 
of vigilance and of a le r tn e ss , but never of frightening. 66
In the months following April 2 , the D efense M in iste r 's  d is s a t is ­
faction mounted as a ttacks on the m ilitary establishm ent inc reased . 
Time afte r tim e, the recently  promoted General re itera ted  to  reporters 
h is chief objection , the armed forces were not being accorded proper 
re sp e c t. He d isc lo sed  to reporters tha t the enemies of democracy ware
64Ib id .
65La R eligion. April 11, 1958.
°°Ibid. At about the same period of tim e, the M inistry of 
D efense announced a large salary  increase  for military o ffic e rs . The 
timing of th is increase  was inopportune, to say the le a s t .  Shortly 
thereafter, Colonel Castro Leon was promoted to  G eneral. Both 
maneuvers occasioned much criticism  from numerous c iv ilian  
sec to rs .
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also  the enemies of the armed forces and th a t their id en tities  were w ell 
known. By July, the patience of Castro Leon, as w ell as a large 
faction within the m ilitary, had reached its. saturation point. When 
the Venezuelan "m an-in -the-s tree t"  was being applauded, the M inister 
of D efense, in reference to the contribution made by the armed forces 
to the overthrow of Perez Jim enez, credited  h is countrymen with p o sse ss ­
ing "a rare faculty for easy  and rapid forgetfu lness. When freedom 
of speech , press and assem bly were enjoying great vogue, General 
Castro Leon sta ted  th a t “there should ex is t tribunals to  condemn and
C Q
punish anyone who sta rts  a rumor.
On the afternoon of Tuesday, July 22, 1958, an  angry General 
Castro Le6n presented  the Government Junta a memorandum in the name 
of the Armed Forces of V enezuela. 68 The memorandum elaborated upon 
several is su e s  th a t constitu ted  the m ilita ry 's  most p ressing  grie­
vances: the shameful treatm ent accorded the Vice President of the 
United S ta te s , Richard M. Nixon; the manner in  which the Government 
Junta relied  upon "co llective" bodies in its  deliberations; the d isg race­
ful in justice accorded Colonel Vicente M archelli (recently d ism issed
67E1 U niversa l, April 17, 1958, April 30, 1958; and El N acional, 
May 2 , 1958.
68E1 U niversa l, July 22, 1958.
88La Religion, July 10, 1958.
as governor of the federal d istric t); the c lear advantage given 
Democratic Action and the Communist Party of Venezuela in the 
government; the dishonorable reputation th a t Venezuela w as acquiring 
abroad; the unjust in su lts  d irected  against the armed forces by new s­
papers, radio and te lev ision ; and the inexplicable behavior of the 
Government Junta in  a s s is tin g  th ese  indignities . At the end of th is 
memorandum was a  l is t  of three demands: 1) the abolition of AD and 
the PCV; 2) complete censorship of the p ress , radio and te lev ision ; 
and 3) immediate punishm ent for anyone provoking or d irecting oppo­
sition  to the above d e c r e e s .^  Venezuela w as on the verge of return­
ing to to ta lita rian ism .
An analysis of th is  document reveals no su rp rises . It is repre­
sen tative of the Latin American m ilita ris t m entality . The inclusion  
of the Nixon v is it and constant a llu sion  to  communists were designed 
to gain for the m ilitary , as  it  had so many tim es in  the p a s t, the 
support of the United S ta te s . Democratic Action had no advantage 
within the government; if  anything AD was a t a d isadvan tage . Since 
it  was the largest party in  V enezuela, i t  could easily  have demanded 
a greater number of cabinet p o s ts . Castro Leon was simply bringing 
to the surface the simmering feud between the military and AD which 
dated from the trien io . F inally, references to  the M archelli c a se , to
^E 1  N acional, July 26, 1358.
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the governm ent's collaboration with outsiders and to  the need for 
communications censorship  are symbolic of the m ilitary 's se lf-  
imposed im age—the armed forces are an e lite  establishm ent and 
must be trea ted  accordingly.
While Castro Leon was presenting the memorandum, significant 
apprehensions were being made by the m ilitary . Dr. Antonio Requena, 
the P resident of the Patriotic -Junta, and three members of the original 
Junta, Fabricio O jeda, Guillermo Garcia Ponce and Enrique A ristiguieta 
Gramko, were arrested  by m ilitary police. The arrests were made as 
these  men departed a te lev is io n  studio where they had ju s t partic i­
pated in a live te le c a s t en titled , iron ically , "Opinion and Unity. " 
Before the m ilitary could a c t ,  the te lev ision  sta tion  immediately 
related  to  its  view ers w hat had transp ired . Thousands marched through 
the s tree ts  of C aracas, but there was no v io len ce . M eanwhile, a t 
M iraflores, Wolfgang Larrazabal was on the spo t. Apparently the 
armed forces ware preparing a coup aga inst the government, and the 
government's only counterw eight, the Patriotic Junta, had been 
immobiled by the m ilitary p o lic e . Democracy in  Venezuela was 
probably salvaged by the Admiral's next move. He named a committee 
composed of Rafael C aldera, Jovito V illalba, Eugenio Mendoza and 
Air Force Chief of S taff, General Josue Lopez Henriquez to  negotiate 
w ith C astro  Le^n. Then, the Government Junta and the entire cabinet 
{minus the M inister of D efense, of course) moved to Mount Avila to
239
confer under the protective shadow of navy sh ips commanded by the
71Provisional P resident's  brother, Admiral Carlos Larrazabal.
The negotiating committee made a profound im pression on 
General Castro Le6n. An admirer of Rafael Caldera and COPEI 
sym pathizer, the D efense M inister was disturbed to learn tha t the 
copeyano leader was deeply committed to  the Government Junta and 
its  dem ocratic progression. More disturbing, however, w as the 
revelation  of General L^pez Henriquez that C astro  Leon's own branch 
of the armed fo rces, the Air Force, would back the government. Con­
fused by ta lk s , the M inister of D efense, a t the request of the nego­
tia to rs , re leased  the apprehended leaders of the Patriotic Junta.
Once free, the Patriotic Junta immediately issu ed  the ca ll for demon­
stra tions in support of the government and for a  general strike between 
11 A .M . and 6 P .M . on the following day.7^
Concerning th is  ep isode, a Venezuelan editor made the following 
remark: "The events of July 22 and 23 may have more significance than 
those of January 23, for they have shown that the people are determined 
to live w ith democracy aga inst a l l  com ers. " On the morning of
7-1-Daily Tournal, July 23, 1958; La Religion, July 23, 1958;
El N acional, July 23, 1958; and "Showdown for Extrem ists, " Time 
LXXII (August 4, 1958), 27-28.
7^La Religion, July 23, 1958; Daily Tournal, July 24, 1958;
El N acional, July 23, 1958; and Alba, H istoria del Movimiento 
Qbrero. 408.
73P a ily  Tournal, July 24, 1958.
W ednesday, July 23, 1958, over 20,000 c itizens dem onstrated through­
out the cap ita l c ity . At 11 A .M ., workers walked off their jo b s. 
Accompanying th is general strike was a mass "lockout" staged by the 
Venezuela Federation of Chambers of Commerce. Venezuela came to 
a s ta n d s till. By la te  afternoon, the ranks of the demonstrators, sw elled 
by striking w orkers, numbered over 100,000 m achete-carrying, p ipe- 
sw inging, placard-w aving V enezuelans. The most frequently heard 
shouts were "down with Castro Leon" and "out with the dirty m ilita ris t. " 
On the balcony of the p residentia l p a lace , overlooking the crowd, was 
a group of men symbolic of c iv ilian  unity: Wolfgang Larrazabal, Jovito 
V illalba, Romulo Betancourt, Rafael C aldera, Dr. Antonio Requena, 
Fabricio Ojeda and Gustavo M achado (chairman of the PCV). Each 
addressed  the cheering crowd. From Patriotic Junta President Requena, 
the people learned tha t sim ilar pro-government dem onstrations v/ere 
sim ultaneously occurring in M aracaibo, Valencia, Lara, Carabobo,
Puerto C abello , and other c i tie s . Near dusk, the crowd heard an 
obviously p leased  provisional president announce the resignation and 
departure from Venezuela of General Jesus Maria Castro L e o n .^
^E 1  U niversal, July 24, 1958; La Religion, July 24, 1958; Daily 
Tournal, July 25, 1958; El N acional, July 24, 1958; "Showdown for 
Extrem ists,"  27-28; Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, 149; 
and Porter and Alexander, Struggle for Democracy, 121-122. .
Granting tha t the July confrontation between the M inister of 
Defense and the. Government Junta had weighty, intim ations for 
Venezuelan c iv ilian  power, its  most meaningful im plication involved 
the armed forces. Unity seemed to  characterize the trad itionally  
disunited civ ilian  secto rs of soc ie ty , while d isunity  seemed to typify 
the country’s traditionally  unified m ilitary. C astro  Leon w as speaking 
for him self and the nation 's  most po litica lized  branch, the Army. Prior 
to  January, 1958, every m inister of defense and nearly every president, 
came from the Army, a fact never popular with the Navy. Since the 
Provisional President was a navy man, in stitu tiona l se lf- in te re s t 
demanded tha t the Navy back the Government Junta. H isto rically , or 
the three Venezuelan military branches, Army, Navy and Air Force, 
the la tte r had been the most ap o litic a l. As Castro Leon w as to d is ­
cover, h is po litica l philosophy w as not the po litica l philosophy of the 
typical Venezuelan airm an. General Josue Lopez H enriques, the Air 
Force Chief of Staff who threw the weight of h is service behind the 
government, became the new defense m inister. Like Castro Leon, he 
was d isliked  by Perez Jimenez— so much so  th a t he had not been in 
Venezuela since 1954. Unlike Castro Le^n, however, L^pez Henriquez 
was personable and easy-going; but, above a l l ,  he adhered to a position 
on the role of the Venezuelan m ilitary not unlike the country 's po litica l
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l e a d e r s .^  Reinstituting the te lev ision  program "Venezuela Know Your
Armed F o rces ,"  cancelled  by the former M inister of D efense, L6pez
Henriquez expressed his view as  follows:
These norms (of professionalization) do not impose indiffer­
ence or d is in te res t. Im pose, y e s , an attitude of po litical 
neu tra lity  and absten tion  from debate and partisan  p o litics .
For those of us who have taken charge of retaining and main­
taining the necessary  instrum ents for the defense of the father­
land and its  in s titu tio n s , we cannot, without excluding our 
authority , resolve feuds between different po litica l ideologies 
or d ic ta te  solutions to  problems th a t should only be se ttled  by 
the w ill of the people freely ex p ressed . . . . Therefore, the 
humble glory of serv ice is  the reward of the s o l d i e r .  76
Regarding strength , the chief legacy of July 23, 1958, was po litica l
cognizance . In July, far more than in January, Venezuelans were aware
of the power struggles taking p lace. Unlike January, where so many
facts were unknown and atten tion  was focused  on the hated New
N ational Id ea l, July presented  a clear ca se  of m ilitarism  versus c iv ilian -
ism . The motives of the Navy and the Air Force m attered little  to  the
nation 's m ultitudes. Once again they dem onstrated the ir w illingness to
pay w hatever price necessary  in  order to  prevent a return to m ilitarism
75 “Nuevo Titular de la D efensa, 1 Revista de las Fuerzas Aereas 
no. 10 {Abril-Mayo-Junio, 1958), 4-5; "Nuevo Titular de la D efensa, 
General de Brigada Josue Vicente Lopez H enriquez, “ Fuerzas Armadas 
de Venezuela: Orqano del M inisterio de la Defensa no. 146 y 145 
(Agosto-Septiembre, 1958), 2-3; El N acional, January 31, 1958; and 
Daily Tournal, July 25, 1958.
7 R / /Introduccion a la Conferencia d e l General Josue Lopez Henriquez
en e l Programa 'Venezuela C onoceatusFuerzas A r m a d a s , Revista de
las Fuerzas Aereas no. 10 (Abril-May o-Jun io , 1951.), 8 .
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and its  consequent tyranny. Also important was the fact that next to
m anifesting studen ts , workers and po liticans, were doctors, law yers,
engineers, businessm en, pharm acists, teachers and housew ives—
participants from the most prominent occupational groups. In January
these sectors contributed written denunciations and a moral commitment
77to  c iv ilian  government; in July they offered them selves.
There was to  be one more attem pt to  return Venezuela to  m ilitar­
ism during 1958. From the standpoint of time, it  w as a brief episode; 
from the standpoint of support, it  w as a very feeb le  effort. For the 
Patriotic Junta and the country 's po litica l p artie s , September, 1958, 
w as a month of po litica l in d e c is iv en ess . Interparty ta lk s had not 
resolved the v iab ility  issue of a unity  candidate, and many observers 
were predicting a breakdown in negotiations and subsequent deviation 
from the atm osphere of po litical concilia tion . On August 21, two 
exiled Army officers, Lieutenant Colonel Juan de Dios Moncada and 
Lieutenant Colonel Jose Ely M endoza, entered Venezuela illega lly  for
A partial l is t  of organizations offering th e ir  verbal and per­
sonal commitment to  support the Government Junta was printed in 
El N acional, July 23, 1958:
Venezuelan A ssociation of U niversity Professors 
A ssociation of Venezuelan W riters 
Venezuelan M edical A ssociation 
Venezuelan Engineering A ssociation 
Venezuelan Bar A ssociation
Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce 
Venezuelan Pharmaceutical A ssociation 
Venezuelan Federation of Teachers
the purpose of overthrowing the government, and reestab lish ing  military 
ru le. The Lieutenant Colonels recruited  a few comrades to  their cau se , 
but remained hidden un til the f irs t week in September. Endeavoring 
to take advantage of apparent momentary civ ilian  d isun ity , a t 3 A .M . 
on the morning of Sunday, September 7, 1958, a sm all group of officers 
under Dios Moncada entered M ilitary Police headquarters in C aracas 
and assum ed control. The officer of the day, Major Pedro Diaz Paredes, 
who refused to  join the rebellion , w as a rrested . Sim ultaneously, 
Mendoza secured entrance into the ministry of defense. Major Alberto 
Nunez S a la s , commander of the C aracas garrison a t the m inistry, was 
a lso  arrested  because he refused to  co llaborate . By 5 A .M . Lieutenant 
Colonel Dios Moncada had fled to the M exican em bassy for refuge, 
Lieutenant Colonel Mendoza was in  the m ilitary police prison, Majors 
Diaz Paredes and Nunez Salas were freed; and , by 6:30 A .M ., the 
la tte r two were addressing  gathering crowds from the balcony of 
M iraflores. W ithin th ree hours, the entire m ilitary a sp ec t of th is 
revolt had been crushed by loyal detachm ents. 78
In the s tr ic te s t se n se , th is  confrontation was not between m ili­
ta ris ts  and c iv ilia n s . It was more of a  c lash  between loyal and sub­
versive officers. N everthe less, c iv ilians were determined to  voice
78,1 E ditorial, 1 Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela: Organo del 
M inisterio de la D efensa no. 153 (Diciembre, 1958), 2; and Daily 
Journal, September 8 , 1958.
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concern. Crowds demanded that the military police re lease  Mendoza 
for lynching. When the MP's re fu sed , the mob, laboring under the 
illu sion  tha t the M ilitary Police was an invention of Marcos P^rez 
Jim enez, besieged its  headquarters in an effort to  abolish  the in s t i­
tution , as they had the N ational Security . M ilitary po lice , after a 
brief battle caused  mostly by confusion, gave up the b u ild in g .^  By 
mid-morning calm had been restored  by a p ress-rad io -te lev is io n  com­
m ittee appointed to inform the public of events and to  assu re  them that 
civ ilian  democracy ruled V enezuela. Heading the committee were 
Fabricio Ojeda and Guillermo Garcia Ponce. These crowds were not 
organized dem onstrations. The Patrio tic Junta did not control th is 
s itua tion , simply because developments occurred too sw iftly . How­
ever, to sa tia te  c iv ilian  m ilitancy and reaffirm civ ilian  support of the 
government, the Patriotic Junta, on Sunday afternoon, called  for a 
general strike on the following day . On Monday, September 8 ,
Venezuela w as paralyzed. The m ilitary was once again made aware 
of c iv ilian  power and unity . ^0
■^Military Police headquarters is  located next door to M iraflores 
Palace in C aracas . When military policemen fired over the heads of 
rio te rs , palace guards, uninformed of exactly what was taking place 
and believing M iraflores was under a ttack , returned the fire . Twelve 
c iv ilian s, two palace guards (Marines) and four MPs were k illed . Over 
100 were wounded. Daily Journal, S ep tem bers, 1958.
8^DaHy journal, September 7, 1958. It is significant that 
V enezuela's university  population was not involved in th is  September 
a ffa ir. All un iversities were closed  for vacations. The demonstrating 
crowds ware composed mostly of workers and middle c la ss  e lem en ts. 
W ashington, "Student Politics in Latin America, “ 471. . .
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The events of September a lso  evidenced further splits within the 
armed fo rces. When given an opportunity to reb e l, the majority ox 
Venezuelan Army officers stood s tead fastly  on the side of the Govern­
ment Junta. The m ilitary service branch th a t provided Venezuela with 
the Tachira dynasty  sid ed , a t le a s t partia lly , w ith a government com­
mitted to civ ilian  control. For the future of m ilitarism  in Venezuela, 
th is  developm ent, already m anifested by the Navy and Air Force, is 
of key im portance. A change took p lace in  the thinking of many m ili­
tary o fficers. By the end of 1958, the armed forces of Venezuela were 
undergoing a process of depo liticalization  tha t had its  roots in  the 
events of th a t same year.
One factor which helps explain th is  transform ation is  the legacy 
of the New N ational Ideal and its  detrim ental im pact upon the pride of 
individual o ffice rs . Perez Jimenez w as an officer and his every ac t 
reflected  upon the integrity  of the m ilitary . The armed forces were as 
much to  blame for the im m oralities, in ju s tices  and corruption of the 
Perez Jimenez regim e, a s  was Lareano Vallenilla Lanz or Pedro Estrada. 
Once the dictatorship  w as overthrown and i ts  m alefic deeds began 
receiving wide publicity , individual officers were em barrassed to  wear 
uniforms in public. I t w as trad itional in Venezuela for officers to wear 
fully decorated dress uniforms to church on Sunday, but during 1958 most 
officers wore c iv ilian  clo thes ax ih ass  . N ational military cem eteries and 
■public edifices dedicated to  past military heroes were dcsecreated .by civilians
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dem onstrating their d isgust for anything connected with the country 's 
armed in s titu tio n s . Many distinguished c iv ilia n s , such as professor 
Humberto Cuenca, engineer Alejandro Garcia Maldonaldo and po litical 
leader Rafael C aldera , men held in  high esteem  by military officers, 
authored a rtic les  frankly informing the armed forces tha t they had no 
business in p o litic s . D efense M inister Castro Leon continually 
declared to reporters th a t the ac tiv ities  of Perez Jimenez in  no way 
dim inished the pub lic 's  respect for military officers; but everyone,
particularly  the officers them selves, knew that the opposite was
11 81 really  the c a se .
However, even C astro Leon's pride was forced to compromise.
For the firs t time in  the history of the Venezuelan armed fo rces, the 
military fe lt it  n ecessa ry  to practice public relations in the hope of 
improving its  im age. The te lev ision  program, "Venezuela Know Your 
Armed Forces, " as designed by the M inister of D efense, Jesus Maria 
Castro Leon, w as to perform this function. There were five of these 
bi-m onthly te le c a s ts .  Instead  of accom plishing the ir purpose, how­
ever, they only served to augment c iv ilian  d is tru st of the m ilitary.
^ E 1  N acional, February I ,  1958, May 18, 1958, May 19, 1958, 
March 4 , 1958, July 27, 1958; La Religion, July 15, 1958; and 
Humberto Cuenca, "El Control C ivil de las Fuerzas Armadas, " La 
Tusticia; Re v ista  de la  Universidad de Zulia XXXIX (August, 1958),
41-47.
243
As previously d isc u sse d , the firs t address, delivered by C astro Leon, 
drew immediate civ ilian  d isapproval. The succeeding four programs, 
respectively  delivered by the Joint Chief of Staff, the Army Chief of 
Staff, the Navy Chief of Staff, and the Air Force Chief of S taff, might 
have served to  m itigate the D efense M in ister's  rather tough position, 
but they did no t. In stead , they became lectures in military h isto ry .
Each speaker gave a  h isto rica l descrip tion of the founding of his 
respective branch and its  many great services to  the n a tio n . ^2 At a 
time when Venezuelans were reading about the numerous im proprieties 
of General Perez Jim enez, many c itizen s fe lt th e se  laudatory orations 
added in su lt to injury. Under the leadership of General C astro Leon, 
the armed forces failed  to improve the ir im age.
It was not until the resignation  of Castro Leon as M inister of 
Defense and the appointment of h is replacem ent, General Josue 
Lopez H enriquez, tha t c iv ilian-m ilitary  relations in Venezuela improved. 
As previously shown, Lopez H enriquez's notions concerning the role of 
the m ilitary in national life were markedly different from those of his
^“Coronel Jesus Manuel Perez M orales, "Venezuela, Conoce a 
tus Fuerzas Arm adas," Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas: Orqano del 
M inisterio de la Defensa no. 141 y 142 (M arzo-Abril, 1958), 14-15; 
"Introducci6n a la Conferencia del General Josue L6pez Henriquez en 
e l Programa, 'Venezuela Conoce a tus Fuerzas Armadas, Revista de 
las Fuerzas Aereas no. 10 (Abril-M ayo-Junio, 1958), 7-3; and La 
Religion, June 1, 1958.
249 .
predecesso r. The new M inister of Defense allowed for more branch 
independence by decentralizing many areas of authority previously 
handled by the defense m inistry. He encouraged creativ ity  and 
inventiveness within the m ilitary, always em phasizing service to  the
i
nation. A lso, he sought to "broaden the culture of the professional 
so ldier, for the broader and more varied his in te llec tu a l preoccupation,
O O
the better he w ill be able to serve his profession.
The previously mentioned de po liticalization  of the Venezuelan 
military w hich took place during the la s t  s ix  months of 1958 can be 
partially explained by the reforms in stitu ted  by the new M inister of 
D efense. These reforms allowed for greater se lf-ex p ressio n  w ithin the 
armed fo rc e s . An excellen t source by which to measure the extent of 
th is transform ation w ithin the m ilitary is  the service journals published 
by the M inistry of Defense and the various branches of the Venezuelan 
armed fo rces. These journals, Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela (M inistry 
of D efense), Re v ista  de las Fuerzas Aereas (Air Force), Revista del 
Ejercito (Army), Revista de la Escuela Naval de Venezuela (Navy),
Guardia N acional (National Guard) and Siempre Firmes (M ilitary Academy), 
are issued  a t highly irregular in te rv a ls , and , prior to 1958, contained 
'news of m ilitary ev en ts , techn ical articles'O n military science and 
h istorical e ssay s  on numerous battles or prominent m ilitary commanders.
"Conferencia del General Josue. Lopez H enriquez, " 8 .
t
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W ithin the Venezuelan armed fo rc e s , these journals perform a v ita l 
function. The concepts of history , duty and purpose of most o fficers , 
and particularly these young o fficers, are formed from reading these  
jou rnals . The o ldest and best es tab lish ed  of th ese  publications, Fuerzas 
Armadas de V enezuela, is  assem bled by the s ta ff  of the M inister 
of D efen se . With the exception of the la tte r, during the f irs t half of 
1958, few of these m agazines appeared; and th o se  tha t did p ers is ted  
in  the ir trad itionalist outlook.
Following the appointment of Josue Lopez Henriquez a s  M inister 
of D efense , there ensued a shuffling of military commands. Officers 
holding to democratic concepts and advocating ap o litica l comportment 
for the armed forces were appointed to  in fluen tial p o sitio n s . These 
more progressive commanders, eager to transm it ideas of the political 
modernization process taking place in  their country, demanded changes 
in  the publications under the ir au thority . The pace was se t from the top. 
The influential, supra-serv ice Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela began 
publishing artic les dealing  with the role of the m ilitary in national l if e . 
Officers known for th e ir in te llec tu a l opposition to m ilitarism , a s  well 
as for their devotion to  duty and country, were requested to contribute 
a r tic le s  defining the role of the armed forces v is -a -v is  p o litic s . 
Reflecting their au thor's view s, th ese  a r tic le s , in  the succinct words 
of Colonel Martin Garcia Villas m il, repeatedly em phasized tha t 
"individually, partially  or co llectively  the armed forces must not ac t
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in in ternal or external p o litic s , but only as provided by the constitu tion  
and national law s. "8 - in  the la tte r  half of 1958, Fuerzas Armadas a lso  
began publishing a r tic le s  by prominent c iv ilian s , a practice without 
precedent. The speeches of Alberto Lleras Camargo, the highly 
respected  former civ ilian  president of the Republic of Colombia, were 
given considerable a tten tion . A ty p ica l Lleras Camargo statem ent read, 
"Politics is  an art of controversy by ex ce llen ce . The M ilitary of d is ­
cipline . . . .  M aintaining them ^/military/" away from public deliberation
OC
is not an obstacle to  the constitu tion , but a n ecess ity  for its  function. 
Finally, afte r the p residen tia l e lec tions of December 7 , 1958, many 
speeches and pronouncements of P resid en t-e lec t Romulo Betancourt 
were published in Fuerzas’Armadas . U tterances of the Democratic 
Action leader tha t had drawn m ilitary intervention in 1948 were now
O C
being printed in the nation 's  foremost m ilitary journal.
^^Coronel Martin Garcia V illasm il, "El M ilitar y la P o litica , " 
Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela: Qrqano del M inisterio  de la D efensa 
no. 150 (Diciembre, 1958), 8 . Other a rtic le s  by m ilitary officers 
advocating a sim ilar position are Lieutenant Gonzalo Borges Ramos, 
"Las Fuerzas Armadas Contribuyen a l Progresso N acional" Fuerzas 
Armadas de Venezuela: Qrqano del M inisterio de la D efensa no. 146 
y 147 (Agosto-Septiembre, 1958), 4-5; and Rogelio Royas M edina, 
"Algunos O bjectivos de las FF. A A .," Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela: 
Qrqano del M inisterio de la  D efensa no. 150 (Diciembre, 1958), 9 -11 ,
Q C /
Alberto Lleras Camargo, "El E jercito , una Institucion  
Republicana, " Fuerzas Armadas de V enezuela: Qrqano del M inisterio 
de la Defensa no. 150 (Diciembre, 1958), 79.
^ " E d ito r ia l, "■ Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela: Qrqano de la 
M inisterio de la D efensa no. 150 (Diciembre, 1958), 2 .
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The service journals d istributed by the individual branches of the 
Venezuelan armed forces followed the example s e t by Fuerzas 
Armadas. ® ̂  Surprisingly, i t  was the Army publication , R evista del 
E iercito, tha t dem onstrated the  most change. Both in  its  ed ito ria ls  and 
in its  a r tic le s , th is  magazine ca lled  for the individual military officer 
to exerc ise ap o litica l comportment.®® Also important for the future of 
m ilitarism  was the position taken bv ’Siempre Firm es, the journal of 
the M ilitary Academy of V enezuela. Every future Venezuelan m ilitary 
officer would be trained  a t th is  Academy; the ideas th a t he would be 
exposed to as a  cad e t would have some bearing on h is thinking as an 
officer. The m agazine published by the M ilitary Academy of Venezuela
f
emulated the trend se t by the other military jou rnals . Cadets could not 
help but be influenced by a rtic le s  which contained such typ ical passages 
as the following:
The entrance of military officers in partisan  po litics is  highly
dangerous and bad for both the in stitu tion  and the individual.
It resu lts in a lo ss  of p restige and resp ec t for the m ilitary in
o 7
"Editorial, " Revista de la s  Fuerzas Aereas no . 12 (O ctubre- 
N oviem bre-Diciem bre, 1958)', 7 -15 .
®®Capitain Luis E. H enriquez, " i  Que S ignifies Pertenecer a 
la Institucion  Armada? " Revista del Eiercito: Orcano de la Comandancia 
General del E jercito no . 4 (Septiem bre-O ctubre, 1958), 3-8; and 
“E d ito ria l,1 Re v is ta  del E jercito: Organo de la Comandancia General 
del Eiercito no. 3 , 4 and 5 (Julio-D iciem bre, 1958), i .
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the eyes of the p u b lic . The ac ts  and thoughts of m isled officers
alw ays reflect on the in s titu tio n . 89I
This kind of indoctrination , which s tre s se s  the belief tha t the Venezuelan 
armed forces are under the constitu tion  and the law rather than above i t , 
continued into 1959 and rem ains presen t today.
Thus far, two explanations have been offered in an attem pt to 
justify  the changes in the Venezuelan military m entality which took 
place in  the la tte r half of 1958. The firs t dea lt with the profound 
impact on the country 's armed forces made by the irregularities of the 
New N ational Ideal. The second dea lt with the apolitical- example se t 
by the M inister of D efense, G eneral Josue L&pez Henriquez,and his 
ranking subord inates. A concluding explanation, external to the armed 
forces and probably the most im portant, was the deep im pression 
created in  the minds of m ilitary officers by the conduct of the 
Patriotic Junta, in particu lar, and the country 's c iv ilian s, in general.
In practically  every volume w ritten on the po litica l nature of the 
Latin American m ilitary, officers are described as  viewing their country 's 
c iv ilian  leaders as inep t and v ac illa tin g . The m ilitary 's concern for 
the national in te rest, alw ays being unnecessarily  compromised by 
civ ilian  p o litic ian s , is  alw ays lis ted  by officers a s  a primary motive
^ Q o ro n e l Enrique C . Valladores L ., :"Los M ilitares y la Po litica, " 
Siempre Firmes: Qrqano Cultural de la Escuela M ilitar de Venezuela 
no. 62-63 (Julio-O ctubre, 1958), 50.
for po litica l in te rv e n tio n .^  The events of January 23, reinforced by 
the events of July 23, clearly  dem onstrated to  the Venezuelan armed 
forces th a t the nation 's  c itizens were anything but inept and v a c illa t­
ing. Led by the Patriotic Junta, V enezuela's c iv ilians dem onstrated 
d isc ip lin e , courage and organization—three a ttribu tes usually  asso c ia ted  
with the m ilitary . The civ ilian  populace proved w illing to  follow the 
commands of recognized lead ers . By fighting with sticks and stones 
aga inst police equipped with’ p is to ls , rifles and machine guns, they 
proved w illing to pay w hatever price n ecessary  for dem ocracy. Finally, 
via the Patrio tic  Junta and its  numerous su b sid ia rie s , V enezuela's 
civ ilians dem onstrated to  the m ilitary the ex istence of a h ierarch ical 
organization sim ilar to th e ir own. Thus, V enezuela's c itizens won the 
respect of the nation 's  armed fo rces. In the words of one officer 
(Colonel Jose Leon Rangel), stunned by what he had w itnessed  on 
January 23, "I sha ll never forget the numerous men and women, the old 
people a s  w ell as  the young people who lo s t their lives for the ir country. 
They were indifferent to  sa c rif ic e . "9 ^
q n
Three of many works th a t explain th is  problem are Finer, The 
Man on H orseback, 6; N eedier, Anatomy of a Coup d 'e ta t , 40; and 
Lieuwen, The U .S . and the Challenge to  Security , 69.
•̂*•£1 U niversal, January 24, 1958.
CHAPTER VII
A SUMMARY
The l a s t  m ee ting  of th e  P a trio tic  Jun ta  took  p lace  in  N ovem ber, 
1958,. In th e  w ords of F a th er Je su s  H ernandez  C h a p e llin , "The work 
of th e  Jun ta  w as c o m p le te , th e re  w as no lo n g er any need  for i t .
I t  may seem  s tra n g e  th a t  th e  P a trio tic  Ju n ta , an  o rg an iz a tio n  b o astin g  
num erous a c c o m p lish m e n ts , should  su d d en ly  c e a s e  o p e ra tio n s . Yet, 
from i ts  in c e p tio n , th e  P a tr io tic  Junta w as d e s tin e d  to  an  ephem era l 
e x is te n c e . Even i ts  nam e co n n o tes  t r a n s ie n c e ,  for ju n ta , in  th e  Latin 
Am erica c o n te x t of th e  w o rd , t r a n s la te s  a s 'a  com m ittee or group of a 
tem porary  n a tu re . The P a tr io tic  Junta w a s  s ire d  by V e n e z u e la 's  
p o lit ic a l  p a r t ie s .  I t  w as c re a te d  to  perform  a  sp e c if ic a lly  n e g a tiv e  
fu n c tio n —to  overthrow  th e  m ilita ry  d ic ta to r s h ip . The Jun ta  a d v o ca te d  
p o s itiv e  p r a c t ic e s ,  su c h  a s  p o lit ic a l freedom , h o n e s t e le c tio n s  and 
re s p e c t  for th e  w ish e s  of th e  e le c to ra te ,  bu t only b e c a u se  th e  im p le­
m en ta tion  of th e s e  p ra c tic e s  m eant a n  end  to  th e  d ic ta to rsh ip . W hen 
th e  Jun ta  a c c o m p lish e d  i t s  t a s k ,  how ever, prudence d ic ta te d  th a t  i ts  
l ife  be g ran ted  a  tem porary  e x te n s io n . Two rea so n s  ju s t if ie d  th is  
developm ent: f i r s t ,  th e  im m ense po p u larity  and  p re s tig e  o f the
^In terv iew  w ith  F a th er Je su s  H ernandez  C h a p e llin , A u g u st, 1S57.
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P a tr io tic  Jun ta  m ade i t  th e  only  c iv i l ia n  e n ti ty  pow erfu l enough  to
s u f f ic ie n tly  p re s su re  th e  p ro v is io n a l governm ent in to  in it ia t in g
d em o cra tic  reform ; a n d , s e c o n d , once  th e  p ro v is io n a l governm ent
com m itted  i t s e l f  to  d e m o c ra tic  re fo rm , th e  pow er o f th e  Jun ta  w as
n e ed e d  to  m ain ta in  th e  governm ent a g a in s t  c e r ta in  e le m e n ts  in  th e
arm ed fo rc e s  d e s ir in g  a  re tu rn  to  m ili ta r ism .
The V en ezu e lan  arm ed f o rc e s ,  for th e  sa k e  of p u b lic  o rd e r , and
in d iv id u a l s e c u r i ty ,  w ere  fo rced  to  a c t  a g a in s t  th e  reg im e o f M arcos
Peirez J im en e z . A new  m ilita ry  governm en t w as e s ta b l is h e d ,  one
m ore h o n e s t  and  e n lig h te n e d  th a n  i t s  p re d e c e s s o r ;  b u t e v e n  h o n e s t
a n d  e n lig h te n e d  to ta l i ta r ia n is m  h a s  l i t t le  room fo r p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s .
In  o rder to  w in  th e  p o l i t ic a l  reform s n e c e s s a ry  for party  fu n c t io n a l iz a -
t io n ,  i t  becam e n e c e s s a r y  to  e x e r t  p re s s u re  upon th e  new  m ilita ry
g o v ern m en t. To e x e r t  th is  p r e s s u re ,  V e n e z u e la 's  p o l i t ic a l  p a r tie s
*
tu rn ed  to  th e  m ost e f fe c t iv e  in s tru m e n t for p o l i t ic a l  a c tio n  a t  th e ir  
d is p o s a l ,  th e  P a tr io tic  Ju n ta . The P a tr io tic  Jun ta  w as th e  on ly  
o rg a n iz a tio n  c a p a b le  of en g en d e rin g  m ass  c iv i l ia n  d e m o n s tra tio n s— 
p e a c e fu l i f  d e s i r a b le ,  v io le n t  i f  n e c e s s a r y — to  b a ck  i t s  d e m a n d s .
U nder th e  le a d e rs h ip  of th e  P a tr io tic  J u n ta , th e  m ilita n t c iv i l ia n s  
of V enezuela  w on th e  n e c e s s a ry  p o li t ic a l  re fo rm s. W ith  th e  p a s s in g  
of t im e , bo th  th e  p ro v is io n a l governm ent an d  i t s  com m ittm ent to  
p o l i t ic a l  reform  cam e u n d er a t ta c k  from fa r  r ig h t e le m e n ts  w ith in  th e  
m ilita ry . U nder th e s e  c irc u m s ta n c e s , th e  P a tr io tic  Jun ta  an d  i t s
257
a b ili ty  to  m ob ilize  th e  m a sse s  w ere  u ti l iz e d  by th e  c o u n try 's  p o lit ic a l  
p a rtie s  to  defend  and  s u s ta in  th e  p ro v is io n a l governm ent. P h y s ic a l 
pow er in  th e  form of a m ilita ry  coup w as m et by p h y s ic a l pow er in  the 
form of te n s  of th o u sa n d s  of pa rad in g  c iv il ia n s  w illin g  and  a b le  to  
confront th o se  e lem en ts  w ith in  th e  arm ed fo rce s  in te n t  upon ru ling  
V enezuela . A s u c c e s s fu l  golpe de e s ta d o  cou ld  hav e  ta k e n  p lace  in  
V enezuela in  1958, bu t i t  w ould hav e  c o s t  th o u sa n d s  of l iv e s .  The 
arm ed fo rces  w ere  no t w illin g  to  ta k e  th e  r i s k ,  th e  n a tio n 's  c iv il ia n s  
w e re .
By N ovem ber, 1958 , th e  P a tr io tic  Jun ta  had o u tliv ed  i t s  u s e fu l­
n e s s .  Follow ing th e  a ttem p ted  coup of S ep tem ber 7 , w h ich  dem on­
s tra te d  th e  p rep o n d e ran ces  of m ilita ry  o ffice rs  lo y a l to  th e  governm ent 
over th o se  ad v o ca tin g  governm ent by th e  arm ed fo r c e s , th e  th re a t o f a  
re tu rn  to  m ilita rism  a p p ea re d  n e g lig ib le . The p ro v is io n a l governm ent 
d e liv e red  on i t s  p rom ises of open p o lit ic a l  cam paigns an d  free  e le c ­
t io n s , and p a r t is a n  a c t iv i ty  rea ch e d  i t s  1953 peak  a s  D ecem ber 7, 
th e  d a te  of n a tio n a l e lec tio n s,ap p ro ach ed . The c o u n try 's  p o l it ic a l  p a rtie s  
d id  not re lin q u ish  th e ir  t r a d i t io n s , o rg an iz a tio n s  and  program s by 
becom ing m em bers of th e  P a tr io tic  Jun ta ; ra th e r , by a c c e p tin g  m em ber­
sh ip  in  th is  tem porary  body , th ey  in su re d  the  co n tin u ed  su rv iv a l, grow th 
and  developm en t of th e s e  p a r tis a n  c h a ra c te r is t ic s .
The P a tr io tic  Jun ta  w as th e  sym bol of a reform  m ovem ent w hich  
had i ts  ro o ts  in  V enezuelan  h is to ry . The s tru g g le  of 1958 re p re se n ts
the  m ost im portan t p h ase  of a s e r ie s  o f p h a se s  in  th e  (developm ent of 
V e n ez u e la 's  p o lit ic a l  c u ltu re . From th e ir  bou t w ith  Juan V incente 
Go'mez, th e  s tu d e n ts  of 1928 (who em erged a s  th e  c o u n try 's  key  
p o lit ic a l  le a d e rs  th ir ty  y e a rs  la te r) w itn e s se d  th e  p o s s ib i l i t ie s  offered  
by a u n iv e rs ity  com m unity a s  an  e ffe c tiv e  fig h tin g  fo rce ; but th e y  a ls o  
d isc o v e re d  th a t  s tu d e n ts  a lo n e  w ere w oefu lly  in a d e q u a te  in  to pp ling  
an e n tre n ch e d  m ilita ry  d ic ta to rs h ip . The re p a tr ia te d  p o lit ic ia n s  of 
1936-1937 d isc o v e re d  th a t  once c o n c e s s io n s  w ere  g ran ted  by a 
m ilita ry  governm ent, on ly  c o n s ta n t  v ig ile n c e  cou ld  in su re  th e  p e r­
m anence of th e s e  c o n c e s s io n s .  In d e e d , of V e n e z u e la 's  th re e  b rie f  
s tru g g le s  fo r re p re se n ta tiv e  governm ent prio r to  th e  c re a tio n  of th e  
P a tr io tic  Ju n ta , i t  w as th e  m ach in a tio n s  of 1936-1937  w h ich  m ost 
n early  p a ra l le ls  th e  d ev e lo p m en ts  of 1957-1958 . The a tm o sp h ere  in  
V enezuela  fo llow ing th e  o u s te r  of P erez  Jim enez h ad  a  s tr ik in g  
re sem b lan c e  to  V enezuela  a f te r  th e  d e a th  of Go'mez. -More rem arkab le  
w as th e  s im ila rity  in  o rg a n iz a tio n  b e tw een  th e  P a tr io tic  Junta o f 1957- 
1958, and  i t s  th ree  1936-1937  co u n te rp arts : th e  V enezuelan  O rg a n iz a ­
tio n  (ORVE), th e  N a tio n a l D em ocratic  Party  (PDN) and  th e  A pril B lock. 
All four g roups w ere com posed  of in d iv id u a ls  e sp o u s in g  v a rio u s p o li­
t ic a l  id e o lo g ie s  and a p p ro a c h e s , and  a l l  four g roups a ttem p ted  to  u n ite  
the  c o u n try 's  v a rio u s c iv i l ia n  s e c to rs  beh ind  a d em o cra tic  reform  
m ovem ent in  o p p o sitio n  to  a  m ilita ry  b a se d  governm en t. The key 
le s s o n  a c q u ire d  from th e  1345-1948 tr ie n io  w as sim p le  b u t .v i ta . .
The p ro c e ss  of transform ing  V e n ez u e la 's  p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re  from one 
dom inated  by th e  m ilita ry  to  one dom inated  by th e  e le c to ra te  w ould 
not be e a s y .  W hen confron ting  th e  m ilita ry , th e  trium ph of any  fu ture  
reform m ovem ent w ould depend  h e a v ily  on  c iv i l ia n  un ity  p lus a w illin g ­
n e s s  to  m ake w h a tev e r s a c r if ic e  n e c e s s a ry  for i ts  s u c c e s s .  Knowledge 
of V enezuelan  h is to ry , and  p a rtic u la r ly  know ledge of h e r p a s t  e ffo rts  
a t  p o lit ic a l  reform , i s  in d is p e n s ib le  to  u n d e rs tan d in g  th e  s u c c e s s  of 
the  P a tr io tic  Junta in  1957 an d  1958. The Jun ta  lea rn ed  much from i ts  
p re d e c e s s o rs .  H isto ry  a ls o  re v e a ls  th e  in d ig e n o u sn e ss  .of V enezuelan  
p o lit ic a l  refo rm . T hese  reform  e p o c h s  w ere  dom inated  by V en ezu elan s 
ad ap tin g  th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  p h ilo so p h ie s  to  a  V enezuelan  p o lit ic a l  e n v iro n ­
m ent. V enezuelans a re  proud of th e  f a c t  th a t  th e ir  v e rs io n  of dem ocracy  
w as e s ta b l is h e d  by a  g ra s s ro o ts  m ovem ent w ith  co n trib u to rs  from 
n early  ev ery  s e c to r  of th e  n a t io n 's  s o c ie ty .  T his pride is  im portan t 
in  u n d e rs tan d in g  th e  s u c c e s s  of re p re s e n ta tiv e  governm ent in  V enezuela  
s in c e  1958.
The im p act of th e  P a trio tic  Jun ta  on th e  p o li t ic a l  cu ltu re  of 
V enezuela w as profound . I ts  work (w ith s ig n if ic a n t a s s i s ta n c e  from 
the  re sen tm en t d ire c te d  tow ard th e  New N a tio n a l Ideal) p rovided  a l l  
V enezuelans w ith  an  av en u e  of p o l i t ic a l  p a rtic ip a tio n  and  a s s o c ia t io n .  
D irec ted  by th e  P a tr io tic  Ju n ta , th is  m ass p o l i t ic a l  a c tiv ism  c re a te d  
p o litic a l a t t i tu d e s  th a t  tra n sc e n d e d  p a r t is a n , econom ic  and  so c ia l  
b a rr ie rs . S ince  1958, V enezuelan  p o lit ic s  h a s  no t been  th e  co n ce rn
of th e  m ilita ry  sp rin k led  w ith  o c c a s io n a l  in ro ad s by s tu d e n ts ,  p o l i t i ­
c ia n s  or o rg an ized  la b o r. T oday , p o lit ic s  is  th e  co n ce rn  of m ost 
V en ezu e lan s . C lo se ly  a l l ie d  to  th e  P a tr io tic  J u n ta 's  ro le in  s tim u ­
la tin g  V enezuelan  p o lit ic a l  c o n s c ie n c e n e s s  an d  p a rtic ip a tio n  w as i ts  
e ffo rts  a t  e s ta b lis h in g  p o li t ic a l  com ity . P o lit ic a l  to le ra n c e , coup led  
w ith  a  fundam en ta l t r u s t  for th o se  ho ld ing  oppo sin g  p o lit ic a l  id e a s  
w ere k e y s to n e s  in  the  p h ilo so p h y  of th e  P a tr io tic  Ju n ta . The in flu e n ce  
of th e  Junta w as su ch  th a t  th e s e  te n e ts  perm eated  v ir tu a lly  ev ery
i
p o lit ic a liz e d  e lem en t in  th e  co u n try . D ia logue  took  p la c e , th u s  
b e tte r  u n d e rs tan d in g  w as prom oted am ong th e  a d v o c a te s  of v a rio u s  
id e o lo g ie s . The o rig in s of th is  com ity  an d  i t s  un in te rru p ted  e x is te n c e  
s in c e  1958 i s  c ru c ia l to  u n d e rs tan d in g  th e  im portan t V enezuelan  ev en t 
of M arch 11, 1969— for th e  f i r s t  tim e in  th e  n a t io n 's  h is to ry , w ithou t 
rec o u rse  to  v io le n c e  or c iv i l  w a r, the  governm ent o f V enezuela w as 
tra n s fe rre d  from one incum ben t p o lit ic a l  p a rt to  th e  lo y a l o p p o s itio n .
The prim ary im pact o f the  P a trio tic  Junta in  th e  realm  of 
c iv il ia n -m ilita ry  re la tio n s  w as i t s  d isp ro v in g  th e  tra d itio n a l ou tlook  
of m ilita ry  o ff ic e rs  tow ard  c iv i l ia n s .  T his a tt i tu d e  held  th a t  c iv il ia n s  
were o p p o rtu n is tic  and  v a c i l la t in g .  .The P a tr io tic  Ju n ta  dem onstra ted  
to  m ilita ry  m en th a t  th e  v a lu e s  and s e lf -e s te e m  o f c iv il ia n s  d iffe red  
l i t t le  from th e ir  ow n. T his new a t t i tu d e ,  to g e th e r  w ith  m em ories of 
the  New N a tio n a l Id e a l , th e  a p o li t ic a l  com portm ent a d v o ca te d  by m ost 
o ffice rs  and  th e  e x c e lle n t perform ance o f the  c o u n try 's  c iv ilia n  p re s id e n ts
s in c e  195 8, a re  re a so n s  why one c an  be o p tim is tic  w ith  regard  to  the  
fu tu re  of dem ocracy  in  V en ezu ela . T rad itio n , how ever, is  d iff ic u lt 
to  overcom e, and governm ent by arm ed fo rces i s  the  dom inant p o litic a l 
tra d itio n  of V en ezu e la . Yet, for th e  l a s t  e le v e n  y e a rs  th e  Republic of 
V enezuela  h a s  b een  governed by c iv il ia n s  and  h as  m ade un p reced en ted  
s tr id e s  in  a l l  a re a s  of n a tio n a l l i f e .  S ince i t  is  no t th e  chore of the  
h is to r ia n  to  m ake p re d ic tio n s , but to  u n d e rs tan d  a n d , th e re b y , to  
e n lig h te n , th e  w rite r  w ill sim ply  s ta te  .that a  qolpe de e s ta d o  is  in eed  
a fu tu re  p o s s ib i l i ty  in  V enezuela , bu t a  very  rem ote o n e .
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